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THE VOICES OF AMERICA

By Henry M. Wriston

EVERYONE has heard of the Voice of America, but the use of the plural changes the entire train of thought. In any democratic nation there will always be at least two voices —the voice of the government and the voice of the opposition. This is so familiar a phenomenon in the free world that it must seem perfectly obvious. It is worthy of emphasis because it is often forgotten that it has always been so; we tend to regard the confusion of tongues as more characteristic of the current scene than of bygone times.

The reason is simple; history emphasizes what was done, and what was said by those who did it. It spends little time on the alternatives which were not acted upon or on the utterances of those who failed to achieve their purposes; the pages devoted to minority opinion—that which did not prevail—are relatively few. Yet when the actions were being considered and determined, contemporaries heard both sides. Not infrequently the side which prevailed did so by a narrow margin; often the opposition was more stridently vocal than those who won. But since history gives short shrift to arguments that failed, there is the natural illusion, common to each successive generation, that the current confusion of tongues is new in the land; in the days of our fathers there was no such cacophony of voices.

Every student of government is familiar with *The Federalist* papers, essays by Hamilton, Madison and Jay, arguing for the adoption of the Constitution. They have been collected, edited, and are constantly studied for the light they throw upon the meaning of the Constitution. Even the Supreme Court has many times referred to them in its interpretation of constitutional meanings.

But who now refers to "The New Roof" of Francis Hopkinson of Pennsylvania? Who remembers that Luther Martin of Mary-

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land called the Constitution a cup of poison offered to the states and said it forged chains for them? Who now reads Elbridge Gerry's "Observations on the New Constitution," Richard Henry Lee's "Observations of the System of Government proposed by the late Convention," James Winthrop's letters of "Agrippa," or Robert Yates' letters of "Sydney"? The papers written by opponents of the Constitution are seldom consulted save by historians with a highly specialized interest. In 1787 and 1788 the voices of opposition, of Patrick Henry and George Mason from Virginia and Governor Clinton from New York, were loud in the land. Opinion was bitterly divided. With failure, their arguments are relegated to obscurity. History attends upon success.

Men everywhere are familiar with the ringing words of Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence: "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." We know those words reflected a deep-felt faith; they were not the slick phrases of propaganda, since on an earlier occasion he had declared, "the God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." It was a lifelong theme. In the last letter he ever wrote he translated the majestic rhythm of the Declaration into the homely vernacular of the Virginia country gentleman: "The mass of mankind was not born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God."

These are the sentiments which history records. But how often is it recalled that it was said of this selfsame Jefferson that he was "the promoter of national disunion, national insignificance, public disorder and discredit," that he was the friend of anarchy, foe of public credit, enemy of the Constitution, incompetent in office, and a plagiarist? The militancy of his "atheism" was taken so seriously that, upon his election, some nervous people hid their Bibles.

We think of George Washington as the Father of his Country, whose prestige and integrity held together the Constitutional Convention, and who, as first President, took pains to establish precedents that have been authoritative ever since. Very few remember that it was a great patriot who wrote to Washington: "As to you, sir, treacherous in private friendship, and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide whether you

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are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you never had any."

We remember Lincoln as the savior of the Republic, whose eloquence once moved men as does that of Winston Churchill. The Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural are among the great state papers in American history. It was not a Southerner, but a member of his cabinet, who called him a "long armed baboon" and a "great hairy ape." It was a unionist, not a confederate, who wrote less than a year before the Gettysburg Address: "He seems to me to be fonder of details than of principles, of tithing the mint, anise, and cummin of patronage . . . than of the weightier matters of empire . . . he is an unutterable calamity to us where he is."

It is not necessary to multiply examples. Men in public life today are not subjected to anything like the personal vilification which once was common. Character assassination is at a low ebb. The current discord among the voices of America is the normal voice of democracy. We hammer out policy in debate which is sometimes calm, sober and logical, but sometimes strident, emotional and demagogic.

II

There is a second kind of discord in the voices of America. Like the first, it is not peculiar to this nation or to our own time. Lack of familiarity with the past is the only reason for treating it as a novelty. The authentic voice of leadership always speaks in terms of prophecy. It is not possible to rouse people to action or to make progress toward some great goal of political or social achievement by using dull and stodgy phrases. Often, however, when statesmen speak on behalf of great aims and high ideals, those hopes are treated as descriptions instead of objectives. That makes an obvious tension between word and act—hostile critics are certain to call it a breach.

Again Jefferson serves as an example. When he said that all men are created equal he was himself the possessor of slaves—human chattels. His beautiful home at Monticello had "ranges," partly underground, where they lived in quarters quite different from his own apartments. It was 87 years before the Emancipation Proclamation put an end to slavery. Even yet we have not learned fully to treat all men as equals.

Every eminent leader manifests to a greater or less degree this

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tension—this momentary incoherence—between word and deed. Surely it was true of Lincoln whose fundamental policy was enunciated in the Second Inaugural, of which the younger Charles Francis Adams said with justice, "This inaugural strikes me in its grand simplicity and directness as being for all time the historical keynote of this war." Yet, almost at once, his policy of "malice toward none" and "charity for all" was reversed by the "wavers of the bloody shirt" in his own party.

This same tension appeared in our time. Wilson was a voice of hope to Europe; he was greeted as the greatest moral force in the world. But he was unable in his own day to match deed with word.

These and other statesmen succeeded in that they seemed to fail; they were indeed true prophets, for time has vindicated the vital policies they advocated, and largely fulfilled the great promises they made. The incoherence between word and deed was remedied.

That is the nature of leadership—to establish goals, having faith that time will reverse momentary setbacks. But political opponents will surely draw attention to the disparity between word and deed, and deny its transience; they will almost always attribute the gap between prophecy and reality to sordid motives, or incapacity, or some even less worthy quality. To the admirers of the prophet abroad, who do not have the opportunity to see how well or ill his deeds match his words, the voice of opposition seems like the tongue of slander.

These two manifestations of disharmony are characteristic of all free nations. However, when by reason of size, wealth, strategic position or other spotlighting factor a nation is under world-wide scrutiny, the effect is greatly heightened. Names which in less conspicuous situations would make only local news are blazoned in headlines the world around. Charges and threats which would be lightly regarded in regions where the protagonists are well known seem much more serious where brief press dispatches give false weight to words drawn from longer context. Only conflict is news, and conflict in a nation with world-wide press services is world-wide news.

The United States has found itself, partly as a result of purposeful leadership and partly in consequence of the logic of events, in an almost uniquely conspicuous position. Therefore, everything that happens here gets disproportionate attention;

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this accentuates inconsistencies and incoherencies which pass with less notice when they occur in many other countries.

III

The kinds of multiplicity of voices so far noted are common to all free nations; they simply are highlighted in the United States. However, a third source of confusion abroad regarding what is said here arises out of our characteristic institutions. Certainly among the Great Powers, indeed among nearly all members of the United Nations, the form and theory of our government are unique.

It is a government of checks and balances—legislatively, the House and the Senate are checks upon each other; the presidential veto is a check upon both; and the judicial determination of constitutionality checks both the legislative and the executive. The legislative checks the executive, since it can define the powers of many executive officers, and through its hold on the purse can destroy executive functions by a process of fiscal starvation. The legislative also has a check upon the judiciary because, by legislation, it defines jurisdictions. The President has a check upon the judiciary in that he nominates the appointees thereto.

One of the profoundest beliefs of our forefathers was that as a government approached democracy it must set up barriers to hasty, ill-considered or arbitrary action lest it degenerate into mobocracy. Therefore, though they established each of the three branches with certain independent powers, duties and responsibilities, they also established strong checks and balances so that no one branch might become dominant because of its vigor in the face of the lethargy or inertia of the others. In fact, the checks and balances were so neatly contrived that it seemed likely that the machine could not run at all; only when parties came into being and became the energizing force was it possible to find any focus of responsibility. At best it is a soft focus!

Historically different departments of the government have been dominant at different periods. Certainly the Supreme Court in the days of John Marshall exercised a powerful influence; it has been said that he reshaped the government. In other times the Supreme Court has been a much less vital force. During the years when Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, Thomas Hart Benton were in the Senate their voices were more influential than those of some of the presidents.

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Two decades before the turn of the century the House of Representatives seemed so powerful and the chairmen of committees so dominant that a brilliant young scholar wrote a book called "Congressional Government." Its thesis was that Congress was "fast becoming the governing body of the nation," "the gist of all policy is decided by legislative, not executive will." "The business of the President . . . is usually not much above routine. Most of the time it is *mere* administration, mere obedience of directions from the masters of policy, the Standing Committees." The cabinet members "are not in fact the directors of the executive policy;" "all their duties look towards a strict obedience to Congress." He pictured the President relegated to a secondary position; he envisaged the Speaker of the House as the "most powerful functionary;" he and the chairmen of committees were on the way to constituting something like a parliamentary executive. The author was Woodrow Wilson.

When one reads that book today it seems at least as unreal as "Alice in Wonderland." With no change in the Constitution to account for it, there has been a revolutionary realignment of power in the Federal government. The stripping of authority from the Speaker, in the revolt against Joseph G. Cannon in 1910, and the emergence of strong presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, reinforced as they were by the position of wartime Commander-in-Chief, tended to put the legislature in the shade.

Both Wilson and Roosevelt ultimately faced congressional revolts designed to reëstablish legislative influence. President Eisenhower has a philosophy of government which makes him want to yield the point without a struggle; he feels that the division of powers is proper, that the Constitution means what it says, and that the President should not seek to be dominant over the legislative branch. But no President is likely to accede to the situation Wilson described.

As between the Senate and the House, circumstances have led to the voices of Senators being heard more often. The office of Speaker has never recovered its prestige; the size of the House has made unlimited debate impossible; it moves under rules so rigid as to amount almost to gag rule; the power of amendment and the scope of parliamentary tactics are closely trammeled. The Senate, on the other hand, still has virtually unlimited debate; its rules allow a maximum of opportunity for vocal

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pyrotechnics as well as much room for paliamentary manœuvre.

The Constitution gave the Senate an important responsibility in foreign affairs and the Senate has never been without full consciousness of its rôle. By one device or another it has often sought to expand its power in diplomatic matters. The Bricker Amendment is, among other things, one such. Every effort to make its weight felt more in external relations has given occasion for Senators to speak their minds with great freedom and with some color of authority.

Inasmuch as the President is elected for a fixed term, an adverse majority in either house does not affect his tenure of office. Senators, however, are elected for a longer term than the President; their own positions are often not adversely affected by a show of "independence." Furthermore, party discipline is enfeebled by the fact that Senators acquire chairmanships of committees by seniority rather than by reason of talent or political capacity or any other factor save survival in office. Consequently, they can speak their minds on the floor of the Senate, at press conferences and in speeches in a manner which may run entirely counter to the President's views. What they say might well, in nations with parliamentary government, be regarded as totally irresponsible; indeed it might bring down their own party government and force them to stand for reëlection themselves. No such results follow here. With our tradition of the separation of powers, and in the light of our historical developments, Senators are not only wholly within their rights; their tendency to sound off is taken as a normal part of the "enlightenment" of public opinion.

When Senators occupy powerful positions, such as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee or of the Judiciary Committee, they have added influence. If such men say sensational things, their voices will be heard not only in the states which they represent, not only in the United States for which they have responsibility, but around the world. This may give the appearance of divided counsels, or instability of policy, or incoherence in political strategy to a degree which is unwarranted by the facts.

Evidence that discordant voices do not mean incoherent acts is to be found in foreign policy. The great historical lines of our foreign policy have stood rather firm for long periods of time. Secretary of State Hull said correctly that policy attained "con-

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tinuity of basic objectives because it is rooted in the traditions and aspirations of our people." It has not remained completely unchanged, of course, but certainly it has not been lacking in coherence relative to the foreign policies of other nations.

In all the world there are few current foreign policies older than the Monroe Doctrine, or more consistently pursued. The word "consistent" must be understood in the context of relativity, for the status of Latin America has changed and the Monroe Doctrine has changed to meet the new situation. Moreover, different presidents have shown greater or less energy, more or less courage, keener or duller insights, in applying the principles of the Doctrine to specific cases where it was involved. Nonetheless the fact remains that the policy has stood for a century and a third.

Since the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, Canada has been regarded as within our defensive perimeter, though sometimes for reasons contrary to those of other times. When President Roosevelt gave assurance in 1938 that "the people of the United States will not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire," he was merely making explicit what had been implicit for over a century.

Since the diplomatic revolution of 1898, close association with Britain has been well maintained on the whole. The reason is simple: the interests of the United States are so extensive that we cannot permit any aggressor to dominate the Continent of Europe. In the twentieth century Britain has been the anchor nation in defense of that policy; we had, perforce, to associate ourselves with it.

Since the war the Marshall Plan and all the nexus of activities which have surrounded and followed it—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Mutual Security Agency, and now the Foreign Operations Administration—have been among the most consistent and coherent groups of policies in the world. This remains true without reference to party, to personal leadership, or to all the confusion of voices.

Beneath surface manifestations basic policy touching Asia has also been consistent. We long since determined that no aggressive power should dominate that Continent. The classic form of expressing the objective was embodied in two phrases, "the integrity of China" and "the Open Door," one blocking territorial domination, the other checking economic imperialism. For

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that essential goal we resisted, then fought Japan; for that central purpose we make defeated Japan an ally and continue to recognize the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa; for that we fought in Korea.

It would be folly to claim perfect consistency. The Battle Act, the Magnuson amendment, and other legislative excursions into the realm of foreign policy have been, like the Asiatic exclusion laws of earlier days, embarrassing and inconvenient. There have been more such episodes than one could wish. Irritating as several have been, relative to the great issues with which statesmen have been called to deal, they have been trivial. The main lines of policy have been clear, firm, consistent—or as clear, firm and consistent as politics will allow, here or elsewhere.

It is impossible to get many different people with many different backgrounds, all having the right to speak, to talk alike. The vital fact is that when the government has acted, its acts have been supported. One would be hard put to find elsewhere fundamental policies pursued with more persistence and firmness than those mentioned and others which could be named.

Is this consistency menaced by recent congressional investigations? The power of the Senate and of the House to conduct investigations is not novel; it has not been enlarged. Both houses of Congress have long employed the practice, which 70 years ago was described as a way to "superintend" administration. It is a principal means of exercising a check upon the executive and, for that matter, upon the judiciary, for Congress has the power to impeach judges.

In the present 83rd Congress there are currently being conducted or have been completed during its life no less than 39 investigations by committees of the Senate, 48 by committees of the House, and six by joint committees. They touch all kinds of problems, such as agriculture, Bureau of Standards, commerce, elections, disasters, foreign policy, internal security, refugees, alien property, military and veterans affairs, and many, many more. Only a few make the headlines, and they are frequently not the ones of most importance.

This form of inquiry often performs a vital service. The Teapot Dome investigation under the leadership of Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana was one of the most striking manifestations of the power of the Senate and was useful in purging our central government of corruption. When this committee's power was

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challenged, the decision of the Supreme Court sustained the broad right of investigation; it is not likely to be questioned again, though specific acts of investigators may well be. Even so, such committees do not have some of the sweeping powers possessed by Royal Commissions in the United Kingdom.

Sometimes investigations are conducted with dignity and sometimes in a circus atmosphere. The latter is not a recent development; it long antedates radio and television "coverage." Over 20 years ago Mr. J. P. Morgan, then head of the banking firm which bears his father's name, had a midget popped on his knee and a news photograph taken. It was a breach of good taste and an unkind act; it was irrelevant, but nothing could be done about it. "Loaded" questions and gross unfairness to witnesses are old abuses.

Current investigations are not fundamentally different from earlier examples. Nor do they cow public opinion. Despite all the uproar about the "terror" created by congressional investigations, I do not know anyone with something important to say which the American people ought to hear who has been silenced by the investigative procedures; many who have nothing to say pretend that the reason they do not say something significant is because of those pressures.

There is nothing in the Bill of Rights that promises the freedom there guaranteed can always be enjoyed in comfort or in a serene atmosphere. In the long history of freedom, discomfort has always accompanied speaking on controversial matters. There never has been a time when there were not social sanctions against candor. But if freedom is to amount to anything, one must be ready to pay the price of freedom. When a man speaks out he must be ready to receive, if not to absorb, criticism.

Many of us wish that Congress would have more regard for its dignity and its responsible function and curb publicity seekers, bullies, exhibitionists and others of like kind. They tend to bring the United States into disrepute because the world is not familiar with this aspect of the tradition and history of the United States. While the American people are not completely aware of the details of this history, they long since learned to take these episodes in stride; they are not confused even when voices are shrill. We can only hope that as the rest of the world becomes more familiar with the United States they likewise will draw investigations into right perspective.

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IV

Three factors which seem to create confusion in interpreting the voices of America have been mentioned. First is the unhistorical assumption that there was once a clearer consensus and fewer diverse voices. Second, tension between prophecy and current performance opens the way for charges of hypocrisy, often—indeed usually—unwarranted. Third, the separation of powers lets the President speak as the official voice of the United States, but permits members of Congress, who have only a party responsibility which is often more formal than real, speak their several minds as they will.

The fourth and final factor that makes it difficult for our friends around the world to hear the authentic voice of America among all the competing voices is our passion or genius, whichever one chooses to call it, for voluntary association. We not only have more telephones in the United States than all the rest of the world combined, we use them more energetically to organize new committees. Therefore, within the United States we have every conceivable type of pressure group. They are by no means mutually exclusive; people belong to several such groups. Many are "joiners" by nature or acquired habit and may be found in the forefront of numerous causes.

"Pressure group" is a descriptive phrase that often carries an undertone or implication of censure; it is a dog with a bad name. It has the same flavor as the word "faction" had to our forefathers. The makers of the Constitution, and more specifically George Washington, did not want political parties; they regarded them as factions, and, for that reason, strongly deprecated their formation. Yet less than eight years of actual operation under the Constitution proved conclusively that there was no means of getting up steam in the governmental boiler without party stoking. Therefore, within Washington's own official family the division of opinion crystallized on the one hand around Hamilton and on the other around Jefferson, and parties were born.

That was evidence enough that the energizing force for action did not lie within the machinery of government; it had to be supplied from outside. What was true when this country was small, when its population was dominantly of one racial stock and its range of occupations severely limited, was bound to be increased to the nth power when those situations were reversed.

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The nation spanned a continent; Europe and Asia poured many millions of diverse stocks into the United States; the industrial, commercial and agricultural revolutions made the economic activities and interests of the constituent elements within the population infinitely complex. All these changes made more acute the need for strong energizing forces to drive the machinery of government.

That this country can continue to have only two major parties is due to their character. National parties are essentially federations of local parties without much effective discipline. Neither has ideological tenets which are consistent; many a Northern Republican was closer to the New Deal than many a Southern Democrat. Often tension within one party on some issue is so severe that it cannot be said to have a policy at all. On the so-called civil rights issue the disagreement between some Northern sections of the Democratic Party and some Southern sections is so strong as to produce a stalemate. There are like dead-center areas in the Republican Party. Before anything resembling party policy can be developed on most points, numbers of factions and group interests within the parties must struggle, if not for ascendancy, at least for an influence upon the inevitable compromise. The result is weak party discipline.

Another reason for slack party discipline arises from the fact that all legislators, whether in the states or in the Federal government, represent constituencies within which they live. Therefore, a man may have a strong political hold upon his constituency without reference to his party regularity. This is heightened by the habit of nominating in primaries; any individual may announce himself as a candidate for office and, if he gets the votes, can defeat the party machine. In many places personal machines are much stronger than the official party apparatus.

Loose party discipline opens the way for cross-party coalitions that dominate specific policies. One of the most striking illustrations is the "silver bloc" in the Senate. The silver industry is not great in size or in economic terms. But it is concentrated in a few states of rather small population, each of which has, nonetheless, two Senators. When that band of Senators stands together without reference to party ties, they can exact a price (literally a price!) for silver that has no relation to economics.

Even within groups regarded as having solidarity, however, there are likely to be countervailing forces. It is not true, for

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example, that all farmers have the same interests; it is even less true that they have the same point of view with regard to interests which they hold in common. The differences between the Farm Bureau Federation on the one hand and the Farmers Union on the other sometimes seem about as great as between the National Association of Manufacturers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

The farmers must have a voice in America, labor must have a voice in America, the churches must have a voice in America. It is only by organizations uniting and speaking as nearly as possible with one voice that they are loud enough to be heard. But the voices of dissent are never still. The Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor pursue some common policies, as in hostility to the Taft-Hartley Act in its present form, but they also press for separate goals. The churches of America are united behind certain ideas and ideals, but the Catholic and Protestant churches do not unite on all questions. Wherever one turns, whether to groups of national origin like the Poles, the Italians or the Jews, or to economic groups such as the farmers, mechanics or longshoremen, or to religious or to any other groups, there are always rival pressure groups.

From one point of view these rival pressure groups in several fields of action seem to add to confusion. From another point of view their net effect is to establish cluster points around which opinion can form. Thus the public may choose, not from an infinite variety of proposals, but among relatively few put forward in an organized and clear-cut fashion.

The different regions, like the different social and economic groups, must each have its own voice. Within the British Commonwealth the points of view of the dominant elements in South Africa, in India and in Britain on basic racial issues are quite different. Here, all these points of view are represented within a single compact nation. Our friends around the world will have to learn that the voices of Georgia or South Carolina on some race issues and the voices of New England or the Northwest may be quite different. However, short of a fundamental change toward a monolithic and authoritarian government (for which we have no yearning at all), there will long remain these contrary voices differing in their stress and content one from another.

The root of pressure groups is simple. They are essential; in

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a country so vast and complex any point of view must be expressed with great energy if it is to thrust its way through all the other demands calling for public action and get a share of public attention. As a matter of practical physics we know that even great energy will not push a blunt instrument far through a dense mass. Therefore, nearly all the drives are sharply pointed. It is, of course, undeniable that the amount of energy expended and the sharpness of the point of approach are not an accurate measure of the inner importance or fundamental wisdom of what is promoted.

An extremely important point needs emphasis: not all pressure groups represent selfish interests. It is one of the evidences of the American genius for voluntary association that many aim to promote the public interest. The organization to support the United Nations, of which the late Henry L. Stimson was a leading figure, was a case in point. The recent Committee on the Present Danger was another. The list could be extended indefinitely. Any contemplation of our habits would fully support the observation of a European, nearly a century and a quarter ago: "If an American were condemned to confine himself to his own affairs, he would be robbed of one-half of his existence."

The change in the international position of the United States during the first half of the twentieth century has been so dramatic that it is an understatement to call it revolutionary. Through much of our history, it was possible to view our institutions, our habits, our traits of character as interesting curiosities; they did not have any vital impact upon the rest of the world. Now the world situation is so tense and sensitive that a small border incident between two of the newest and smallest nations occupies the worried attention of the Great Powers; the behavior of a group of war prisoners creates an explosive situation which could eventuate in war. Under such circumstances not only the activities of the United States but even its voices attract an attention quite new in the history of the world. If we have not yet learned to discipline ourselves to speak softly on matters which affect international policy, it is because we have been as lavish with words as with dollars; we have been as little aware of the damage words may do as we are overhopeful of the services dollars may perform.

Nevertheless, the voices of America are authentic voices of democracy. They are the only means available for attaining any

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consensus in a nation of continental proportions, which reaches from the tropics to beyond the Arctic Circle and which fronts on both the great oceans of the world. There is no other way by which we may come to a common understanding and a common action.

The vigor, not to say the ebullience, of our people have always been notable. Over a hundred years ago de Tocqueville remarked that in private conversation "an American cannot converse—he speaks to you as if he were addressing a meeting." Today when we speak to one another with a view to determining our policy we sometimes sound as though we were addressing the world. As time goes on, world opinion will come to judge us more by what we do than by what we say in the course of doing it; and in turn, as we gain experience in world affairs, we will learn better how to talk with our own countrymen without needlessly disturbing friendly nations.

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BRITAIN AND AMERICA: COMMON AIMS, DIFFERENT OPINIONS

By Clement R. Attlee

I HAVE been invited to write about the reasons for misunderstandings between the British and American peoples. This is rather a delicate subject, for any criticism of the United States may be taken out of its context and used by those who do not desire friendship between the two peoples to suggest that I am personally unfriendly to the United States. This would be entirely untrue. Therefore, I think that it is well that I should start by putting on record that I have nothing but goodwill towards the great nation across the Atlantic and that I am very sensible of the great contribution which America made during the war and afterwards to the furtherance of those democratic ideals which both countries hold. Further, I enjoy the friendship of many Americans, including both Democrats and Republicans.

For many years I have held the view that close coöperation between the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples is vitally important for the peace of the world and for the defense of democracy, and I know that this view is held by the majority of British people whatever their political persuasion may be. This coöperation depends not only on agreement between governments but upon mutual understanding between peoples, for in both countries public opinion is, in the long run, the decisive factor.

It is, of course, inevitable that even where long-term objectives are the same, differences of opinion in international affairs on particular questions are bound to arise between allies from time to time; and this has occurred between Britain and the United States. Accommodation is generally reached, though sometimes not without some friction, and there is apt to remain a certain soreness and a feeling of grievance that the one party cannot accept the other's point of view. When this happens old memories are revived and old disputes recalled, just as when two people have a tiff and, in the course of it, each brings up former vexations which the other had hoped were buried in oblivion.

It is, therefore, worth while to consider some of the reasons for these disagreements. It would, of course, be presumptuous of me to try to indicate the feelings of Americans, but I must show that

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I am aware of them lest this article should seem to be a mere recitation of Britain's grievances.

First of all, we should take note of the kind of picture which the people of one country have been taught to form of the other and for this we have, I think, to go to the schoolroom and perhaps to the cinema and the newspaper.

American history naturally, while not disregarding the colonial period, tends to regard it as a mere preliminary to the emergence of the United States into nationhood. It tends to start with the Boston tea-party, the American Revolution, George the Third and all that. The picture the young American forms of Britain starts with this struggle of a freedom-loving people fighting against an oppressive colonial imperialist Power.

To the Englishman, on the other hand, whose history goes back at least to 1066 and all that, the revolt of the American colonies is a regrettable episode. He learns that George the Third and his ministers were stupid and wrong. Lord North is condemned and Chatham eulogized. He learns that the lesson of the loss of America has been well learned, as is shown by the subsequent development of the British Commonwealth into a free partnership of equals. To him the American Revolution is an old unhappy far off thing, but to the American it is still vivid as the birth of a nation. People tend to forget unpleasant things. The average Englishman would like to forget some of his history, especially the more predatory phases of British imperialism, just as, I expect, Americans don't care much for remembering the Mexican War.

It is difficult to shake off the influence of what has been learned in childhood. I have found well-educated Americans who did not understand the evolution of the British Empire into a free Commonwealth. A friend of mine, not so long ago, was lecturing to an audience of New York businessmen and was actually asked how much Canada paid in taxes to Britain. This conception of Britain as an imperialist, colonial Power exploiting large areas of the world is still very potent. It gives a background of suspicion about all British policy. I think that even President Roosevelt was not wholly free from this prejudice.

The Briton, on the other hand, has seen the steady expansion of self-government overseas, first to the colonies inhabited by people of European stock, then to the great Asiatic countries of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and gradually to African colonies

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such as the Gold Coast, and to the Islands of the Caribbean. He knows that many of the colonies have been for years run at a loss to the home country. He has come to look upon the colonial peoples, not as objects for exploitation, but as subjects for trusteeship and he feels that he is misunderstood. He is indeed sometimes irritated by what he feels to be a degree of self-righteousness on the part of people who have not to take responsibility.

He is apt to recall that, after all, the British Empire in the old colonial days was freely open to American traders and missionaries, while Britain carried the burden in blood and treasure of preserving order and bringing in settled government. He feels that perhaps in these matters Britain has a very wide experience and that the average American is a little apt to apply first principles without adequate knowledge. He thinks that some Americans are prone to think that all colonial peoples are in the same stage as were the 13 North American colonies, ripe for full self-government.

On the other hand, the American has a perfectly just grievance in the fact that in earlier days the British ruling classes, or some of them, were apt to take a superior and supercilious attitude to Americans which must have been very infuriating. One can find this attitude in nineteenth century newspapers. The same people were, of course, pretty scornful of the pretensions of their own working-class people. Things have changed a good deal since then, but the tradition of the Britisher as a noble lord dies hard. Similar mistakes are made over here. There are people in the Labor and Socialist movement who really believe that all American policy is dictated by Wall Street. The hidden hand of American finance is seen behind every move on the international chessboard. I think this comes from a certain pleasure in depicting one's opponents as diabolically clever and unscrupulous persons plotting evil in secrecy. The Wall Street gang of well-dressed capitalists plotting the downfall of the workers is paralleled by the picture of the bloodthirsty "Reds" of the Labor Party. One may say that these are the mistakes of the ignorant but they form part of the background.

There is a rather similar myth relating to the British, and even to any member of a European diplomatic service, as being a terribly clever and experienced person liable to pull the wool over the eyes of the innocent American. The parallel here is the British conception of the American businessman as being far superior

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to our home-bred industrialist who is sure to be out-smarted by the clever Yankee.

Oddly enough, one of the causes of misunderstanding lies in the fact that we speak the same language. The Briton and the American each expect that the other will be more like him than is actually the case. The different traditions and environment make for an increasing diversity of view on many points, but each side is apt to be surprised and hurt at this. The Briton is prone to forget that very many Americans who speak perfect English have nevertheless a continental background—German, Polish or whatever it may be. They have been brought into the American melting pot and have become good Americans, but they look back to other countries than Britain.

The geographical point of view is different and so, I think, is the ideological and historical. I had an interesting example the other day which shows how different the same set of facts may appear to two people. I had a very abusive letter from an American who said that it was disgraceful that I should criticize America when I ought to be humbly grateful to America for having come along and saved Britain in two wars after she had made a mess of things. I understood his point of view, but a Briton of the same mental caliber would have said to an American, "Don't you realize that in two wars for the defense of civilization we bore the brunt and held the fort until you were ready to come in?"

II

I will now come to some practical problems of Anglo-American relationship. There is first of all the question of trade. Britain's industrial structure, built up through the nineteenth century, is such that she cannot live without foreign trade. She has a highly diversified industry and must seek markets all over the world and, indeed, must be constantly seeking out new avenues as old ones become blocked up by the industrialization of newer countries. Britain must sell her goods and services abroad to buy food and essential raw materials. The United States, however, is a continental Power with immense resources. Great as her foreign trade is in total, it is but a small part of her industrial activity.

It is, I think, hard for the average American to realize just what Britain's position is; still harder to realize the shattering effect which two world wars have had on Britain's economy. I was Prime Minister when lend-lease was suddenly brought to an

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end. Our whole economy had been keyed up for the production of munitions of war and integrated with the American economy. We had had to let go our overseas trade. At short notice the whole position changed. We were grateful to the United States and Canada for the generous help they gave us, but we sought to free ourselves from debt and pay our way. The only way we could do this was by selling our goods and the products of the Commonwealth and Empire, but here we came up against American protection.

It seems to us that Americans, while agreeing with us that we want trade not aid, do not help us to attain that objective. I realize, of course, the difficulty that any administration has in the traditional protectionist atmosphere of the United States in resisting demands for protection, but the fact remains that it does make it difficult for us. Furthermore, there seems a certain inconsistency in the constant adjurations to Europeans to get together and to get rid of restraints on trade. We are apt to think, "Physician, heal thyself."

It also seems inconsistent to maintain tariffs and other protectionist devices such as the Battle Act while demanding that Britain should give up her Commonwealth and colonial preferences in the sacred cause of freeing trade from all restraints. We cannot see that the fact that parts of the British Commonwealth are separated one from another by sea, whereas the American states are part of a single land mass, should make all that difference. However, accepting the American position that she must have tariff protection, we then turn to the rest of the world. Many voices tell us that we are betraying the free world if we trade with countries behind the Iron Curtain. In particular, although we are carrying out strictly the conditions laid down by the United Nations as to the supply of munitions to China, we are attacked for carrying on trade in non-warlike commodities. We thus find ourselves cut off from the East and the West. Yet we find Japan and other states trading with China without any fuss being made. But here I am touching on the China question with which I will deal later.

I think that everyone in Britain recognizes the great and wise generosity shown by the United States to ourselves and other countries which have suffered through the war, but there have been instances in which "strings" have been attached to aid which seemed to have been conceived in the interests of America.

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Hence the talk in some quarters of what they call "dollar" imperialism, meaning thereby the use of the economic power of America to enforce policies on other nations. This seems quite natural to many Americans who say, "We are obliging these people with loans, why should we not lay down conditions?" But this is where commercial practice conflicts with international relations. The position of giver and recipient of aid is always difficult in the case of individuals; it is still more delicate in the case of states. Sometimes, I think, there has been a lack of tact shown.

III

I do not think that there is anyone who underestimates what the United States did in the war and how much it has contributed to world stability in the postwar period. Marshall Aid is one example. American participation in NATO is another. There was a real danger that Soviet imperialism might overrun all Europe, as it has already become the dictator of Eastern Europe. Yet it is permissible to doubt whether still more of Europe might not have been saved from the Russian yoke if those who controlled the policy of the United States had been rather more fully aware of the European position.

Everyone is aware of the difference of opinion on strategy between Britain and America in the later stages of the war. These differences were not solely due to military theories but to divergencies on international policy. It was our view that an advance into Austria from Italy was a sound proposition, not merely from the point of view of military strategy but to save the states of Middle and Eastern Europe from becoming satellites of Soviet Russia. As it was, Russia was able to pose as the deliverer of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other states from the Germans, and Communists were able to make themselves masters of these states. I do not think that this danger was sufficiently present to the mind of American statesmen who, as I saw at Potsdam, were rather too ready to think that they could make a deal with Russia. I think, too, that some Americans thought that the British plan was dictated by imperialism.

I think that there has been some lack of understanding of Europe which is entirely natural. After all, for a good long time the United States tended to stand aloof from Europe and its troubles, whereas our geographical and historical position has necessarily bound us more closely to the Continent. For instance, various

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plans have been advocated for the integration of Europe—politically and economically—and occasionally impatience has been shown at the reluctance of European states to merge their sovereignty. There is here, I think, some disregard of the long histories of these states and of the wide differences between them. There are, of course, great differences between the states of America, but the difference between, say, Virginia and Pennsylvania is nothing to that between France and Germany or Holland and Italy. The merger of sovereignty is a very difficult thing to bring about and its advantages may be cancelled out by the loss of the distinctive characteristics which diversify the European scene. Let me hasten to add that Britons often make the same mistake in assuming that public opinion in the Eastern States is representative of opinion in the Middle West, the Southern States or California.

I am not writing this by way of captious criticism but am trying to point out some of the inevitable consequences that flow from historical and geographical facts.

To take another instance. It is, I think, impossible for Americans to understand fully the feelings of the people of France with regard to Germany. The French, in the course of only 80 years, experienced three great wars with Germany, including long periods of occupation. They cannot forget these facts. They inevitably look with the greatest suspicion on any suggestion for the rearming of their old enemy. The same thing applies to Belgium and to a lesser degree to Holland and the Scandinavian countries. Even in Britain, where invasion did not take place, we have still a very vivid memory of the "blitz" and we live in London and many other cities with bomb-cleared areas and ruins as ever-present memories of what we suffered. I am well aware of the great sacrifices of American lives made in the Western and in the Eastern theaters of war, but America did not have her soil actually invaded or her homes destroyed. This difference of experience undoubtedly has its effect on the outlook of the two peoples.

To turn to another area—what is called the Middle East and particularly the Moslem world. We have been intimately associated with Turkey, Egypt, the Arab countries and Pakistan for several centuries. We have many people who have lived in these countries. There are families whose friendships with people in Pakistan go back for several generations. Naturally, therefore, we have quite a considerable understanding of these peoples and

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equally they understand us. With the best will in the world it is not possible for those who have not had these contacts to see things in quite the same perspective. I have heard an American talk as if the Moslem world were a unity, ignoring the differences between the Sunnis and Shi'ahs and the long history of the relations of the Turks and the Arabs. It has sometimes seemed to me that Anglo-American differences of opinion on policy in this region flow from a tendency on the part of Americans to think that the British view is solely due to an imperialist approach, whereas so often it is based on wide knowledge both of the past and present of the peoples in that part of the world.

There is one other point which is perhaps rather a delicate one. In the composition of the American nation there are elements drawn from many races, but not in equal proportions. There are, for instance, more Italians than Jugoslavs, a great many Jews and practically no Arabs. It is natural that the Italians and the Jews should be more influential in America than their rivals. They are able to make their voices heard very emphatically at election time, and quite inevitably party leaders listen to them. The elections being close and the international complications being far away, home considerations may be more effective than foreign affairs.

IV

Let me now turn to the Far East and, particularly, to the question of China. Here again, we must consider how opinion is influenced by historical and geographical considerations. We have had long trading relations with China and we have many Chinese living under the British flag in Malaya and elsewhere. We have also had many years of rule over Asiatic peoples. On the other hand, Americans have for years sent many missionaries to China and given great material aid to the Chinese people. Furthermore, there is a point which the Briton may easily fail to appreciate, namely, that the West of America faces China across the Pacific with only scattered islands in between. More than that, the Americans bore the heaviest burden in the war against Japan and have the memory of Pearl Harbor. Americans, therefore, are likely to be more conscious of the danger of a strong hostile Power on the eastern shores of the Pacific.

Britain was, until recently, a great Asiatic Power and is today the equal colleague in the British Commonwealth of three great

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Asiatic countries—India, Pakistan and Ceylon. She still has colonial possessions in Asia. She is, therefore, in a sense in Asia. Despite its connection with the Philippines, the United States is not in Asia, but is concerned as living in a neighboring continent.

Britain brings to the consideration of the Chinese problem her experience of other parts of Asia. Now, one of the outstanding events of this century has been the rise of Asiatic nationalism. I think the emergence of Japan at the turn of the century as a Great Power was one of the stimulants; but the education of Asiatics in European and American universities has been another, especially in the latter where they naturally imbibed the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Here was the beginning of the end of colonialism in Asia. In India, the nationalist movement grew in strength; and ultimately, under a Labor Government in Britain, four great countries in Asia attained their independence. Two major wars quickened the demand for independence. Experience shows that unless this demand is met in time reasonable men get thrust aside and the extremist takes control. It is just here that Communism has its chance. The Communist is always ready to use the language of freedom and democracy the better to enslave people. I have no doubt that had not timely action been taken, Communism would have taken hold in India. I think that the Dutch acted just in time in Indonesia. I think the French delayed too long in Indo-China and are suffering the penalty in a long and exhausting war there.

What relevance has this to Anglo-American understanding? I think that it is of prime importance in considering the attitude to be taken up in respect of the People's Government of China.

The struggle between the Kuomintang faction under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists ended in the complete victory of the latter. The remnant of Chiang's forces survived in Formosa only owing to their protection by the United States. I think that this victory was due to the corruption of the old régime and to the fact that the Communists offered something that appealed to the mass of the Chinese people. The evidence seems to show that where the Communists gained possession of territory in the course of the civil war they gave a new hope to the masses of the people. It was at least clear that the Communists had become the effective government of China, and the British Government, though totally opposed to Communism, recognized this as a fact. The United States took a different view, as it was perfectly en-

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titled to do. The disagreement between Britain and the United States arose on the question of the filling of the seat assigned to China on the Security Council of the United Nations. It was mainly due to President Roosevelt that China had been assigned this seat as one of the Great Powers. She was certainly not one at that time. She was weak and torn with dissension. I thought it an unwise decision at the time. Now, when she has become powerful, the seat is filled by the representative of a discredited faction. The People's Government was denied this right because it was a Communist Government, and this before there was any question of aggression in Korea. The inevitable result has been to make the Chinese Government draw closer to Russia as its only friend and to strengthen Communist control, for Communism is now reinforced by nationalism. The Chinese feel affronted because America denies China her rightful place in the world's councils.

I think the American attitude unwise. It seems to resemble the short-sighted attitude of the British Government after the First World War when it supported Kolchak and the reactionaries against the Bolsheviks and thus rallied to Lenin the support of Russian nationalist feeling. There are other precedents in history, such as the support of the émigrés against the French Revolutionaries at the end of the eighteenth century. One can imagine what the effect would have been in America at the time of the revolution if European Powers had supported a rival government in, say, Bermuda against President Washington.

It may well have been that had China been given her seat in the United Nations the Korean War might never have been started. In dealing with Asiatic countries the matter of self-respect or "face" is of great importance. The refusal to recognize the effective government of China affronted the self-respect of the Chinese people.

We in Britain recognize as clearly as do the American people the danger of Communism, but we differ as to the right way to deal with it. I think it unlikely that the Chinese people with their ancient civilization are likely to swallow the whole Communist doctrine. Still less do I think that China is likely to become a docile satellite of Russia. But the more China is shut away from the Western World and forced to ally herself with Russia, the more strength will be given to her Communist masters. The greater the contacts with the Western World, the less will be the

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danger of the integration of the great Asiatic mass in a Communist bloc.

I consider that as soon as support for aggression has ceased, the People's Government should be given the Chinese seat on the Security Council. I hope that thereafter an attempt might be made to get a real settlement in the Far East. I recognize very fully the feeling in the United States that Korea and Formosa might become advanced bases for an attack on the American continent by the Communists; but equally I recognize that from the point of view of the Chinese Government these two places are regarded as bases whence an attack on China might be launched by a hostile Power. The United States has very vivid memories of the attack of Japan against her, but China has memories of the Japanese War launched from these very bases. My view is that the only solution is that they should be neutralized.

Above all, I am sure that it is vital to the peace of the world that we should be very careful to avoid any action which would seem to set Asia against the West. Colonialism is dying, but in the new relationship between the Asiatic peoples and the West there is an immense work to be done in helping to raise standards of living in the East. This is, in my view, the best way of preventing the spread of Communism.

I think that here we should recognize that there is a certain difference of outlook between the British and American people. I think that Americans tend to see things in black and white where we see shades of grey. For instance, many Americans tend to lump together all kinds of left-wing movements as Communist. They do not discriminate between democratic Socialism and Communism. Some even look with horror on what we consider to be very mild liberalism. This absolute view is paralleled by the attitude of some people on the left who lump together every government that is not Socialist as being Fascist or reactionary. On this ground, the extremists of the left and right meet, for the one only sees everything with which he disagrees as black and the other as red.

It is unfortunate that much more publicity is given in the press to the extremists than to reasonable people. In America you get reports of anti-American sentiments expressed by a writer or speaker in Britain without realizing that he represents a small minority, while we hear a great deal about a speech by some Senator who is not highly regarded in his own country.

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V

I have, hitherto, been trying to give a general review of causes of misunderstanding between the two peoples without any special references to any political party, but I would like now to say a word about my own party. The Labor Party is not anti-American and if any Labor adherents are prejudiced against the United States they are only a small and unimportant section; but it is right that I should express some feelings of disquiet which have arisen in our ranks recently.

The British Labor Party is not Marxian. Its philosophy is based on Christian principles rather than economic dogmas. Amongst its leaders and supporters are prominent adherents of all the Churches, including Roman Catholics. In the Labor Government there were three Catholics. The Labor Party has always been democratic and, in the broadest sense, liberal. It has been painful to find that some Americans, including people in high positions, fail to discriminate between Communism and Democratic Socialism.

The Labor Party is Socialist and believes in a large measure of public ownership and control. It works for a classless society and a wider measure of social justice. These views are not held by most Americans, who are devoted to the capitalist system and do not disapprove of great inequalities of wealth. But these differences of outlook on social and economic matters do not prevent us from agreeing in our conceptions of the worth of the individual, in democracy and freedom and in absolute moral values.

Incidentally, I would remark that the Socialist Party is strong —and, in some instances, in power—in several of the democratic countries in Europe and Australasia.

We have, therefore, been disturbed, as I know have many Americans, at the apparent strength of Senator McCarthy and those who hold his intolerant views. Every state has, of course, the right to defend itself against those who seek to overturn its institutions by violence or are in fact devoted to the interests of an alien power, but there is a danger lest those who profess to defend freedom sacrifice liberty itself. Those who wish to make a breach between Britain and America say, "You profess to be standing together for freedom, but look at the witch-hunting in America." Some of our people fall for this argument. The Labor Party has had nearly 40 years of fighting Communism in Britain

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and, despite war and economic depression, the Communists have utterly failed. We are pardonably annoyed at being instructed by a beginner like Senator McCarthy.

Another difficulty is the support given to those whom we consider undemocratic reactionaries, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee and General Franco. We know that one cannot always choose just the associates one would wish in the international sphere, but we feel that there is a danger lest there should be disregard for the fundamentals of the democratic alliance.

As I have said, I want to see the utmost coöperation between Britain and America. I have stated frankly some of our difficulties, but they do not really affect our wide measure of agreement. In the thought of the Labor Party there is a wide range of ideas, idealistic, anti-imperialist, anti-privilege and social reform, which are held by many Americans. These ideas really stem from our common heritage of the Christian ethic. The difficulty is to get the personal contacts between like-minded people. The number of Labor people who can visit America is at all times very limited by financial considerations, and the dollar situation increases the difficulty. No doubt the same thing applies, but in a lesser degree, to Americans. Yet it is only by visits to each others' homes that real understanding can be reached by the unprivileged classes. I am certain that this understanding is vitally important for the preservation of our democratic and free way of life.

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REVISING THE CHARTER

Is It Possible? Is It Wise?

By Ernest A. Gross

THE American people were not pushed into the United Nations, and they did not stumble into it. Most of them believed that they owed it to themselves as well as to all mankind, following the most devastating of world wars, to join the influence and idealism of the United States to those of other nations to establish at long last an effective organization to maintain peace and security.

The Charter of the United Nations, adopted at San Francisco June 26, 1945,[1] undertook to define "international order" and to establish certain institutions pertaining thereto. It was, of course, never supposed—and is even less to be supposed now—that these were to be the sole and preëmptive institutions of international order. Indeed, as was said by Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, a leading authority on the Charter:

> The truth of the matter was that by establishing the United Nations, the peace-seeking nations of the world were providing themselves with a new and important mechanism for the conduct of international relations, but one that was to be supplementary to all the other machinery of international relations, rather than one that would entirely supplant the latter.[2]

The American tradition is that the general welfare is best promoted through coöperative, rather than dictated, effort. The Charter of the United Nations realistically interprets "general welfare" by counting among its enemies not only violence, aggression and imperialisms, large and small, but also those other ancient enemies of man: disease, poverty, ignorance and slavery. "Collective security" both as a means and an end depends upon a general agreement: (a) that these dangers to society are clear, present and common; and (b) that the burdens of collective defense against them should be shared as equitably as possible.

The Charter has two specific and interrelated purposes: 1, as set forth in Article I, the maintenance of "international peace and security;" and, 2, as set forth in Article 55, the promotion of "conditions of stability and well-being which are *necessary for*

[1] The Charter was ratified by the U.S. Senate on July 28, 1945, by a vote of 89 to 2.
[2] Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, University of Illinois, May 2, 1950.

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peaceful and friendly relations among nations" (italics added). This broad definition of the common objectives of a free society, and the machinery established or proposed for giving them effect, made the United Nations in a sense a projection of our own concepts into the international community.

II. SHOULD THERE BE A CONFERENCE?

Nevertheless, it is natural that room should be made for occasional attempts to clarify the purposes of the United Nations and to simplify its methods. Article 109 provides this, as follows:

> 1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the Members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.
>
> 2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. [This repeats the amendment procedures embodied in Article 108.]
>
> 3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the Members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

Confronted as we are with all the problems arising from the cold war and left over from the last hot one, there are plenty of grounds for frustration and therefore, one would think, for reexamination. Eight years after the end of the war we face: unsettled treaties of peace; the legacy of destruction and loss of manpower of two world wars and many local ones; the Communist enslavement of millions, and the constant threat of enslaving millions more; the fracturing of the world by the Iron Curtain. In view of the risks of conflict in these circumstances, some think that the United Nations is not providing the full measure of collective security which is to be expected from a world organization. Is this because the United Nations Charter is "blocking the way?" If so, should the Charter be amended? Or should the United Nations be abandoned? More concretely, in view of the fact that a Conference of United Nations members to consider all these problems might be held, under Article 109, three years hence, should we urge and prepare for such a Conference?

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Amendment, if there is a conference, will not be as easy as many seem to think. A two-thirds vote is required in the General Assembly; there are five Powers with a veto in the Security Council over any actions taken by the General Assembly; and even if all these hurdles were cleared, the amendments adopted would still have to be ratified by two-thirds of the member governments.

There are, in fact, three alternative aims which we might have in view in favoring a conference, and we should be clear in advance which we are seeking:

1. A "punctuation" conference.
2. A "showdown" conference.
3. A "propaganda" conference.

The first of these would be a conference confined to making technical improvements in the language of the Charter, removing ambiguities and the like. That would not seem worth the effort or expense. In any event, such technical revisions as may appear valuable to experts can be proposed in the Assembly at any time.

The second—a conference in which we would propose major changes which must be accepted "or else"—has some appeal to those who have concluded that continued Soviet membership in the United Nations is not in our national interest. Not all of these go so far as to favor our withdrawal from the United Nations in the event the Soviet Government, acting true to form, rejected a settlement of all issues in one all-embracing prolonged conference, as it has rejected piecemeal settlements in innumerable short conferences, formal and informal. But there are some who advocate "kicking the Russians out"—which is merely another way of saying that we should withdraw, since the Soviets can veto their own expulsion. The advocates of this course favor a "showdown" conference precisely because it would precipitate a break-up of the organization.

This leads us to consider whether Soviet membership in the United Nations is indeed adverse to our own interest and security—so adverse, even, that we should dissolve the organization by walking out of it if the Soviet Government vetoed revisions which we proposed. Soviet adherence to the Charter is seen today to have been dictated by a cynical policy, for the U.S.S.R. has been in contempt of its obligations from the beginning. Nevertheless, various advantages accrue to the free world from continued membership by the Soviets:

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(a) They can be held legally and morally accountable for violations of their commitments to the Charter's code of conduct. (b) They are subject to moral and political pressures in the United Nations forum—the biggest hole in the Iron Curtain. (c) They are constantly forced to reveal the true nature, purposes and operating methods of the Soviet system, often with perceptible impact even upon the naïve or cynical. (d) They are available for negotiation on specific issues—a most important consideration since United Nations delegates have a general feeling that continuing discussion of specific issues with the Soviets is more likely to produce a certain measure of agreement than are large-scale and dramatic efforts for a general settlement. (e) The processes of the United Nations make it easier for weak or wavering members to "line up with conscience" in hard cases, like that of the Soviet troops in Iran.

Those who see the United Nations as the cause of our difficulties, rather than as a reflection of them, are attracted by the prospect of an organization free of the Soviets and hence free of Soviet obstruction. Their views shade into the attitude of those who think we would be better off with no United Nations at all. These advocates of retreat to national or regional isolation (as well as, indeed, some of those who support a radical "transformation" of the United Nations) do not fear that the loss of the "neutrals" or the establishment of a rival "peace" organization by the Soviets would weaken our efforts to build a strong coalition. On the contrary, the defection of the neutrals is often favored. It is said: "We must separate the men from the boys." Or, "It is time for people to stand up and be counted." Or, "You are either with us in this thing or against us." And as for the possibility that the Soviets might establish a rival United Nations, it is usually assumed that our side would be able to hold on to the Charter "copyright."

These arguments aside, it seems certain there would be strong bipartisan opposition within the United States to a "showdown" conference. Not only our free world partners, but many Americans, would be reluctant to confront the Communists with an ultimatum, having in mind Ambrose Bierce's definition of that term as "the last warning before resorting to concessions."

The third alternative is a "propaganda" conference: one in which we seek substantive Charter changes but do not necessarily expect to get them. It would be a "propaganda" victory, it

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is argued, merely to show that the Soviet Union was in the wrong, and to dramatize the deadlock. This might be described as a sort of peace conference in the cold war.

The essential question here is whether such a conference would be more likely to reveal or further obscure the actual roots of the conflict between the Soviet system and the free world. If one leans toward the view that the United Nations is at least partly responsible for the deadlock, or that our quest for security is thwarted by the United Nations (either because it does too much or too little), then this sort of conference to review the Charter would be thought likely to reveal the issues and lead to better public understanding. It would presumably "expose" the shortcomings of the United Nations and the pitfalls in our continued membership in it.

On the other hand, if one accepts the fact that the world danger lies in Soviet attitudes and policies, then an abortive conference to discuss organizational and procedural matters would be seen as concealing the true problems, confusing public opinion and frustrating those who would like to deal with the root causes of the troubles we face. This would weaken American support for the United Nations, or for any other international coöperation, since most people regard the two as synonymous.

Nor should we forget that there is still another set of problems which may turn out to be as influential as any in determining the issue between peace and war. These are the problems besetting the free world internally. The menace of Soviet imperialism so overshadows our lives that we often lose sight of the dangers to peace caused on our own side of the Iron Curtain by ancient feuds, national aspirations, economic misery and the struggle to achieve or maintain human rights. These are the problems about which books—rather than headlines—are written. Yet they are involved in Charter revision, as will appear from the following discussion of certain real and false issues relevant to the question whether we should seek to amend the Charter.

III. REAL ISSUES AND FALSE ONES

1. Three real issues of substantial importance are selected for discussion here because they characterize three types of problems which would confront us in the course of a revision conference:

a. *Disarmament.* A major cold war issue, since weapons of mutual annihilation are in the hands of both sides.

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b. *Domestic Jurisdiction.* A major issue within the free world, embittering vast sections of it in connection with the "colonial" issue and evoking controversy at each session of the General Assembly.

c. *Membership.* In one sense a cold war issue, yet more fundamentally also involving differences in basic attitudes within the free world regarding the universal or selective character of the organization.

It is highly doubtful, to say the least, that a conference could contribute toward a solution of any of these problems.

The disarmament issue is not in its present state of deadlock by reason of any substantive defects in the Charter or because of the lack of a forum in which to negotiate. The United States has repeatedly made clear in the United Nations that any valid disarmament plan requires a verified disclosure of armaments, that is, a strict system of inspection. Agreement on disarmament is blocked by the Soviet Union's refusal either to accept the United Nations plan, or to come forward with an effective and safe plan of its own. The fact is, of course, that the Soviet Union must choose between the Iron Curtain and disarmament, and chooses the Iron Curtain.

It may be that persistent search by us, or those allied with us, might produce some new and practicable formula for disarmament. For example, it has been suggested that, even though the chance of Soviet acceptance is extremely slight, we should lay out a specific program of what we mean by "foolproof" inspection and effective enforcement, and say unequivocally that, if the Soviets agree, we are prepared to go through with it. Such a plan would be embodied in a treaty with atomic disclosure in stages.

However, it should be remembered in this connection that one of the reasons assigned by the Soviets for rejecting the plan which the United States has already advanced in the United Nations is that it provides for the disclosure of atomic armaments by stages. Some substitute for this would apparently therefore be necessary. Regardless of whether this might be possible, it seems clear that a Charter revision conference—whether for show or for showdown—would be a poor place indeed in which to try to negotiate such a treaty. And it seems even more unlikely that the projected conference would lead to a Soviet agreement to revise the Charter in such a way that the United Nations would be free to enact a genuine disarmament plan.

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Some may feel that this is a defeatist conclusion, or that is assumes too much knowledge of Soviet motivation. We may at least agree that if we do indeed have some sound new plan to put forward there are certain distinct advantages in doing so in the United Nations, where we could constantly inform and consult with our colleagues.

As for the issue of domestic jurisdiction, there is no doubt that it is constantly becoming more vexatious, if not explosive. All the various forms in which the problem of "colonialism" presents itself are involved in it. Many Powers contend that under the Charter the United Nations has no right to discuss or decide such issues. When we interpret the organic law of any social institution, a general grant of authority must be read in the light of general limitations expressed in the same document. The United Nations Charter is of course no exception.[8] However, it is not really necessary for the purpose of this analysis to consider whether "discussion" constitutes "intervention," or whether Article 10 is subordinate to Article 2 (7), or vice versa. The question here is whether it is wise or practicable to attempt to clarify the matter by some new Charter formulation.

Our own national experience shows that the sensitive issues of "delegated" power versus "reserved" power are difficult to codify. The difficulty has led to bloody civil war in this country; it has never led to the calling of a new constitutional convention. Attempts to reformulate Article 2 (7) or Article 10, or to try to spell out their relationship, would almost certainly lead the conference into argument over specific issues, such as Morocco, Tunisia, the Indians in South Africa, and many other perennial sources of bitter strife in the General Assembly. The result would very probably either be retention of the present general language or substitution of new but equally broad texts. All the while, the Soviet representatives would be cheerfully applying the old dictum of Stalin: "The national movements for the freeing of the

[8] Article 2, Paragraph 7, reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

Article 10 reads: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters."

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oppressed countries from the imperialist yoke contain unexhausted revolutionary possibilities."

Our third example, the standing deadlock in the United Nations on the question of admitting new members, is a famous example of the Soviet abuse of the veto; it has accounted for 27 out of the total of 56 Soviet vetoes. On the other hand, even though we have said that for our part we would abide by a majority decision, our position has lost some virtue by reason of our more recent indications that we might, if necessary (and if constitutional), use our veto on the related issue of Chinese Communist representation.

Assuming, however, that we are in fact willing to make a legal commitment not to use the veto on membership questions (or on Chinese or other representation questions), an amendment making the veto inapplicable to membership applications would be a good step forward. The difficulty, of course, is that the Soviet Government would refuse to agree to such an amendment for just the same reasons they have refused to join in a voluntary undertaking not to use their veto on new members.

Moreover, even if the Soviet Government should change its approach, the Government of the Republic of China would probably refuse to surrender its veto power on this question. Indeed, the Chinese delegate to the Security Council has even asserted the right to veto a Security Council invitation to the Chinese Communist régime to give testimony before the Council. Unless the Chinese representation issue has been "solved" prior to the proposed review conference, the membership question would involve the members in a vexing debate on the already much-debated problem of "who represents China."

In addition, there is the problem of eligibility for membership raised by Article 4 of the Charter.[4] This involves a divergence of view within the free world between those who favor universality and those who regard membership in the United Nations as something like a reward for meritorious conduct. To a large extent, the individual approach to this question is conditioned by one's attitude toward Soviet membership in the United Nations. Those who favor "kicking the Russians out" oppose admitting Soviet satellites, and indeed are inclined to regard it as a moral

[4] Article 4 of the Charter reads: "1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

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issue; they often attach the label of "appeasement" to those who disagree with them.

On the other hand, many adhere to the view that the *obligations* of United Nations membership should be universal and mandatory. On this theory, every state is born into the United Nations, so to speak, just as an individual is born into citizenship and cannot voluntarily free himself of the citizen's duties. In this aspect, then, the membership question involves a rather basic difference of view within the free world itself.[5] This is sometimes lost sight of because of the more newsworthy impact of the Soviet vetoes. It would be wise to delay taking up the membership question unless a consensus of opinion had been reached on this aspect of it, particularly since it is reasonably certain that the "veto amendment" would not clear either the Soviet or the Chinese barrier in any event.

2. Unlike the foregoing real issues, questions of structure and procedure such as those involving the veto or changes in voting methods may be regarded either as false issues, or as real issues which are often given false weight in the balance of judgments about the United Nations. But they stand high, of course, on the priority list of those who consider that the tensions and perils of the present day are due largely to the structural character of the United Nations itself, instead of existing in spite of or regardless of any merits or defects in that structure.

Conflicting views are held as to what is wrong with the structure. Some say: "The United Nations is nothing but a debating society; we must put some legal teeth in it." Others vehemently disagree: "We must recapture our lost sovereignty from this superstate." Or, as Senator Bricker has put it: The United Nations has "an insatiable lust for power."[6] It is sometimes a bit confusing when some who feel this way nevertheless call for the abolition of the veto. The explanation of the contradiction, of course, is that the Soviet abuse of the veto arouses fear and anger and it is easy to direct these emotions against the forum in which the acts take place.

Seen from this perspective, the Soviet abuse of the veto is

[5] Within the two extremes are the conflicting attitudes toward the Soviet "package proposal" for the simultaneous admission of most of the present applicants, including all those sponsored by the Soviet Government. The split in the free world on this issue was shown at the Sixth General Assembly in 1952, when the vote on the Soviet proposal was 22 in favor, 21 opposed and 16 abstentions (passage being prevented by the two-thirds rule).

[6] *The New York Times*, May 18, 1952.

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"proof" that the United Nations is hopeless and helpless to provide security. Hence, the elimination of the veto becomes the way to assure our security, or at least to enhance it. A celebrated statement of this point of view was made by the late Senator Robert A. Taft: "I believe we should remain a member, and do our best to amend the Charter so that action is based on international law and the adjudication of an impartial tribunal, and the veto power eliminated."[7]

Nevertheless, the practical difficulty of applying this concept of "international law" to specific situations may be found in the opposition which some Senators expressed to the North Atlantic Treaty. Indeed, Senator Taft himself voted against the Treaty primarily on the ground that he felt it deprived us of the freedom of decision (*i.e.* the "veto") whether to go to war or not. And this, even though Article 5 of the Treaty had been watered down, at the insistence of the Senate, so as to create no legal obligation whatever except to take such action as we "deem necessary."

On the other side stand those who see the Soviet abuse of the veto as a symptom of her contempt for the processes of international coöperation. By this diagnosis, if the Soviet Government were willing to agree to Charter amendments restricting or eliminating the veto, it would not be guilty of having abused the veto in the first place; and if it ceased to abuse the veto, it would be because it had abandoned at least some of its policies of expansion and obstruction. It is in this sense that the veto may be called a "false issue"—one which should not decisively affect our position for or against a conference to revise the Charter.

Of course, this conclusion would not be valid if the objective were merely to have a "propaganda" conference, dramatizing Soviet unwillingness to restrict the veto, thus illuminating our own higher moral position. Whether the procedure would, in fact, further our national interest depends upon some complex questions. For example, would the American people and Congress really be willing to surrender our veto in cases involving a commitment of our troops or resources to warlike action? Or would our major partners in the free world give up their veto on matters affecting their "colonial" interests? Or, again, would the Soviet rejection of the amendment increase tension more than it would instill resolute firmness on our side?

If the answer to any of these questions is "probably no," then

[7] *The New York Times*, June 2, 1952.

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a propaganda conference for the purpose of talking about the veto might do more harm than good. Specifically, in seeking the answer to the first of them, we should remember that on a question surely much less vital than the use of our armed forces, the Senate insisted that we retain the right to veto applications for new membership in NATO.

"New machinery, more law" is the formula of those who feel confident that men can be inspired to develop institutions with authority and power to keep the peace. "More compliance with the law we have" is the slogan of those who believe that the present crisis is due to the conduct of the Soviets rather than to faults in the international machinery. Few would deny the perils which arise from Soviet principles and policies or our necessity to take every sensible step to improve our security, aware, as Professor Oppenheimer wrote in these pages, that "the atomic clock ticks faster and faster." However, as everyone knows, the really violent arguments are among those who want to use different means to reach the same objective.

Formulas for radical changes of machinery, elaborations of new procedures, plans for super-governments and the like often rest on an unconscious assumption that the more explicit the obligation, the more it is honored, and that the more parts the machine has the more smoothly it runs. After all, it is argued, international relationships involve the same human factors that personal relationships do. Aggression is like any neighborhood armed robbery, only more so. The Big Lie, used as a matter of national policy, is like any other kind of lie, only more so. The law book, the court and the police force tamed the Wild West; the same institutions will tame the wilder "East." This overlooks the fact that the very scale of the challenge to law and order determines the practical means for dealing with it.

We do not face a band of cattle rustlers. Something close to one-quarter of the human race, led by despots, defies the Charter. This is not to say that they will necessarily always stay that way; but it does say that a mere reformulation of the obligation will not change the nature either of the revolt or of the threat.

Moreover, whether we like it or not—and we do not—another vast group, perhaps half the human race, does not regard this fact as a problem of any real concern to themselves. Some are more worried about where the next meal is coming from than where the next aggression is coming from. Others are seething in

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revolutionary ferment. Others rationalize their objections to Communism and equate them to their objections to capitalism. Still others fear their next-door neighbors in the free world more than the seemingly distant fires of Communism.

Given the vast sweep and movement of a world where such forces have play, it requires a truly exceptional degree of self-assurance to believe that some particular code of international law which one has written out, or a certain kind of machinery which one has devised, or some ingenious set of procedures which one has invented, is just the thing to save mankind. A sounder historical perspective shows that the tides of human events run in less institutional channels. Far from belittling the vital importance of institutions in the affairs of men, this is merely to accord them the respect of a fair evaluation.

One illustration is worth a dozen homilies. For some years there has been an item on the agenda of the General Assembly called "The Question of Defining Aggression." Our government has consistently opposed the project, for reasons set forth by the President of the United States in a Report to the Congress:

> The United States and some other delegations advocated that the Assembly should discontinue its attempts at definition as no satisfactory one could be found. A definition which enumerated all possible acts of aggression *would necessarily be incomplete and could thus be harmful;* conversely, an abstract and general formula would be too vague to prove useful. Therefore, those states considered it preferable to leave the United Nations organs, which are responsible for determining an aggressor, full discretion to consider all circumstances of each case.[8]

Even though experience thus has shown the impossibility of making a complete and safe definition of "aggression," a resolution which was introduced by 19 Senators in the first session of the 81st Congress jumps the big hurdle by proposing a world federation "with defined and limited powers *adequate* to preserve peace and *prevent aggression.* . . ."

Can one hope to define powers which are "adequate" to achieve an undefinable objective? And how *limited* could powers be which are "adequate to preserve peace" in a world where peace is threatened by atomic armaments and massed armies, by the Iron Curtain and forced labor, by subversion and terror? The existence of these very evils is what has led Soviet representatives to reject, at every step of the way, all suggestions looking to

[8] "U.S. Participation in the U.N.;" Report for 1951, p. 253 (italics added).

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broadening the Charter. In particular, they revile proposals to limit the veto, even on a voluntary basis, as a "capitalist" plot against peace.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Any organization—the United Nations, NATO or a projected Utopia—has need of powerful symbolism; but symbolism is a method, not an objective. Our main object should be to keep and improve the realities that are already at our disposal.

The United Nations is the outstanding agency in which men and governments can join their efforts to achieve their objective of enforcing peace. It should be buttressed by regional and other defense organizations and by the increasing power of the United States in its support.

Conciliation functions, particularly in respect of disputes within the free world, are important. They can disinfect the wounds inflicted in the course of disputes between persons, tribes or nations. We must keep studying how to make more effective our methods in attempting to settle international quarrels. It also is of the utmost importance that we have procedures for coöperation in economic, health and welfare activities. The Specialized Agencies are doing some of the most pressing work of the world—building the foundations of freedom.

So long as the cold war continues, it is good to have this standing international conference for the continuous exploration of specific issues. If it did not already exist, we would hail its creation. And in case of aggression, it would serve as a rallying ground for those who were willing to fight the aggressor—with even more general participation, let us hope, than was the case in Korea. Korea has taught many lessons in the command, logistics and other aspects of operating a collective defense.

Some of the new formulas that are suggested for amending the Charter involve amendments to our own Constitution also. It would seem highly desirable to settle the American attitude in these matters before talking about putting issues of such gravity into international debate. For example, it would be awkward for the American delegation to a Charter conference to be confronted with the support which the Soviet delegation might well give to the Bricker Amendment. It would be far better if, prior to a conference, the 27 Senators who want to explore an Atlantic Union and the 19 who favor a world federation with powers "adequate

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to preserve peace" should publicly state their opposition to the Bricker Amendment, which is clearly designed to make their proposals impossible.

Flexibility is the life blood that sustains and perpetuates constitutions. Concepts as to the nature of the foundations of peace and freedom change. This underlines the advisability of letting the United Nations Charter evolve, little by little, case by case. The general principles will remain, as they should do in any constitutional system. The practice will change to suit new needs and meet new emergencies.

An example of how procedure may be improved was the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution adopted November 3, 1950, which put the veto-free General Assembly in a position to act in emergencies where the Security Council found itself veto-bound. Recommendations of the Assembly in any case have a greater political and moral effect than was foreseen at San Francisco. Their influence can be measured by the heat which Assembly debates engender.

Meanwhile it is essential to counter Communist imperialism by strengthening regional and other defensive coalitions, and by making more effective our own economic and military power. We should prove by our diplomacy that we do this only because of the tensions which are both the cause and effect of armament, and that we are hoping and striving to end them. The need, above all, is for intelligent "multilateral diplomacy." In the last analysis, the test of survival will be whether we are able to exert a wise and informed leadership of freedom's coalition in the strategy of peace.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS: STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL?

By Bernard Brodie

WHEN President Truman in his last "State of the Union" message to Congress, on January 7, 1953, dwelt on the thermonuclear tests at Eniwetok in the preceding November, he added a note of significance if not substance to the original cryptic release of the Atomic Energy Commission. He asserted that man now "moves into a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of a new order of magnitude, dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." The war of the future, he added, "would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past—and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations."

President Eisenhower was later stimulated by comparable tests in the Soviet Union to add the distinction (in his press conference of October 8, 1953) between "conventional" types of atomic weapons and more advanced types. The Soviets already have a stockpile of the former, he admitted, "and we must furthermore conclude that they have . . . a weapon or a forerunner of a weapon far in excess of conventional types." He then went on: "We, therefore, conclude that the Soviets now have the capability of atomic attack on us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time. . . . We do not intend to disclose the details of our strength in atomic weapons of any sort, but it is large and increasing steadily." In a speech at Atlantic City a few days later he envisaged "the possible doom of every nation and society."

Neither President Eisenhower nor his associates added anything to what his predecessor had said nine months earlier about the American thermonuclear experiments. Thus, almost a year after the event at Eniwetok, we know only that certain things happened there, and more recently in the Soviet Union, involving devices having thermonuclear characteristics, and that these happenings have moved two presidents of quite unlike temperament and background to reflect gravely on the threat to our civi-

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lization. But we have been told quite explicity that a new phase of nuclear weapons development has now opened, and that it points potentially to weapons of a power "far in excess" of the type which even in its most primitive form was enough to cause the horror of Hiroshima. We are thus faced with the necessity of exploring the implications of the new type when we have not yet succeeded in comprehending the implications of the old.

Although our very forebodings on nuclear developments suggest a glimpse of consequences which proceed far beyond the normal concerns of the military, it is nevertheless from the area of military utilization that all these imaginings flow. Laymen interested in politics and society must therefore interest themselves in the character of that utilization lest they beg all the questions which are legitimately theirs.

Near the beginning of the first phase of atomic development, this writer attempted, in a symposium written with some former colleagues,[1] to appraise the military effects of atomic weapons. Now that the opening of another phase of development requires a new attempt, a drastically different situation confronts him.

Then the number of bombs in existence was already a matter of great secrecy, but it was clear that the number was quite small. One could generalize broadly about the future, because broad generalizations on the subject were still novel; and the knowledge then secret mattered very little, on the whole, for sweeping projections into the future. In fact, the fund of information available publicly was quite respectable compared to the amount withheld, for we had, among other things, the Smyth Report and some fairly detailed accounts of what had happened at Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

The more poignant and vigorous speculations of the time centered around the questions: When will the Russians get the bomb, and what will be the rate of growth of our own stockpile? In attempting to answer them one could be as much deceived as served by privileged access to information. The first question has already been answered, painfully, and the second, in so far as it concerns our existing stockpile and projections for the immediate future, continues to touch the innermost sanctum of the temple of forbidden knowledge, with the difference that the figures are now large.

[1] "The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order." Edited by Bernard Brodie. New York: Harcourt, 1946.

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The secrecy which continues to beset the entire subject of atomic weapons and their military uses is so pervasive that anyone who discusses the subject publicly must regard it not merely as a factor which must control his own writing but as a substantive issue of the first importance to his argument. For in approaching our subject we enter the domain of the ascendancy of the partial view, where no one short of the highest levels of authority can legitimately know all the important relevant facts, and where those few who find themselves at those levels are much too preoccupied with other matters to do much thinking about the problem.

One of the insidious effects of a climate of secrecy is that those who live in it gradually lose all awareness of the limits to their thinking that result not only from the curbs on their own knowledge and curiosity but also from the protection accorded their views. Those views are legally screened off from criticism arising outside the tight corporate structure in which they were developed—a structure that is unavoidably influenced or governed by habit, tradition, interest and formal authority.

The significance of all this for us is that when we presume to talk about the consequences of nuclear weapons upon military strategy and organization, we must modify our notions of inevitable effects following from sufficient causes. We are not dealing with Holmes' free market-place of ideas.

When we recall that both sides prior to the First World War failed utterly, with incalculable resulting costs, to adjust adequately their thinking to something as evolutionary as the machine gun, and that such failures have been characteristic of rather than exceptional in the history of war, we can hardly be sanguine about the adjustments likely to be made to such a change as that represented by developments in nuclear weapons. This is not to deny the important progress in scientific handling of military problems achieved since World War II. It is simply to ask whence will come the motivation and pressure that will cause incredibly busy men, advanced in rank and experience, to preoccupy themselves with basic issues which are confounding in the extreme and which must play havoc with special service interests and previous indoctrination.

We must therefore abandon all attempts to predict the extent of doctrinal adjustment and concern ourselves only with what the new facts of life, so far as we know them, seem to us logically

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to indicate. Some important facts are not public knowledge. About thermonuclear weapons, for example, all we know officially is that certain "experiments" have been concluded by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and that conclusions derived from those experiments have profoundly moved two warmhearted men. Among the things we should have to know in order properly to appraise the military importance of such weapons are the following: Will they be transportable in existing types of aircraft, or likely to become so? What will be their energy yield, or probable range of yields? And what will they cost per unit to produce; particularly, what will they cost in resources specific to the manufacture of fission bombs?

On the other hand, the range of publicly available information is perhaps greater than is generally realized, and is quite sufficient to warrant some useful speculation on forthcoming developments. We would have reason to suspect from the many test shots carried out by the A.E.C. that the technology of bomb development and manufacture is a vigorously expanding one, but Mr. Truman has been quite explicit about it. In the same speech cited above he stated that "the speed of our scientific and technical progress over the last seven years shows no signs of abating. We are being hurried forward, in our mastery of the atom, from one discovery to another, toward yet unforeseeable peaks of destructive power."

We know from official remarks on the many tests made thus far that the thermonuclear weapon, when and if it comes, will be only the latest and largest of a potential *family* of weapons. That the fission weapon can get fairly small in over-all dimensions and weight is suggested by the fact that one model available for use in a 280 mm. (11-inch) army gun has been tested with much public fanfare. The quantity of weapons available at any one time will probably therefore depend on how the existing fund of fissionable materials is apportioned among different types of weapons and on the current state of the art so far as it governs methods and efficiencies of detonation.

It is also officially public knowledge that the number of American nuclear devices already exploded at this writing is over 40—a quite suggestive figure in the light of international tensions which would presumably restrain us from waste (though it might also conceivably stimulate an eagerness to demonstrate our power). At least three Soviet fission devices and two British ones

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have also been exploded, besides one Soviet device "of a new type." Incidentally, every shot publicly announced beforehand came off as planned, indicating a high degree of reliability in the weapons so used.

It has of course been open knowledge from the beginning that the two standard types of fissionable material do not appreciably decay or deteriorate. Thus, the fund of available bombs accumulates in a strictly additive way. Obsolescence presumably affects the envelope or gadgetry of the weapon, but from all available indices this must be by far the least expensive component of the whole bomb and no doubt is as readily manufactured, once designed and in prototype, as any piece of ordnance.

We know also that the rate of American production has been considerably expanded in response to external stimuli like the Soviet nuclear explosion and the Korean war. Along with various press accounts and official releases of the discovery of new uranium deposits in various parts of the world, this suggests that the rate of output has so far depended on the amount of productive capacity we have been willing to invest in the project rather than on any absolute limit in availability of raw materials.

Finally, we know that the total amount spent by the United States Government on the atomic energy program from the beginning until June 30, 1952, was eight billion dollars, and that the budget for fiscal year 1953 was approximately two billion. The over-all figure of ten billion, of which about four billion represents present capital investment, includes the Manhattan District Project and the early days of the A.E.C., when exploratory ventures in a wholly new field, under pressures of haste, inevitably involved disproportionate costs. It also includes research into fields other than that of production of weapons, although the proportion so spent is probably not high. At any rate, for this over-all figure, which is a quite small fraction of the amounts spent on the other components of the national defense in the postwar years alone, we have acquired a stockpile of bombs or bomb components which is already fairly large, is rapidly growing larger, and which is presumably subject to even further expansion of production rates if desired. We are assured that the power of the individual fission bomb is or could be substantially greater than that used at Nagasaki, which was fearsome enough.

What sorts of broad general consequences do these facts suggest to us which are not already commonplace? If we mean this

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in the sense of predicting consequences which were not predictable or actually being predicted six or seven years ago, probably very little. But we should certainly now be capable of much more orderly judgments, and we have a far better basis for estimating how the trends are running. The size of our nuclear stockpile is still super-top-secret. But certainly 40-odd American atomic test explosions suggest that the weapon can no longer be regarded as exceedingly scarce or costly. Also, the predictions of much greater available power per bomb, reaching up to the untold destructiveness of the thermonuclear weapon, seem to have had some degree of confirmation. We are aware, too, of a flexibility of size, type and means of delivery for the bomb which seems to have outrun all predictions. And by whatever means they learned or acquired the essential bomb secrets, the Soviets tested their first nuclear device considerably sooner than most responsible observers expected them to—and their first thermonuclear device appallingly sooner. All in all, the conservatives of six or seven years ago now find themselves quite far down the course.

Certain other patterns begin to emerge. One of the most important concerns the relationship between the bomb and the vehicle delivering it, which for the time being appears to be primarily the airplane. The fact that bombs steadily accumulate while aircraft and their crews tend to reach a fixed level at which they are maintained and replaced means that the size of the bomb stockpile must inevitably grow larger and larger compared to the stockpile of long-range combat aircraft. We also know that an air force, particularly that part of it devoted to long-range bombing, is by any kind of accounting a frightfully expensive thing. Every year our strategic air force costs us an amount not far short of the entire sum we have thus far spent on atomic weapons. And whatever the relevance or irrelevance of monetary costs during war, it certainly affects preparations for war.

It is therefore inescapable that sooner or later, if not already, the long-range combat aircraft and its crew will represent a much larger investment and a substantially scarcer military resource than the nuclear bomb it carries. In war, attrition rates will be added to operational burdens to establish a cost of delivery which must dwarf that of the weapon carried. For fission bombs, the size of the long-range bomber force rather than the bomb stockpile will be the critical factor governing the magnitude of deep-penetration attacks.

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The simple circumstance just described sets off a chain reaction of significant consequences. First of all, it surely creates a bias, at least for long-range operations, in favor of larger-yield bombs, including perhaps the H-bomb itself. One should rather say it implements a bias already strongly urged by other military considerations which have to do with dependence on intelligence, on bombing accuracy, on the need for re-attack, and on the standard military desire to accomplish decisive results as quickly as possible.

This trend must in turn affect various other aspects of the strategic bombing campaign, such as choice of target, choice of vehicle, choice of base sites, and over-all force requirements. Suppose, for example, the thermonuclear weapon proves to be both technologically feasible and transportable in existing type bombers. And suppose we assume that the yield approximates that magic figure always spoken of in the newspapers, *i.e.*, 1,000 times that of the "nominal" (20 K.T.) fission bomb. Obviously, such a weapon is not going to be used against individual plants. Whether we like it or not, such a weapon when used strategically is a "city-buster." It could not be used on any industrial concentration in or near a city, where almost all such concentrations happen to be situated, without destroying that city. But large industrial-city targets happen to be relatively limited in number in any country, and after 50 or 60 of the larger cities were destroyed in either the Soviet Union or the United States there might not be enough industry surviving to be worth going after. What this will mean for the inhabitants of the cities concerned is another matter.

All this may indicate, among other things, that while the high sortie cost of the B-47 or the B-52 might promote adoption of the super-weapon in the first place, the net effectiveness resulting may be such as to warrant recourse to a more specialized and even costlier delivery vehicle, which may in turn affect the character and location of appropriate bases. Also, if larger-yield weapons reduce the number of necessary targets, we might do with a smaller delivery force than is presently planned, though not necessarily a less costly one. And smaller numbers of delivery units will probably mean that the striking force can be more dispersed and better concealed and protected than is feasible with existing strategic air forces, which in turn does much to alleviate the present possibility of a surprise attack wiping out our deter-

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rent and retaliatory force. All this is of course in the future, and is perhaps only a possibility worth discussing; but in view of the progress (using that word in anything but a normative sense) which has been made during the past seven years, events are likely to sweep along the unready if indeed they do not overwhelm them.

Another large result which should flow from the continuing production and accumulation of materials for nuclear weapons is the spilling over of great numbers of weapons into all kinds of tactical use. From the public comments of a number of high official authorities, including the former Chief of Staff of the Army, this is obviously already under way. The much-publicized development of the gun-fired atomic shell certainly suggests nothing else. Nevertheless, what we are justified in questioning, as a result of historical experience on the one hand and the absence thus far of any conspicuous adjustment of the tactics and organization of ground forces on the other, is whether the real portent and extent of the forthcoming revolution in firepower on the battlefield will be appreciated in good time.

The atomic bomb is already old enough to have encouraged some crystallization of attitudes concerning its use, and these attitudes naturally derive from a period of great scarcity when the conception of what was a "suitable target" had to be most restrictively interpreted. Also it is clear that military requests will greatly influence if they do not govern the rate of production of nuclear weapons and the kind of weapons produced, and it must by no means be taken for granted in these matters that the military appetite is always voracious. One might venture as a general principle the truistic proposition that there is no military unit too small, down to the company level, to be a "suitable" target for a nuclear weapon, provided such weapons are abundant enough—and whether they are abundant enough depends in good measure on whether there has been prior to the hour of need a sufficiently imaginative interpretation of the over-all economy and effectiveness of nuclear weapons as compared with ordinary munitions.

Obviously we cannot make any quantitative comparisons of economy and effectiveness here, but a few general points are worth remembering. First, the amount of ordinary high explosive ammunition consumed even in a Korean-type war is also enormously expensive. Some two billion dollars of the military budget

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for the fiscal year of 1953 were allocated to ammunition. Clearly it requires a good many shells to kill or disable an enemy soldier, and a considerable number of fighter-bomber sorties to put out even a small bridge. The artillery organizations and the weapons for firing that ammunition are expensive too, as are the tactical support air groups.

May we not suppose that some at least of the factors which have obviously revolutionized our conceptions of strategic air campaigns are also applicable to ground warfare and tactical air support of ground operations? The mere fact that we are able to maintain indefinitely a strategic air force which is capable, in the event of war, of carrying through with existing strength a complete strategic air campaign, argues such an overwhelming contrast with World War II conditions that we can only conclude that for such purposes nuclear weapons are enormously more economical than high explosive bombs. In fact, there is reason to suspect that because of the much greater cost of jet bombers as compared with World War II types, and also because of certain advances in defensive techniques, a large-scale strategic bombing campaign with high explosive bombs, especially over long distances, would simply not be a feasible operation today.

Battlefield targets are of course not strictly comparable to those of strategic bombing in terms of concentration and vulnerability; but it nevertheless seems clear that liberal use of nuclear weapons must contribute vastly to the effective fire power of ground forces. Nor can we on *a priori* grounds exclude thermonuclear weapons from tactical use, where they may indeed prove to have even greater comparative utility than in strategic bombing. In the latter, the militarily useful area of destruction is limited by the spatial extent of a fixed target. In tactical use, on the other hand, the limits are imposed only by the locations of people whom one does not want to hit; and so long as these can be protected or removed, the more area covered the better. By the very broad reach of its destructive power the thermonuclear bomb may anticipate and negate the tactics which ground combat forces might adopt as a counter to the smaller fission bomb, that is, distribution into smaller, more widely dispersed units—which cannot in any case be carried too far without forfeit of offensive power. It would also reduce dependence on precise enemy rear area intelligence, which in any rapidly moving campaign is almost always woefully inadequate.

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It is perhaps impossible at this time to picture what ground campaigns will be like in a situation where both sides freely use nuclear weapons of all sizes, and it is certainly disagreeable to try. But one result appears inevitable and important. Large masses of men must count for less on the battlefield except to provide more lucrative atomic targets—and superiority in military manpower is the one respect in which the Soviets have had us at an apparently permanent disadvantage. It also seems plain that opportunities to apply nuclear weapons usefully are much more open ended in tactical than they are in strategic use, which means that the American advantage in numbers of weapons and in ability to produce them (which there is no doubt we can continue to enjoy for as long as we are willing to make the effort) is likely to be profoundly meaningful for some time to come. For the short range penetrations characteristic of tactical use, the problem of delivery is nothing like so acute as it is in strategic bombing; attrition rates for aircraft are lower, a wider array of aircraft types and much larger numbers of aircraft are useable, and in the gun and the guided missile we have alternative methods of delivery. All this would seem to present the NATO Powers with a great net military gain vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, provided always the former can stand up as well as the latter to the threat of destruction of their cities, and provided also that reasonable precaution is taken against surprise nuclear attack on our tactical air forces.

What about the "limits" of nuclear weapons which we are constantly being admonished to bear in mind? There is no doubt that there are extremely grave and far-reaching limitations. But they lie not in the costliness of the weapons, in the difficulty of delivering them or in the finite boundaries of their destructive power. They stem, on the contrary, from their excessive destructive power. Excessive in terms of what? Their power is likely to be excessive in terms of any reasonable war objectives we might have. It threatens to be excessive in terms of the degree of responsibility which either side will develop concerning their use in war. And it is certainly excessive in view of the fact that the Russians as well as ourselves will have these capabilities.

The one thing which we must obviously begin to face up to in both our military and political planning is the fact that strategic bombing, in which we seem to have pretensions to monopoly privilege, is probably already a two-way capability, and that

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within a relatively few years Soviet capacity to injure us and our allies through such means will at least rival our capacity to injure them. The real significance of thermonuclear weapons used strategically, if it is feasible to transport them in jet aircraft and if they become available in any numbers, is that levels of destruction are likely to be set not by quantity of weapons nor even by numbers and quality of delivery aircraft but simply by the numbers of larger cities exposed as targets. Also, as stocks of thermonuclear weapons increase, civil air defense as we now think about it will be almost meaningless, as will any active air defense which fails to achieve the very highest levels of enemy attrition. This may be the kind of war we have to fight if and when we have a major war, but it ought not be the kind which we make inevitable through our own military acts and policies.

The dilemma of our age is that in order to preserve those things which we hold inviolable we must stand ready to meet a military challenge, and unless the ensuing business is handled most skillfully the things we have moved to defend will surely perish. It is self-evident that national objectives in war cannot be consonant with national suicide. But for the future there is no use talking about an unrestricted mutual exchange of nuclear weapons as involving anything other than national suicide for both sides.

Strategic bombing, which used to be deprecated on grounds of its presumed ineffectiveness, may in the future have to be restrained because it has become all too efficient. The ability to destroy the enemy's economy and some 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 of his people overnight might be inharmonious with our political objectives in war even if it could be done with impunity; but if we have to suffer such a blow the fact that we can also deliver one may be of small advantage and smaller solace. The fate of the Kilkenny cats was not before available to nations, which could often ruin each other in war but could never wholly succeed in consuming each other. There may be reasons besides those offered by conservative army officers for wishing to bring war back to the battlefield. Perhaps we can destroy the Russian strategic bombers before they get off the ground, but who will guarantee it?

Following his description of a future war in the words quoted at the beginning of this article, Mr. Truman asserted: "Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men." There was nothing

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at all extravagant in his description. If the kind of war he envisaged is not a present possibility, it will certainly be one soon enough. The standard political answer to such a horrible issue is that war must at all costs be avoided. But this is not a sufficient answer. War may in the net be less likely as a result of the new atomic developments, but there is not a sufficient guarantee against its occurrence. We have not yet discovered any substitute for force as a means of controlling blatant aggressions by powerful states, whose rulers may conceivably find in the universal fear of atomic war a stimulus to evil acts rather than a restraint upon them. There must also be a military answer, a second line of insurance, one which maximizes the chances that even a resort to arms will not mean an immediate pulling of all the stops.

There are conceivable ways of accomplishing this, of placing certain restraints upon ourselves and of using our formidable atomic power to force the enemy into observing similar restraints. Universal atomic disarmament, which is still the official aspiration of the United States, is clearly not possible. We therefore need to maintain and develop further our strategic striking power, even if our only use of it in a war of the future is to command observance of the ground rules we lay down. And we should probably need to use nuclear weapons tactically in order to redress what is otherwise a hopelessly inferior position for the defense of Western Europe.

If this conception of unlimited atomic potential coupled with limited wartime use thereof appears fanciful, let us look again at what happened in Korea. Perhaps Korea is not too appealing an example of the reëmergence in modern times of limited war, because the United Nations appears to have set greater restrictions upon both its use of means and its strategic and political objectives than the circumstances demanded—with, among other results, a deplorable stalemate. But it is noteworthy that narrow limits were imposed, and that it was the obviously stronger Power which imposed them and made them stick. These facts alone render dubious some of the easy generalizations of our time concerning the inevitable totality of modern war, or for that matter of the inexorable necessity to achieve total victory rather than more limited and modest goals.

Yet in war as in many other pursuits, there's nothing right or wrong but thinking makes it so. So long as the view persists in

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high military and political circles that *any* war which brings the Soviet Union and the United States into direct and open conflict *must* be total, so long will preparatory measures be adopted which insure that the opening of hostilities does in fact precipitate total war. It is obvious that one of the great inducements to the American leaders to keep the fighting in Korea limited was precisely the desire to maintain a favorable posture in the event of a more direct challenge in a more important region.

We must therefore proceed to rethink some of the basic principles (which have become hazy since Clausewitz) connecting the waging of war with the political ends thereof, and to reconsider some of the prevalent axioms governing the conduct of military operations. What are suitable political objectives to be sought through military action if a war situation should develop, and what are suitable military measures for bringing them about? Above all, what are the available instrumentalities for assuring that military action does not proceed beyond the suitable? If our strategic air force is a retaliatory force, as is so often asserted, what kinds of action will it retaliate against?

The time to begin such rethinking is right now, under urgency. In the technical sense of the term we may indeed be far away from push-button war, as we are so often reminded, but we are living right now in a situation in which the flashing of certain signals, possibly ambiguous signals, would in effect push buttons starting the quick unwinding of a military force which has been tensed and coiled for total nuclear war.

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RADAR DEFENSE TODAY— AND TOMORROW

By Sir Robert Watson-Watt

RADAR is now such a well-advertised secret that no one, physicist or publicist, stops to tell the simple citizen the simple facts about it—how it works, what it does easily, what it can do only with difficulty if at all, how it may be better used, how it may be frustrated. Yet all this can be put in civilian English without coming anywhere near the limit of what is recorded in military Russian. Radar is at once a science and an art, at once a process, a device and a system. What it achieves depends only in part on physics. It depends very greatly on people, as was shown by those of whom I have spoken elsewhere, in describing radar as the secret that was kept by a thousand women. An unintelligent, uninformed, uninterested or unconscientious operator can effortlessly throw away half a million dollars' worth of radar performance. I have not the means of knowing whether the NATO nations are now giving as much earnest consideration to the man as to the machine. The radar man, or the radar woman, is, I suppose, assumed to be much less newsworthy than the electronic Hobab.

In my wholly prejudiced view, radar began only when there was recognition that the agelong military problem of "What is beyond the Hill" should take, in air defense, the form of an attempt to give a substantially continuous flow of information about the exact position, flying height, composition and character of every formation in a possibly considerable number of spaced formations of aircraft, along and beyond an invisible, intangible frontier of detection and location. The frontier had to be thrust so far towards possible enemy bases as to give time for the interception and destruction of each enemy aircraft before it came near an important target. The unstated demand covered independence of the normal cycles of light and dark, of cloud, rain and fog, and—*dans la mesure du possible*—of the character of the intervening terrain.

At the risk of talking too much about my personal contribution, I propose to use the first part of that contribution as an introduction to some of the possibilities and difficulties of radar,

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without using the austere and often obscure language of the specialist. Consulted by the British Air Ministry early in 1935 about the prospect of using a "death-ray" against enemy aircraft, I wrote disparagingly about death-rays, but encouragingly about radio detection rather than radio destruction; and I went on to the writing of a 2,000-word memorandum offering a brand-new project, unsupported by any *ad hoc* observation or experiment.

II

What this memorandum of February 27, 1935, said, in language addressed to the scientific but non-specialized reader, can be fairly translated into plain language, without benefit of "hindsight," as follows:

"You need not hope for any help from the enemy in your attempts to locate him by the light, heat, sound or ordinary radio which he sends out. Nor will you get any useful results by spraying him with beams of light, heat or sound. You *must* put up a short-wave radio frontier which he must penetrate. Simple arithmetic [not reproduced in the present 'translation'] shows that you will get lots of reflected energy back, because the wings and fuselage of his aircraft will act as a good horizontal receiving antenna, and the received currents in them, due to your short-wave transmissions, will be also transmitting currents in this same antenna sending back to you. If, further, you use radio pulses instead of continuous waves, you can use existing valves to much better advantage; they will give much more output power without 'blowing up.' And if conditions allow you to beam your energy, instead of sending it out widely broadcast in the radio equivalent of floodlighting, you can do still better. But you must remember that radio searchlights may miss targets that would be caught in radio floodlighting; so let's try floodlighting first.

"You might well be able to measure the span of the aircraft by varying the wave length you use until you get specially strong reflections. More important, however, is my reassurance that the aircraft is a very flatly tuned antenna, so that for locating it you need not match your wave length carefully to its span; you need not worry about quite a big mismatch. This fact will also help you to hold your target when he turns. The amount of reflected energy you will get back is quite amazingly big.

"Going back to my advice to use pulses (which was first given here because you could safely overrun your transmitter to get

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greater ranges of location), you will be able to measure the distance of the aircraft from you by measuring the time of travel of the outgoing and reflected pulses, using a cathode-ray tube as a clock ticking off millionths of a second. You can use methods familiar to me and my colleagues, but you'll have to improve the technique very greatly. I am sure we can make these necessary improvements. I am quite seriously visualizing your getting location at 200 miles away; and the cathode-ray method which I propose gives you a very clear picture in which the echo stands out well against the background of 'radio noise.'

"If you can do no measurement other than distance—if, that is, you are confined to radio range finding—you will have to do range-cutting from spaced stations. You will want automatic computers for speedily solving the arithmetic of location. You will often need a long, continuous radio frontier, and you can afford it, for you can get a wide coverage from each station along the front. You can do still better with a front-line and a back-stop line. You will have some trouble with the Ionosphere. My figure of 200 miles may have startled you; but anyway 60 miles is a sure bet, and up to that range you can use tricks to avoid some of the possible difficulties with echoes from the electrically conducting region of the upper atmosphere (for which region, as it happens, I suggested the name 'Ionosphere'). But we shall have to be still cleverer. These troubles are due to the comparatively low frequencies that we must use at first; and we have to use them at first because we know enough about them, and we are in a hurry! On such frequencies we can generate high powers, build sensitive receivers, and we know what the airframe will do about reflecting them. They also risk giving away our secret of radio location. We might fool the possible enemy for a time by a quite plausible cover-story, pretending that we are peacefully surveying the Ionosphere in the interests of pure science.

"But we must get up to higher frequencies, and that means fresh work on techniques. But don't let us be foolish enough to wait for that; let us use now what we know now. To go to higher frequencies might more than halve our sensitivity until we can generate and receive them better than now. But that's not the main catch. We don't want to do just radio range finding.

"We have a very nice way (invented by myself) for seeing directly on a cathode-ray tube the directions from which brief radio impulses are arriving, but we haven't yet used it at the higher

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frequencies. Even if we could not do radio range finding we could do radio location immediately by a line of these instantaneous visual cathode-ray radio direction-finders, working on 50-meter wave lengths, with automatic computing and display. I am sure we can go on to make it work at ten-meter wave lengths, but that means work—and time. We have gone a long way towards the goal, even though we have not yet arrived (because we have not had to try).

"But that is by no means all we can do. We shall want to combine this direction-finding with range finding. In any case, we want to find the flying height of the enemy aircraft conveniently, and we have a way to do that, too; we have an instantaneous visual cathode-ray radio angle-of-elevation meter as well. We have not had, for our previous purposes, to make it very accurate, but we have, in fact, even used it down to ten-meter wave lengths. We are sure we can make it more accurate.

"It is not worth guessing now at the best way to combine these three direct and continuous sets of measurements—distance, direction and angle of elevation—because I am pretty sure that the only sensible thing for you to do is to ask us at Radio Research Station to put together these pieces, of the things which we have done ourselves or have learned from others, in such manner as to convert the new invention, here disclosed, into an operational process and equipment.

"It is possible I have overlooked some snags (though I do not think so); if I have, then there are two other things we can try, though I do not myself think much of them. First, there is a possible continuous-wave system which would reveal moving targets only; it would tell us directly the speed of the aircraft in line of sight, and two of my instantaneous visual direction finders would give us position fixes, but there are extra tricks needed. You will, however, see that it may, in any case, be important to get a system which 'sees' moving things only, neglecting fixed objects; and here I am offering you one way of doing that.

"Second, there is the frequency-change method, used by my colleagues Appleton and Barnett in exploring the Ionosphere. But I don't see how to get quick enough answers from it. I don't think we should do anything about it (or even think any more about it) unless we find that I have made big mistakes in the encouraging arithmetic of my main proposal.

"It is not, however, enough to locate an aircraft; we ought to

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know whom we are locating, so that we do not have to stop and think before we shoot. Therefore, we should try to do two more things: on the one hand we should try a new radio method of distinguishing ('discriminating') friend from foe and of distinguishing ('identifying') one kind of friend from another kind of friend. We should do it by a coded intermittent reinforcement of the radar responses we expect. And we must, of course, have good radio communication with our interceptor aircraft to control their manœuvres into a favorable position and altitude for attack.

"Lastly, we can almost certainly, again from our experience and our own novel devices at Radio Research Station, provide automatic following."

How this proposal led to the first tracking of aircraft by radar on June 16, 1935; to the first diagnosis of the strength and tactics of a formation of aircraft on July 24; to the first radar measurement of flying height in August and the first experimental verification of monostatic radar in November 1935, is a separate story. But the limitations of radar are essential to an understanding of radar in defense, and even this "plain language" translation itself needs translation.

III

The radar problem can perhaps be illuminated by considering the searchlight problem, in which a similar basic difficulty is attacked by different physical means.

The main difficulty about the unaided visual detection of a moderately distant aircraft in the daytime is that the sunlight which it reflects is absorbed by fog, mist, haze or cloud, when these are present, or partly scattered and partly absorbed by the molecules of the atmosphere even in "clear sky" conditions. The twofold difficulty at night is that the aircraft does not reflect a sufficient amount of the feeble moonlight or starlight falling on it to stand out more brightly than the background, and it does not stand out sufficiently darkly against the average night sky background because of this same scattering and absorption between it and the observer's eye. In both cases the basic defect is inadequate contrast between target and background, a lack of contrast due to interference by sources of light—direct light or reflected light—other than the target. The ordinary searchlight attempts to make the aircraft a predominantly strong source of reflected

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light by projecting strong direct lighting on to it. Quite aside from the needle-in-a-haystack aspect of searchlighting, the too familiar groping in the dark sky, the effort is in any case doomed to very restricted success. For the searchlight beam itself is heavily absorbed even in "clear air," and it makes its own contribution to diminution of contrast by having its light scattered sideways by the air molecules, which thus join the throng of interfering sources of light. So the searchlight has an acute search problem. When that is solved, it is effective at ranges of a comparatively small number of thousands of feet in cloudless weather and is ineffective when cloud intervenes. When the distant aircraft escapes from the beam there is no adequate evidence about its direction of escape (the needle is reëmbedded in the haystack). And at the best there is no direct evidence of the flying height and distance of the aircraft—simultaneous illumination by several searchlights and some quick trigonometry must intervene to establish the data needed by the gunner or the interceptor pilot.

What are the radar counterparts to these difficulties?

The basic problem of establishing adequate contrast between target and background faces the radar man also. He knows that the enemy will not send out "flashes" of invisible radio waves, because these would give away some evidence on the position of the aircraft containing the radio transmitter. So he "illuminates" the uncoöperative aircraft with his own radar waves, and hopes to catch and interpret the small fraction of this invisible radio "light" which the aircraft throws back towards him. Why is there not perfect contrast between this radio reflector and its background? Not because the atmosphere scatters the radio "light" as it does visible light; the scattering of radio waves by clear air is negligible, by cloud it is substantial, but not (because it gives on the radar screen cloud echoes that are readily recognizable as cloud-like) very troublesome. Nor is the absorption of the radio "light" by the atmosphere a serious contribution to the difficulties.

Are there, then—to revert to the searchlight story—interfering sources of radio "light" in the sky? Or is it that the reflected radio "light" from the aircraft is just intrinsically too weak to be "seen" at useful distances? Not the latter; because (as the unquoted arithmetic of the 1935 memorandum showed) this could confidently be expected to be "visible" to a radio "telescope" two

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hundred miles away (because of one technical trick of supreme importance in radio, the ability enormously to magnify, or amplify, as the radio man prefers to say, excessively weak received radio waves). Not wholly, though largely, the former; because the sky is studded with radio stars and the sun is a radio sun, pouring the longer "radio" waves into our atmosphere along with the very short electromagnetic waves which we call light. Moreover, lightning flashes are not only light flashes, they are radio "flashes" sending radio waves towards us from quite large distances. So the radio mirror of the aircraft shows up through a feeble diffuse glow of radio "noise" (as the radio engineer, for obvious reasons, calls it), shot through at intervals by brighter radio "flashes," dispersed more or less all over the sky. And all this may be supplemented and even dominated by a "bright blaze" of radio communication waves, or of such waves deliberately sent on the wave length of the radar by an enemy undertaking radio countermeasures.

There is one more major problem in "seeing" the target from great distances. As just described, the amplification of the radar waves which are reflected by the aircraft is accompanied by the amplification of the cosmic and terrestrial radio noise. In addition, the degree of amplification that can be usefully employed is limited by the presence of radio noise generated within the radio receiver which acts as a radio eye. It is as if in the searchlight case we looked for our illuminated aircraft through binoculars inside which we had a tiny flickering lamp bulb constantly distracting us by its fluctuating internal reflections. This internally generated radio noise, due to the random movements of the electrons in the receiver circuits, can be kept low, but it cannot be eliminated, and it sets the final limit to the minimum radio "brightness" which we can observe.

It sounds formidable. But despite it all, we can extract all the information we require from a radar echo which contains only one hundredth of a billionth of a billionth of the energy which we send out to produce the echo. And although there are radio seasons and radio day-and-night, their variations are not of major importance to us, so that radar performance is substantially independent of season, day, night or weather, save for some cloud effects which are at times troublesome—and often valuable.

If any one particular aircraft were always at the same distance from our radar station when the received fraction is one hun-

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dredth of a billionth of a billionth—if, that is, the fraction returned to us were uniquely related to the distance—radar would do almost all that is asked of it by the most exacting user. But this is far from being the case. Just as the useful range of a searchlight is greatly reduced when it is turned nearly horizontally—even over a flat sea—so, though for completely different physical reasons, radar range at low angles of elevation is very greatly reduced relative to high angles. Moreover, the oddities due to the electrical conductivity of the ground, one of them being this poor low-angle performance, include also the existence of a whole series of inclined lanes in which aircraft are detectable only at much shorter range than between lanes.

And, for practical purposes, radar range is not dependably greater than "line of sight" in the special sense that if an extremely sensitive eye at the height and position of the radar antenna could not, under conditions of perfect visibility, see an extremely bright light at the height and position of the aircraft, then radar detection by any normal radar is nearly at its extreme limit of range. The radar rays can always bend a little around the bulge of the earth after grazing it, but normally only a very little. Although special distributions of temperature and humidity in the atmosphere can give exceptional radar "visibility"—sometimes to very great distances—this can by no means be depended on to happen at a selected moment. For the military user, it happens at a random and not usefully forecastable moment; it gives him only abstract satisfaction to know that a radar on the western shores of the Indian sub-continent once "saw" the hills of Aden, 1,600 miles away.

Further, just as a searchlight beam illuminates the tips of hills, the crests of waves, the walls of buildings in its path, so do the radar rays produce radar echoes from similar projections from the level surface. Thus an echo coming from an aircraft may be, and too often is, lost in "ground clutter;" or coming from a ship or a buoy or an iceberg it may be lost in "sea clutter." So on most sites the radar will require a "moving target indicator" which, on request, can be blind to reflections from stationary objects.

The objects which thus give radar echoes also cast radar shadows behind them, but fortunately the shadow "heals up" much more nearly completely for radio waves, with their relatively very great wave length, than for the short waves of visible light. Nevertheless, it is possible for the enemy to skulk in the shadows

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and in the low-sensitivity lanes, just as it is possible for him to dazzle the radar with "flashes" or radio jamming signals and to confuse it by radar reflections from widely spreading masses of metallic foil strips which are so effective as reflectors that they can simulate the responses which would be sent out from an aircraft formation.

IV

So much for the things just above the average surface. What of things high above, and things below, the surface? There are frequent suggestions that the very high-flying aircraft is likely to escape radar detection, and that the very high-flying missile—V2 and its progeny—would be even more likely to do so. This is true, but not with the almost implacable certainty that protects the low flier at any substantial distance from the radar station.

There are four possible excuses for failure to locate and track the modern very-high-flying aircraft. Two of them are legitimate excuses, two are the product of faults in system design, in the sense that a failure to achieve something that is practicable, but difficult, inconvenient and expensive, is still a fault in system design.

Let's begin with the faults. The first arises from what I might call the pursuit of the celestial omnibus—the hope that a single car with infinitesimal fuel consumption can give flashing pick-up, exhilarating top speed, imperceptible braking, satin smooth riding and dependable reliability, all with the boudoir luxury of a limousine and the capacity of an inter-city coach. Radar can do nearly everything; any one radar can do only a very few things very well. What is required to maintain a continuous watch for medium-level fliers at long range, together with continuous tracking to short range, is difficult enough to embody in one radar equipment. An effective watch for low-flying aircraft over the same total area requires several separate and additional installations. And an effective watch for really high-flying aircraft poses two special design demands which are best met technically, though perhaps not economically, by still another separate radar installation. This installation must adequately "illuminate" the no-man's-land of the higher angles of elevation, and to do this it must cope with the high angular velocity of the fast aircraft at these high angles; so if it searches, it must search fast. But if it searches too fast, then—because unlike the ordinary searchlight

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it does not pour out its illumination in an unbroken stream, but in a succession of very brief, very intense radar "flashes," spaced very widely in time relatively to their brief duration—it may score a hit on the target with only one or two of these brief flashes in passing, and so fail to get enough energy back for detection. In other words, as the radar engineer puts it, it may achieve too few "paints" on the target. To reconcile these two sources of faulty performance is in itself difficult; to combine the successful resultant high-angle, continuous watch with a lower-angle watch by the same equipment is almost unreasonably demanding.

Now for the two "legitimate excuses." The lesser but far from negligible of these is that such special but not infrequent distributions of temperature and humidity in the atmosphere as we have already noted may "trap" a large fraction of the energy radiated from radar and target alike in a temporary "duct" at low levels. This gives a temporary (but, as was remarked earlier, unuseful because unforecastable) extension of low-angle coverage at a most dangerous expense of a restriction of high-angle coverage. This is one more of nature's contributions to the perplexities of the radar man.

The other "legitimate excuse" is man-made. Thus far we have discussed an aircraft as if it were just an aircraft, but there are aircraft and aircraft, very diverse in their merits and demerits as radar targets. The big-span, plump, many-propellered bomber of 1945 was an excellently copious reflector of radar waves; the disappearance of propellors was and is a disappointment to the radar man. The svelte figure of the jet-propelled interceptor, which should be visible on the screen of the ground-controlled interception radar so that it may be directed towards its prey, is a major worry, for the interception ought, for tidiness, to be made far beyond the radar chain and far out towards the invisible frontier.

Well before the V2's began to reach us in London, we were studying the astonishingly accurate specifications of its size and shape which became available to us from certain highly coöperative sources. We at once recognized that we were faced with an acute radar problem. We could compute with certainty that, nose-on, it would be an extremely poor radar target; it would send very little of our exploratory radar pulse energy back to us. Looked at side-on rather than head-on, it promised to be a moderately good target for our original comparatively long-wave

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radars of the coastal chain protecting the United Kingdom; but it still would be a very poor target for the centimeter radars that had supplemented (but not supplanted) the radars that were, with a quizzical combination of affection and disdain, called "steam radar" by all save the eight-year veterans of radar. And when the full-scale trials (in both senses) came on us, steam radar did in fact locate the V2 as it was ascending vertically, and thus side-on to England, from its launching point 120 miles away, but lost it as it turned on to the flatter and major part of its trajectory. No need for me to draw the moral or morals of this cautionary tale.

So much for troubles of ground radars. The airborne early-warning radars and the shipborne early-warning radars of the now so well advertised secret defense programs share most of these troubles, accentuate many of them, and add to them formidable problems of logistics, communications and position fixing. But they are all soluble, given money, which is in short supply; technical skill, which is in shorter supply; and operational-technical wisdom, which is in much the shortest supply of all.

It is scarcely necessary to speak here of that other over-publicized item in the defense-radar catalogue, the data-handling system necessary to reconcile and compact the information from a group of radars into constantly clear and un-stale situation maps. But without putting so much as the pressure of a little finger on the highly elastic envelope of secrecy, we must add a reminder that a country worth defending, and capable of defense, will have in its skies a wealth of aircraft which are not hostile, and that their right to live and work unharassed must be maintained. The problem of aircraft identification in radar was posed in the first "prospectus" of radar in 1935; and despite a vast expenditure of ingenuity and effort it was not satisfactorily solved by 1945. It must be solved by 1955. We may hope that there is more hopeful material in the envelope of secrecy than the Multiple Corridor Identification System, the TOMCIS cat that was let out of the bag in a recent magazine article.

We simple citizens should have some general awareness, too, of the scale and variety of the instruments of "radio warfare" that can be brought to bear on an otherwise "solid" radar early-warning radar screen. These form just the newest item of that never-ending series of counter-counter-countermeasures in the agelong contest between projectile and armor.

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V

The sub-surface object of the greatest military importance is the submerged submarine. This is virtually radar-proof, even without anti-radar paint, the thick coating with carefully computed electrical and magnetic properties which greatly reduce its effectiveness as a radar mirror over an octave or so of radio frequencies. The anti-radar coat is valuable to the unsubmerged breathing tube of the schnorkel and to the unsubmerged periscope. The submerged craft finds a vastly more convenient and effective anti-radar coating in the mere body of salt water in which it is immersed. It isn't that all radio waves fail to penetrate a layer of salt water, for it is no secret that radio signals can be sent to submerged submarines from stations a thousand or two miles away. The trouble is that only very long wave lengths thus penetrate to any considerable depth; and very long waves, though they are reflected at boundaries between regions of differing electrical-and-magnetic properties, bring back such crude information about their travels as to be of no value as searchers. The short radio waves which are the highly qualified radar detectives cannot effectively penetrate even a few feet depth of sea water.

Can radar usefully pursue the submarine after submersion? Here all prognosis is gravely unfavorable. But fortunately the technical entrepreneurial daring which was encouraged by the triumphs of radar development offers hopes of other, non-radar, solutions.

Can the limitation to substantially rectilinear-line-of-sight radar detection range be effectively overcome? The scientific prognosis is favorable, the technical not unfavorable, the economic forbidding. A relatively new field of knowledge, which may legitimately be called radio weather and radio climatology, has been opening up at an increasing tempo in recent years. It must not be supposed to be identical with the field which is already identified as Radio Meteorology, though it is intimately linked with that field. Radio Meteorology deals, almost exclusively, with the effects of the lower atmosphere, and of its water content in particular, on the travel of radio waves and, inter alia, with the study of the lower atmosphere by the use of radio tools. What I am calling, in the absence of adequate semantic analysis, Radio Weather and Radio Climatology is the ensemble of systematized information on how the terrestrial atmosphere as a whole, up to

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levels hundreds of miles above the ten-mile thick weather-layer, governs the conveyance of desired intelligence from man-made devices by imposing it as a modulation on radio "carrier-waves." There are quite recently recognized grounds for expecting that radar information may usefully be gathered from greater distances than near-horizon distance; but how precise the intelligence can be, and above all how nearly the mechanism of travel of the radio waves can satisfy the inexorable military need—"the selected moment, not merely the random moment"—is still a subject for long, close and wide-flung study.

VI

May I now, in conclusion, interview myself briefly?

Question 1: "Can a radar network be designed, on the knowledge available to us within 1953, to give certain warning at a defense command center of the passage of any aircraft over a frontier lying outward, by about six hours flying time, from any major target of attack in the continental United States?"

Answer 1: "My personal answer is broadly 'yes,' but it is subject to many reservations and explanatory supplements which cannot be set out within the limits of an article."

Question 2: "Can an aircraft crossing this frontier be identified within 15 minutes to the degree of being classed as 'very probably hostile' or 'very probably friendly'?"

Answer 2: "I do not think that an adequate or nearly adequate solution to this problem has yet been found."

Question 3: "Can the early-warning network envisaged in Questions 1 and 2 ensure the destruction of an overwhelmingly large fraction of a hostile force before it reaches a major target?"

Answer 3: "Not without the absolutely indispensable activities of an inner radar network for control of interception, and of a very large, exquisitely organized and stringently practised interceptor force."

Question 4: "Can such a destruction ratio as is envisaged in Question 3 be achieved without the network of Question 1 and the organization envisaged in Answer 3?"

Answer 4: "Quite certainly not without the latter, almost certainly not without both; almost certainly 'yes' if both are well designed and well operated."

Question 5: "Are these two radar networks and the elaborate interceptor organization indispensable to the defense of the

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United States, having regard to other military deterrents to aggression against the United States?"

Answer 5: "Yes."

Question 6: "Do you think the United States economy can afford the provision and operation of this threefold defense system, together with the other deterrents mentioned in Answer 5?"

Answer 6: "Yes. Expensive as they are, they are certainly within the reasonable reach of an economy with a present Gross National Product valued at a billion dollars a day. A just appreciable reduction of the material standard of living in the United States would probably be involved; but it would not be more than a minute fraction of the hardships still being suffered by every nation outside North America on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This I say not from secondhand information only, but from personal observation, in and since World War II, in every continent save Australasia and on both sides of the Iron Curtain."

Question 7: "Have you anything more to say on aids to averting successful aggression against North America?"

Answer 7: "Yes, two widely different things. First, that we must not underestimate the risk that isolated defense airfields, in the Far North for example, *could* become intermediate airfields used by the aggressor. Second, that as words are still triggers that release bombs, we should be diligent to use no word that tends, avoidably, to unite the ordinary citizens of Soviet and satellite lands with their dictatorial masters."

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AGRICULTURE IN THE SOVIET SPOTLIGHT

By Vladimir P. Timoshenko

MALENKOV'S speech before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on August 8, 1953, promising the Russian people much more food and manufactured consumer goods, made a great impression abroad. Perhaps it impressed the inhabitants of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, perhaps not. Who can tell? But in the West, at any rate, the promise was taken as announcement of a complete break with previous Soviet policy. Many learned conjectures were advanced to explain the important change and many imposing forecasts have been built upon it.

Is it really a new policy? Or had it, perhaps, already been proclaimed by the Party Directive for the Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1951–55, accepted in October 1952 by the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party and announced in a draft in August of that year? What we can profitably speculate upon is whether the Soviet Government is likely to be able to fulfill Malenkov's promises. And it is a fair guess that the Russian people are wondering about that also, since they have heard such promises before, and know that they were not fulfilled. The Third Five-Year Plan, for instance, pledged to raise the supply of consumer goods during the years 1938–42 slightly more than Malenkov has now promised; in fact, the supplies of consumer goods declined even during the three prewar years of that period.

What is certainly a fact is that Soviet *heavy* industry has grown rapidly, and from the recognition of that fact comes the belief of the outside world that if the Soviet Government were actually to shift its efforts from heavy industry to light industries and food, results would quickly follow. But is the matter so simple? Textile and food industries supply by far the largest part of the total requirements of consumer goods. Has the Soviet Union enough raw materials to expand them rapidly? Assuming continuation of the autarchic policy which has become sacred to the Soviet Government during the past 20 years, the only source of raw materials for consumer goods is the agriculture of the Union itself. Is the Soviet Government perhaps prepared to repudiate this autarchic policy? If not, then the question is whether Soviet agriculture is in a position to increase the supply of foodstuffs and industrial crops on short notice. By foodstuffs I mean

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not only grain for bread, but also meat, milk, lard, oil seeds, sugar beets, and fruits and vegetables, because bread alone cannot satisfy the food requirements of a rapidly growing urban population in such an industrialized country as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government has long kept its population on a diet mainly of bread and potatoes. Perhaps that is why Malenkov is now obliged to speak strongly of better food.

City people like to eat animal products; but to produce them requires several times more labor and land than does vegetable food. Moreover, such textile raw materials as cotton, flax, hemp, wool and silk also require much intensive labor, and some need a warm climate. The area of subtropical climate is very limited in the U.S.S.R., and by far the largest portion of it is very dry and requires irrigation. Again, the cold winter weather typical of most Soviet areas is not favorable for some branches of the livestock industry—merino sheep, for instance; and it also means that buildings are needed for animals.

Certainly the record of the Soviet Government in dealing with such problems is poor. The plan of reorganizing agriculture on a socialized basis, in the form of *kolkhozes* (collective farms) and *sovkhozes* (state farms), was started sometime in 1927–28, at about the same time as the First Five-Year Plan of industrial development. Yet in 1940, the last prewar year, after 13 to 14 years of planned development, gross agricultural production as estimated by competent specialists was only 15 percent above the level of 1927–28, whereas production of industrial materials such as coal, petroleum, pig iron and steel has been multiplied several fold. A similar relationship also prevailed during the first postwar plan (1946–1950). Whereas the basic heavy industries rapidly reached and even surpassed prewar levels, and in several cases exceeded the 1950 goals, practically no target established for agricultural products was reached in 1950. The gross agricultural production in that year missed its goal by more than 15 percent. It is not necessary to resort to complicated calculations of various indexes based on incomplete Soviet information to prove this. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said in the plenary meeting of the Central Committee last September that while gross industrial production increased 2.3 times from 1940 to 1952, gross agricultural production in 1950 exceeded the 1940 level by only 10 percent. It is also significant that light industry, which depends on supplies of raw materials

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from agriculture, lagged far behind other industries; production in 1950 exceeded the 1940 level by only 17 percent.[1]

At first glance it may seem strange that the Communist rulers could push ahead so rapidly with industrial production, particularly in heavy industry, in a country so relatively backward as prerevolutionary Russia, while meeting with so many failures in reorganizing agriculture, the main occupation of the peoples of the Russian Empire for many centuries. But the discrepancy is natural enough. Most urban proletarians welcomed the nationalization of industrial enterprises and participated actively in taking them over. Early in the revolution the peasants also were active in taking over the large estates, but they were not thinking then of the nationalization of these lands but of parcelling them among themselves. From the outset the Soviet Government proclaimed the principle of nationalization of large estates, but for some time this remained mere words; only a few million acres of the more than 100,000,000 confiscated from large estates were retained as state farms or communes. In order to realize its dreams of large agricultural enterprises, the Communist Party had to undertake a real war against the peasantry in the early 1930's. The peasants remained recalcitrant even after they had been forced into *kolkhozes,* particularly in the Ukraine and in the areas of Don and Kuban Cossacks where individual ownership of land was more common than in central Russia. The government deliberately starved these peasants into submission in 1932–33 by taking not only the surpluses from the *kolkhozes* but the food their members needed for survival.

At the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932, gross agricultural production, instead of being raised 50 percent as ordered, actually fell 20 to 25 percent below the level of 1927–28. Nearly half of the livestock that peasants possessed before forced collectivization were killed or perished from various causes. This catastrophe in the early years of forced collectivization enabled the Soviet Government to boast of substantial increases under the next two plans, when measured by the disastrously low level of 1932. But recovery was slow and, although in 1940 gross agricultural production was some 15 percent above the pre-collectivization level, the numbers of livestock never were restored to the level of 1928.

Khrushchev called attention last September to the critical con-

[1] G. Drampyan, *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* Moscow, N2, 1953, p. 35.

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dition of the *kolkhoz* livestock herds, admitting that there were 10,000,000 fewer cattle in the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1953 than in 1928. Nine-tenths of the decline, he said, was in numbers of cows. He also declared that the numbers of sheep and goats in 1952 were also below pre-collectivization levels, and that there were only about two-fifths as many horses as in 1928. His revelations were not news for students of Soviet agriculture, though it was interesting to be told that during 1952 the total number of cattle in the Soviet Union had fallen by 2,200,000 head (one-fourth of which were cows) instead of being raised by the same number, as directed by the Fifth Five-Year Plan. That this information should be shared with the readers of all newspapers was a new departure, however. For 20 years no Soviet publication had published an honest comparison of the achievements of collectivized and pre-collectivized agriculture. Why was the failure emphasized? Both Malenkov and Khrushchev, of course, also drew comparisons between the failures of backward *kolkhozes* and regions and the achievements of certain others. All responsibility was put on the backward farms. Was this merely the usual Soviet method of inspiring subordinates? Or was it a preparation of excuses for non-fulfillment of promised abundance?

II

Various measures taken from 1946–1950 show the Soviet dissatisfaction with what was going on in this section of the economy. In February 1947, the government and the Communist Party resolved "on measures to raise agriculture in the postwar period," and Andreev, who was then responsible for the Communist drive for recovery in agriculture, presented a report revealing the depths to which production had fallen at the end of the war. In the autumn of 1948, a huge project for afforestation of the entire steppe zone in the European territory of the Union, affecting more than half of the country's total arable area, was proclaimed. This project, usually called "Stalin's Plan of Transformation of Nature," included also the plan for rapid introduction of new crop rotations to restore the fertility of the soil. That so vast a project was thought urgently necessary indicates that the government was aware not only of shortcomings of the peasants but also of the climate and soil of the country. It suggested that Soviet agriculture had, in fact, reached its natural frontiers in spite of the existence of vast undeveloped regions in northern

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European Russia and Asiatic Russia, and that further increase of agricultural production must be achieved mainly by raising yields per acre through application of intensive methods of farming. However, climatic conditions of the southern steppe zone make doubtful the success of intensive agriculture. Even if the project of afforestation of the steppe is eventually successful, it cannot produce an important effect on agricultural production in much less than 20 years.

In the spring of 1949, two years before the end of the plan, the government announced a new Three Year Plan (1949–1951) for development of livestock breeding in collective and state farms. Its statistics revealed an enormous reduction in the numbers of livestock held individually by members of collective farms, and thus showed that the drive to increase the numbers of livestock in collectivized herds was proceeding at their expense. Both Malenkov and Khrushchev confirmed this in their recent speeches. A decision of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in September 1953 simply says that "many directors of collective farms and leaders of local administration and agricultural agencies, instead of organizing reproduction of livestock in collective herds, continued mass purchasing of livestock from *kolkhozniki.*" It must be added that members of collective farms are not free to refuse offers of purchase extended by Soviet officials. Khrushchev said that the number of cows held privately has declined by 6,500,000 and that nearly half of the *kolkhoznik* families now have no cows. Both he and Malenkov admitted that this contradicts the policy of the Communist Party, and both promised to correct it. But this situation was widely known in 1949, and the practice had not been changed by 1953. Khrushchev's speech also reveals some reasons why: "some comrades believe that possession of livestock privately by *kolkhozniki,* even within the limits of their right according to the *kolkhoz* statute, represents a certain danger to the Socialist régime." He insisted that only persons who did not understand party policy could harbor such an idea. A good many comrades were evidently unclear about it.

Even with these "incorrect practices," however, the schedule for expanding *kolkhoz* herds during 1949–51 was not realized. The rates of growth actually declined, until finally in 1952 there came even an absolute decline in the number of cattle. The preamble to the three-year plan of development of livestock breed-

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ing, announced in 1949, indicated that the principal obstacle to growth in number and productivity of livestock was the unsatisfactory situation in fodder production. (Four years later, in 1953, both Malenkov and Khrushchev reiterated this.)

In 1950, just before the end of the plan-period, the government found it necessary to undertake two more major steps. Four big irrigation projects were dramatically announced, and a ruthless political drive for enlargement of collective farms was launched. The irrigation projects are supposed to add 15,000,000 acres of cultivable land, and to supply grazing area of 55,000,000 acres with water for grazing livestock. Most of these projects plan to use water from the Dnieper, Don and Volga rivers, and are thus outside the traditional area of irrigated farming. They are supposed to complement the big afforestation project launched in 1948, which may indicate that the Kremlin rulers are not confident of the early success of that project. In any event, both the afforestation and irrigation plans are long-range, and even if ultimately successful they cannot help Malenkov keep his promise to raise sharply the supply of foodstuffs and manufactured goods in two or three years. The greater accent on supplying water for grazing land only emphasizes the increasing difficulties facing the livestock enterprise.

The drive for enlargement of collective farms, launched in 1950, is a trustworthy clue to the deep dissatisfaction of the Soviet planners with the functioning of collectivized agriculture. It was undertaken without much fanfare. Several technical articles published in mid-1950 explain that it is prompted merely by technical requirements, such as the need for larger fields to permit efficient use of tractors and other machinery. Yet the drive for enlargement was not limited to the northern forest areas, where farms were really small, but extended to the southern steppe area, where existing farms were large enough for use of tractors. In two years the number of collective farms was reduced from more than 250,000 to less than 100,000.

Clearly, technical reasons were not the major factor in the drive. It was partly an expression of the mania for giant farms so much in vogue in the early period of state and collective farms, but the principal motive was probably the desire of the government to tighten control over collective farms through Machine-Tractor Stations. The program apparently roused much opposition among members of collective farms, who feared that in their

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resettlement to the new centers of large collective farms—so-called agro-cities—they would lose the last vestiges of the highly-cherished small plots of land around their farmsteads. Finally, the government postponed the resettlements and, at the Nineteenth Congress, Malenkov criticized the enthusiasts who wanted to tear down the old villages and build the agro-cities immediately. He advised the building of good stables and pigsties on the newly-enlarged farms, well aware that this task alone would keep the *kolkhozes* busy for several years. Khrushchev's speech of last September indicated that in some places the problem of providing buildings for livestock looms as important as the problem of fodder supply.

Whether or not prompted by technical considerations, the drive to enlarge farms brought to the foreground some real technical difficulties. The resurveying of lands and the plotting of new fields for crop rotations disrupted existing rotations. It seems altogether possible that the program may delay a badly-needed improvement of rotations for another decade. Unquestionably, the setback in the development of livestock breeding recently revealed by Khrushchev was also due in considerable degree to uncertainty and turmoil connected with the farm enlargement. The fact that the setback took place in 1952, before the death of Stalin, indicates that it was caused by previous measures that provoked dissatisfaction and suspicion on the part of the *kolkhozniki,* and not by the political uncertainty that followed Stalin's death.

In spite of all these important steps taken by the Kremlin during the first postwar plan for economic development, and in some cases, perhaps, because of them, practically all goals of the agricultural plan were missed by considerable margins. By contrast, as we have noted, the industrial plan was satisfactorily fulfilled, except for food and light industries which were handicapped by shortage of agricultural materials. Such a gap in performance between agriculture and heavy industry cannot have been intentional. It is possible that there was a decision in 1947 to accelerate the manufacture of armaments and, in connection with this, to expand heavy industry beyond the goals originally planned. But this could not have been done deliberately at the cost of agricultural production. It is clear that every effort was made to expand agriculture, at least to the original goal. If this was missed by a wide margin, it was because the leaders lacked not the will but

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the means to achieve it. The recent speeches of Malenkov and Khrushchev offer conclusive evidence that the lag has become even more serious than before.

III

The peculiarity of the agricultural plan for 1951–55 is that it set ambitious goals for total outputs of both vegetable and animal products—an increase of about 50 percent in gross agricultural production in five years—but at the same time scheduled little expansion of the cropped areas (except for fodder crops) and of livestock numbers. By far the largest part of the planned increase in crop production, therefore, must be achieved by a rapid rise in yields per acre, while a substantial part of the required increase in animal products must be reached by raising the productivity of animals.

Successful fulfillment of this plan requires great improvement in agricultural techniques, improvement of crop rotations by adjusting them carefully to the special conditions of each farm, a large increase in the application of fertilizers, improvement of seeds, more adequate feed supplies, and better care for animals, including the better buildings that, as we have noted, are so important under the severe climatic conditions of most of the Soviet Union. But the collective-farm system is very poorly adapted to intensive forms of agriculture. Its enormous maze of bureaucratic controls leaves no room for initiative among the farmers; and its obligatory deliveries of products to the state at low prices give the *kolkhozniki* little interest in increasing their output. To these brakes on production must be added the uncertainties generated by the drive to enlarge the collective farms which, at least temporarily, must have weakened rather than reinforced *kolkhoz* discipline.

It would be difficult to present a stronger criticism of some of the existing practices of the Soviet agricultural system than was contained in Khrushchev's September speech: the speech is required reading for anyone who wishes an authoritative explanation of the shortcomings of the collective farm. The only puzzling thing about it is how Khrushchev could hope to improve the system enough to fulfill Malenkov's promises of abundant food and other consumer goods in two or three years. Indeed, some of the goals of the plan would be difficult to fulfill even under an efficient organization of agriculture.

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As examples of what Khrushchev is up against we may note the plan for increasing the acre-yields of grain nearly 40 percent in five years. Grain still occupies 70 percent of the total cropped area in Russia. In 1952, when the plan for 1951–55 was approved, the average yield of grain per acre stood practically the same as in 1950. That was a good year, and the total output of grain was the best since the end of the war. But that means that the increase of 40 percent must be reached in three rather than five years. So rapid an increase of yields has never been achieved even in countries with well-advanced agricultural techniques and heavy use of fertilizers, save when years with exceptionally good weather happen to follow years with exceptionally bad. And although in October 1952 Malenkov boasted to the Nineteenth Communist Congress that the grain problem was definitely solved in the Soviet Union, he was less exultant in August 1953 and said humbly: "We must assure further, more rapid growth of grain production, considering that it is necessary in our country not only for satisfaction of growing needs of population in bread, but also for raising of the level of livestock breeding and for supply of grain to the regions producing technical crops." Finally, it would seem, Malenkov came to understand that animal husbandry cannot be improved unless there is concentrated feed, and technical crops are not to be expanded at the cost of food crops unless farmers are supplied with necessary foodstuffs. This last relates particularly to the expansion of cotton growing on irrigated land in Central Asia, where in some regions cultivation of cotton became practically a monoculture, squeezing nearly all the cereals from the irrigated fields.

When Malenkov was obliged to tackle the thorny problem of supplying the rapidly growing urban population with ample quantities of meat, milk and textiles, he discovered that the grain problem was far from solved. It could not be solved so long as only one-third of the total grain area was given to feed grains (in the United States they occupy about two-thirds); and with grain comprising such a large proportion of the total cropped area badly needed crop rotations cannot be introduced.

Since achievement of the planned yields of grain in 1955 is impossible, the fulfillment of the goals for animal husbandry, as well as for some of the technical crops, also appears questionable. We know from Khrushchev that the numbers of cattle and cows at the beginning of 1953 were smaller than at the beginning of

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1951, and that production of milk per cow was not higher than before the war and may have been lower. Here again, as with grain, it would be necessary to accomplish within three years more than was planned for five, and this with an insufficient supply of concentrated feedstuffs.

Enough of examples, which could be multiplied. Khrushchev told his fellow Communists that gross agricultural production in 1952 was only 10 percent larger than in 1940. The "Economic Survey of Europe in 1951," published by the Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations,[2] estimates on the basis of Soviet statistics that Soviet gross agricultural production in 1950 exceeded the prewar (1940) level by 7 percent. It follows from this that during the first two years of the plan-period, 1951–55, the gross agricultural production increased less than 3 percent. How, then, is it conceivably possible to raise it 50 percent by the end of 1955?

And yet the whole plan to increase production of consumer goods by 65 to 70 percent is tied closely to satisfactory fulfillment of this plan for agriculture. Malenkov knows this well. Speaking before the Supreme Soviet last August he said: ". . . in order to insure a drastic upsurge in the production of consumer goods we must first of all care for the further development and upsurge of agriculture, which supplies the population with food and the light industry with raw materials." Nevertheless, he gave assurance not only that the plan for enlarged production of consumer goods would be completed, but also that it would be done by 1954 instead of 1955. It is instructive to note some of the measures that he and Khrushchev proposed.

IV

Does Malenkov intend to change basically the collective-farm system as he inherited it from Stalin? Does he deviate from the planned reorganization of the *kolkhoz* system as it was considered in Stalin's last work, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," published just before the Nineteenth Congress? To both questions the answer is "no." Although Malenkov promises concessions to the collectives and even to their individual members, he does not make the *kolkhoz* system responsible for the failures of agriculture. He says that the "present-day level of agricultural production does not correspond to the increased

[2] Geneva, 1952, Table 61, p. 134.

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technical equipment in agriculture and to the potentialities inherent in the collective-farm system." And he expects to obtain badly-needed improvements by a rapid development and strengthening of the communal economy of collective farms. Only in return for such a "strengthening" does he offer an increase in remuneration for working days to collective farmers. His concessions to the private economy of the *kolkhozniki* are of secondary importance and appear to be only temporary; he does not expect much from their private production.

In enumerating the principal decisions of the government and the Party directed to insuring the "rapid upsurge of agriculture," he mentions first of all measures for increasing the economic interest of collective farmers in the development of lagging branches of agriculture; among these he puts animal husbandry first, followed by potatoes and vegetable crops. This emphasis on economic interests of collective farmers is a new note; in his earlier report of October 1952 to the Nineteenth Congress he emphasized technical measures. It must be observed, however, that *Pravda* of January 28, 1953, spoke about the necessity of "raising the economic interest of *kolkhozniki* in increasing the number of livestock and its productivity." Hence this policy too had been formulated by the Communist Party before the death of Stalin, practically in identical terms.

From Khrushchev's speech we learn that in order to encourage lagging branches of agriculture it was decided to raise the prices for livestock delivered to the state five and a half times, for milk and butter twice, and for potatoes two and a half times; but for vegetables the increase was to be only 25 to 40 percent. He does not give absolute levels of prices and it is impossible to learn how high they became after these increases, which appear important in relative figures. However, in the same speech Khrushchev reveals that prices paid previously for obligatory deliveries of livestock products were so low that the remuneration of a *kolkhoznik* for a workday spent in animal husbandry averaged about one-fourth that for a workday spent in cultivation of technical crops. Malenkov regards this remuneration for work on technical crops as a sufficient economic stimulus for farmers. Apparently the increase in prices for livestock and its products will just about bring the rewards for work in this important branch of agriculture to the level of those for technical crops. It seems surprising that this was not done eight years ago, since the postwar restora-

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tion of animal husbandry was one of the most important problems for the Soviet Government.

Prices for grain have not been raised at all, though the obligatory delivery of grain at very low prices is the heaviest burden on the peasantry. The Kremlin rulers believe that peasants will produce grain anyway, since it is their principal foodstuff. In discussing price increases for potatoes and vegetables, Khrushchev explained that they were the very maximum that the government could accord without raising retail prices to consumers, which is excluded by the present policy of the party. Prices for animal products purchased by the state, after collective farms complete their obligatory deliveries, are raised much more modestly by 30 to 50 percent.

The policy of stimulating the private interests of collective farmers by raising prices is thus strictly limited to the most backward sectors of Soviet agriculture, insufficiently mechanized and requiring much hand labor. Some of them, particularly animal husbandry, never can gain advantages from mechanization comparable to those which are possible in the cultivation of grain or sugar beets.

Members of collective farms are promised a reduction in obligatory deliveries from their small private plots of land, and a reduction of about 50 percent in the tax levied upon them. If honestly fulfilled, these concessions may be important, but it must be said that the previous policy with regard to the private economy of the *kolkhozniki* resulted in such ruin that the base for improvement is weak. Khrushchev explained that restoration of animal husbandry in the private economy of members of collectives, as well as of increased cultivation of potatoes and vegetables in their gardens, will be helpful not only for them but also to the state. It is impossible to deny this, since these are the products which are now most scarce. Their sale in *kolkhoz* markets by individual farmers once contributed substantially to the food supplies of city dwellers.

The reader must be reminded that in 1934–35, Stalin was obliged to depend on the private economy of members of collectives to speed the recovery of animal husbandry ruined by forced collectivization. The present rulers apparently are not prepared to go even so far as Stalin in their concessions, since Khrushchev immediately reassured his fellow Communists that proposed measures for restoration of private animal husbandry by no

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means signified any lessening of attention to collectivized herds. He emphasized that "the main road to the solution of the livestock problem was and will remain the raising of collectivized animal husbandry."

In his efforts to obtain the "rapid upsurge of agriculture," Malenkov also plans to rely more on technical and organizational measures; that is, he intends to tighten state control over the newly enlarged collective farms through the Machine Tractor Stations. For this reason his efforts are directed toward strengthening the M.T.S., since he recognizes that most of them are working unsatisfactorily. Khrushchev supplied a good deal of information concerning this. Agriculture will receive 750,000 tractors (15 horsepower) during 1954–57. This apparently means a change in the plan for production of tractors, since the original goal was surprisingly modest—an increase in annual production of tractors in 1955 only 19 percent above that of 1950. (Producer goods were to be increased 80 percent.) The government also decided to increase the supply of mineral fertilizers for agriculture; but this is only a long-term objective—about 17,000,000 tons more in 1959 and up to 30,000,000 more in 1964. Khrushchev says that in 1953 agriculture received 6,000,000 tons or even less. Since it had been planned to increase production of mineral fertilizers from 5,000,000 to 9,500,000 tons during 1951–55, the program is obviously lagging badly now.

But the principal emphasis falls on reinforcement of the M.T.S. by improving the technical qualifications of directing personnel and by providing more skilled workers. Up to 7,000 mechanical engineers must be sent to the Tractor Stations and up to 100,000 agronomists and other technicians are to be assigned to them and to *kolkhozes*. Furthermore, the tractor drivers and mechanics who left the M.T.S. for jobs in urban industry because the remuneration there was higher must be returned to agriculture.

From Khrushchev's speech one gathers that there is an acute shortage of qualified workers in agriculture. Apparently the total labor force in agriculture now is substantially less than before the war. War losses tend to affect the rural population more than the city dwellers, and after the war the drain of population from farms to industry continued in Russia. The first postwar industrial plan could be completed successfully only because by 1950 employment in industry had increased about 25 percent over

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1940, instead of 10 percent as expected. Malenkov said that the urban population of the U.S.S.R. has now reached 80,000,000, as against 60,000,000 before the war. All this indicates that there is a high proportion of women, old people and children trying to carry on the tasks of farming. And the scope of their tasks has been greatly enlarged: they must plant forest belts, build new farm buildings in the centers of the big, new farms, prepare the networks of irrigation canals in the fields and perform many other new tasks.

An indication of serious labor shortage in collective farms is provided by one of the stipulations of the new law on agricultural taxation. Its principal purpose was declared to be that of lightening the burden of taxation on the *kolkhozniki* and stimulating their production in such intensive branches of farming as animal husbandry and cultivation of fruit and vegetables. But, at the same time, it attempts to tighten the labor discipline on the farmers by imposing a tax 50 percent higher than normal on those families whose individual members fail to complete the required minimum of labor days in their collectives without a satisfactory excuse. Plainly the Communist rulers do not expect the promised price increases for agricultural products to stimulate the members to increase their work sufficiently, and are supplementing the carrot with a heavy stick.

Khrushchev thinks that there are also not enough qualified Communists in the countryside, and he suggests sending 50,000 of the most reliable Party members to reinforce commanding posts in every M.T.S. and *kolkhoz*. This recalls the years 1930 and 1932 when the Party dispatched 25,000 proved Communists to build collective farms, and later another 20,000 to take them more firmly in hand. Khrushchev's proposal does not promise much self-government on the farms. It certainly does not indicate a loosening of controls over agriculture. Despite the pleasure of some Western commentators at what they took to be a new kindliness on the part of Soviet bosses toward their working force, the controls are to be intensified.

This, indeed, is the principal means by which Malenkov expects to assure the "rapid upsurge of agriculture." The methods remain the old ones and the promises are not quite new: from 1935 on, Stalin not only promised a "merry and abundant life" to peasants, but pretended that they were really enjoying it already. And yet during the 25 years of collectivized agriculture

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the gross agricultural production increased only some 25 to 30 percent over 1928. Now Malenkov would have the Russian people, and the rest of the world, believe he thinks it possible to raise production nearly 50 percent in two or three years.

A limited increase in gross agricultural production, say less than half of the original plan, may take place in the two remaining years. The promised increases in prices will be most helpful in this respect. A rapid increase in the number of tractors and other machines, and, particularly, in the supplies of mineral fertilizers available for agriculture, also may help greatly; and the last would be within the grasp of the Kremlin if a strong shift in this direction were made at the expense of production of tanks and explosives. But time is decidedly short for achieving the goals set for agricultural production by the Fifth Plan. We may conclude that the goals set for consumer goods likewise cannot be reached, either in 1954 as Malenkov promises, or in 1955 as originally planned. Malenkov could fulfill his promise only by turning to the capitalist world for necessary raw materials and foodstuffs.

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MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN AMERICA AND RUSSIA

An Indian View

By P

DURING the period of India's struggle for independence, Nationalist opinion looked upon America as a friend and there was widespread sympathy for the Indian cause in America. In the period immediately following India's independence in 1947, these relations continued to be friendly, and by and large Indian leaders looked to America for help and advice in solving the difficult problems which lay ahead of them. But today, no one will deny that the two countries have drifted apart, that large and influential groups in the United States suspect Indian motives and declare her to be pro-Communist. Equally, in India most people are inclined to consider that the United States is deliberately opposing India at every stage and is following an anti-Asian policy with the object of reducing the new countries of Asia to a condition of political dependence.

The United States naturally finds it difficult to understand why, when the great nations of Europe willingly accept American leadership and follow her policy, India, Burma and Indonesia, who achieved their independence so recently and who are weak from a military and economic point of view, should not only hesitate to follow her, but actually oppose her on major issues. It is all the more difficult for America to understand this attitude when she is genuinely anxious to help these countries with money and with technical assistance to overcome their economic weaknesses and if necessary even to strengthen their military resources. No one in these countries has accused America of imperialist designs or of selfish motives. Why, then, ask the Americans, should we, when our approach is so friendly and so unselfish, when all that we desire is only the betterment of the material conditions of these areas and their friendship and support to meet the common menace of Communism, be treated with suspicion and obstructed in our policies designed for the benefit of the entire free world?

It is India that is most blamed for this development, for it is undoubtedly true that it is Indian leaders who have given ex-

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pression to South Asian thinking and it is in India that one finds these views most widely held. But in Burma and Indonesia, and perhaps to a lesser degree in Ceylon and in Pakistan, the approach is not very different. Therefore the fact has to be recognized that there is a growing difference between South Asian opinion and the United States in matters affecting world policy. If this tendency is not to widen and influence developments to the detriment of both parties, it is of the utmost importance that the problem should be frankly analyzed and an effort should be made by both parties to understand the other's point of view.

One preliminary point may, however, be emphasized. Though the differences between the United States and India are undoubtedly important and have been debated a great deal in public, there is perhaps a greater community of political thought and spiritual feeling between them than between any two countries outside the British Commonwealth. Both have firm faith in democratic institutions and methods, in civil liberties, in freedom of thought, expression and every legitimate human activity. Both believe in the principles of moral suasion and govern themselves on that basis. Both are pledged to work for the material betterment of their peoples without encroaching upon human rights and liberties. More than all, both have deep spiritual feelings which move them in their political action. This is generally understood. In fact, quite recently there was a pamphlet issued by the State Department testifying generally to this point of view. Equally, in India there is no one who denies the moral greatness, the economic achievement and the amazing desire to serve the world which America symbolizes. And yet the differences are there and seem to be growing. It behooves us, therefore, to examine the problem dispassionately.

II

There are three aspects of policy where the United States and India do not see eye to eye with each other. They are 1, the attitude towards the menace of expansionist Communism; 2, colonialism of European nations; and 3, China. All these three are basic factors in the complex international problem of today, and while a difference on any one of them is sufficient to create misunderstanding, a difference on all three amounts to a major conflict of opinion.

Taking the first issue of Communism, which is undoubtedly

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the most important, it is perhaps unnecessary to say that there is no difference of opinion between the United States and India on the internal problem created by the Communist Party. The Indian Government has fought Communism tooth and nail in India and has shown no weakness in dealing with its many ramifications. India's notable success in this fight has also been widely recognized. Why, then, this difference of approach to the external menace of Communism? Primarily, it is because India is not satisfied that there is such an external menace. Both China and the Soviet Union are India's neighbors, and yet India has not, in spite of very considerable American effort to persuade her, seen any menace to her existence by the presence on her frontiers of these two giant Communist states. We may be stupid or completely blind, but where we do not see the menace, we cannot pretend to do so, merely because we are so advised by no doubt wiser people.

Further, India cannot forget that not so very long ago both America and Britain claimed to be friends of the Soviet Union. It is not that the Soviet Union was something different in 1942. There is nothing known today about Communist policies or Communist ambitions that was not known in 1942! And yet not only did America and Britain ally themselves with the Soviet Union, but at least in India the British went to the extent of helping the Communists against the Nationalists. Then, as now, the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, opposed the Communists; it was the British Government that helped them to gain control of labor unions and treated them as the representatives of genuine Indian opinion. Whatever strength the Communist Party gained in India was the outcome of this unholy alliance.

It is generally argued in justification of this policy that Fascism was a greater menace then, and therefore expediency required that all anti-Fascists, whatever their political complexion or moral position, should unite to fight that menace. If alliance with Communism in the period between 1942–1946 was on the basis of expediency, what guarantee have we that opposition to Communism and alliance with Fascism in Spain and with the rearmed Imperial Government in Japan, which the United States and other Western Powers proclaim, are also not based on expediency and on a calculation of their own interests? Further, is it so very definite that if Russia continued a policy of appease-

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ment and met the Western Powers on some of their demands, the European nations and with them the United States would not change their policy of considering Communism as the concentration of evil and accept gradually a policy of coexistence? *Foreign Affairs*, in its issue of October 1953, published a very illuminating article entitled "The Grand Alliance Hesitates." It establishes clearly that even some of the partners in the Grand Alliance feel that it may be expedient to go slow in their implacable opposition to Communism and may be prepared to accept the doctrine of coexistence. Why then, ask political thinkers in India, Burma and Indonesia, should we, against our own better judgment, be asked to line up in support of an anti-Communist policy?

It may sound strange to American ears, but nonetheless it is a fact that the leaders of India and Burma, and perhaps of other South Asian countries (excluding Siam), do not feel themselves threatened by Communism. They feel satisfied that their people are not attracted to Communism, that except in alliance with nationalism it has no strength or vitality in Asian societies. The experiences of the last five years in Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia have proved to their satisfaction that where national governments exist and follow an independent policy—that is, assert their nationalism—Communism fails to win any support. The clearest case is that of Burma. It will be remembered that in 1949 and 1950, at the time when the Communists occupied the mainland of China to the very borders of Burma, that country was seriously menaced by an internal Communist problem. It was easy for the Chinese Communists to give unofficial help by way of leadership and arms to the so-called Burmese Liberation Army which was then at the height of its power; and yet no such thing happened. Not only was no help given to the Burmese Communists, but the Communist régime across the border scrupulously refrained from interfering with the Kuomintang guerrilla force under Li Mi which had entrenched itself inside the Burmese border. The National Government of Burma has, without any external military help, slowly but effectively destroyed the Communist forces within the state.

It has been stated by some distinguished American observers that what saved Burma from Chinese intervention was the fact that China was heavily engaged in Korea, and that but for her commitments there she would most probably have helped the

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Burmese Communists. This view overlooks two major facts. In the first place the Communists in Burma required nothing more than trained leadership and some arms to tilt the scale effectively at that time. No large-scale intervention would have been needed. The Chinese were not committed so heavily in Korea that they could not afford to spare a few commissars and some arms for their friends elsewhere. In fact the Chinese army in Yunnan, on the borders of Burma, has at all times been a major force.

The second fact is that many months before the Korean trouble started the Chinese solemnly assured the Burmese Government that they would make no attempt to attack even the illegally-established Kuomintang forces within Burmese territory and would respect the established boundaries, a promise which they have scrupulously observed in spite of grave provocation by General Li Mi and his men.

It is often stated, mainly in the American press, that the enforcement of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is an act of aggression which India, because of her pro-Chinese attitude, has overlooked; that it constitutes evidence of Chinese expansionism. Undoubtedly the absorption of Tibet into the Chinese political system brings Communism to the outer ranges of the Himalayas. But it is strange that America should consider this an act of aggression, for it was only in 1948 that the State Department frankly told a Tibetan delegation which visited the United States that it considered Tibet to be a part of China. Of course that was in relation to Kuomintang China. The mission, whose ostensible purpose was to find a market in America for Yak tails, returned disappointed. Thus the question of expansion did not arise when it was the Kuomintang which claimed authority over Tibet, though India is blamed for overlooking it now.

Another instance often mentioned as a clear demonstration of the Communist policy of expansionism is the seven-year-old war in Indo-China. India especially is charged with being blind to the implications of this southward move of Communism. To the political leaders of India, Burma and Indonesia the situation in Indo-China presents itself in another light. They emphasize the undisputed fact that the Communist-led Viet-Minh struggle against France started even during the period when the Soviets were still allied with the Western nations, that it consolidated itself before the Communists gained authority in China, and finally while the movement may be Communist, and is certainly

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Communist-led, neither Russians nor Chinese are fighting in Indo-China, while the forces opposed to the movement are still predominantly French. No doubt, under American pressure, the Bao Dai régime is being entrusted with greater powers, but the attitude of the French towards the idea of Viet-Nam independence can best be judged by the violent reaction by the authorities in Paris to the recent resolution of the Viet-Nam National Assembly (consisting of leaders hand-picked by Bao Dai) demanding the right to secede from the French Union. And yet, the right to secede is the genuine test of independence. Is it any wonder that the people of Asian countries, who have newly won their independence, should hesitate before they accept the French assurances that France is fighting in Indo-China to safeguard the independence of the Viet-Namese? In India this position seems specially ironical when France takes the position that her constitution prevents her from handing back to India her small colonial establishments in south India (Pondichery, etc.). Pondichery has thus become to India a symbol of French colonialism, and judging from the attitude of France towards the freedom movement there, the Indians cannot be blamed if they see in the French position in Indo-China only an obstinate desire to fight to the last ditch to maintain France's position in the Far East.

How does this affect India's attitude towards America? It affects it primarily because India feels that without the active support of America in money and material, and her acquiescence, reluctant though it be, in French policies, the French could not have maintained their position in the Far East and their colonial footholds in India. Secondly, in the eyes of Indians and other like-minded Asians it also weakens the claim that the alliance which America heads is a union of the free world. How can we be asked to associate ourselves with a free world, of which one leading member still holds colonial possessions in India and another (Portugal) has, with unconscious irony, declared an integral part of India (Goa) an inalienable part of Portugal? French and Portuguese policy is frankly based on colonialism. What the people of India are disappointed with is the American failure to realize that as long as an inch of India's territory remains under colonial occupation, she will never be allied even indirectly with those states.

If, therefore, the Asian people and their leaders have no fear of Communist expansion, then their refusal to join the Grand Alli-

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ance, which they suspect from their previous experience to be based on expediency and the national interests of Western nations, should be understood and accepted. They may be wrong, they may not even know their own interests, but it does no good to abuse them or suggest that they are concealed Communists.

III

The second question which deepens the gulf between America and India is the indecisive attitude that the United States has been taking of late on the colonial issue. America's traditional attitude towards colonialism, and her record in the Philippines, are fully appreciated in India. But what neither India nor any other Asian power understands is the facile view now finding favor that colonialism is a thing of the past, that we in India are attaching too much importance to its survivals, and that we are really fighting shadows when we make this a point of difference between ourselves and the West. A moment's consideration will show that while the old-fashioned colonialism of owning countries like absentee landlords is dead, a new and more dangerous colonialism is developing in Africa. The contours of this new phase of European exploitation are now fairly clear in Kenya, Central Africa and in the North African states. It is a clear attempt to develop small European communities, vest political and economic rights in them, deprive the indigenous population of the use of large areas of land and convert them into servile labor, thus establishing "white" colonial states of which the prototype is Malan's South Africa. In Kenya this policy is being enforced with a ruthlessness which has few parallels in colonial history. It is no doubt true that the reaction of the Kikuyu to this policy of keeping the tribes down has been one of primitive savagery, but no amount of Mau Mau atrocities can conceal the fact that Britain has attempted to vest political authority in a small community of settlers enjoying exceptional economic rights and reserving an area in the highlands for themselves. Nor can the recently established Central African Federation be viewed as anything but an attempt to integrate European authority in tropical Africa. Is the policy of France any different in Tunisia and Morocco? All the so-called reforms that France has introduced have had one overriding purpose—to keep for the French settlers the rights which belong to the sons of the soil.

This new colonialism, based on the twin doctrines of racial su-

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periority and economic exploitation, is being developed with the passive acquiescence, if not the active support, of the United States. The debates on Tunisia and Morocco in the United Nations demonstrate that while America may not approve of the policy of her allies, expediency makes her a silent partner and an accessory in the grand design of the colonial Powers to "call forth" Africa (as Canning said on a historic occasion about South America) to redress the balance of the loss of Asian colonies.

It is often asked why India and other Asian countries are so loud in their protests against European colonialism, while they are silent about the colonialism of the Soviets. The answer is clear. The Soviets have never claimed that they represent the free world and have never asked India or any other country to join forces with them. Their ideology is different, and so long as they do not force their views on us, we do not force our views on them. But the case of the free world is different. It is claimed that by refusing to line up with the free world we are doing something morally reprehensible and politically bad. It therefore becomes important for us to know what the free world represents. Such a question does not arise with regard to the Soviet Union, as we know what Communism means and have been fighting it even while others were fraternizing with Moscow.

IV

Finally, there is the important question of China—the major point of difference between the United States and India. The point of view of India is well known and has been stated many times. It is that the Peking Government, having established undisputed authority over the entire mainland, is entitled to the seat which the Charter gives to China, and further that any policy based on ignoring the fact that the Central People's Government is the effective government of China is utterly unrealistic and can only lead to further troubles in international relations. The American point of view, after a short period of uncertainty, is that there is a continuing civil war in China and that of the two parties Chiang Kai-shek and his group in Formosa represent the legitimate government and are therefore entitled to the rights belonging to China. It is further argued that even if it be conceded that the Peking régime, by virtue of its control of the entire mainland, is the real government of China, it has disqualified itself for mem-

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bership in the United Nations by committing aggression and fighting the United Nations forces in Korea.

Not much need be said about the first point. Most Asian countries, excluding the Philippines, Siam and South Korea, recognize the government in Peking as the only legitimate government of China. Not only India, Burma and Indonesia, but Ceylon, Pakistan and Afghanistan recognize the Peking Government. Predominant Asian opinion therefore does not accept the view that there is a continuing civil war in China. But a more detailed analysis of the Indian position is necessary for a proper appreciation of the differences between the United States and India in regard to the question of Peking's aggression.

The Korean conflict started in the last week of June 1950. Almost immediately President Truman by a unilateral declaration extended the protection of the 7th Fleet to Formosa, that is, intervened in the civil war in China by taking under American protection an area where one party to the conflict has established its headquarters. The Peking Government denounced this action as aggression committed against itself and brought the matter up before the Security Council. There is no doubt that in the view of many Asian countries this was an act of intervention in the revolution, and Peking seemed justified in considering it as an aggression against itself, especially when the United Nations gave no support to this action. Even then the Chinese did not move, but only brought the matter up before the Security Council. The war in Korea continued without any Chinese intervention. Then came the landing in Inchon and the move north. When the U.N. forces were approaching the 38th parallel the Peking Government officially intimated that if *non-Korean* forces crossed the 38th parallel it would not stand by idly and would intervene effectively. The U.N. Command, after having repelled aggression, decided to carry the war into enemy territory. The Chinese looked upon this as a further act of aggression and, when the U.N. forces were approaching the Yalu River, intervened in force, as they had warned they would, and threw back the U.N. armies.

Two other facts have to be considered in this connection. The first was the visit of the Supreme Commander in the Far East and the head of the U.N. forces, General MacArthur, to Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and the announcement about their deliberations for the joint defense of that island. Even before the Chinese intervention in Korea the announcement thus emphasized the con-

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nection in the American mind between the Korean war and the allegedly continuing civil war in China. The second factor was the letter which General MacArthur addressed to the Veterans of Foreign Wars declaring that control of Formosa was essential for American strategy in the Pacific, thereby strengthening the Chinese conviction that Mr. Truman's original order to the 7th Fleet was a deliberate action of aggression against China. It is true that General MacArthur's letter was withdrawn, and that the State Department dissociated itself from his action; but Formosa continued to be under American protection.

The question of aggression by China seemed therefore to most Asians a very doubtful point. This became clear when the Resolution to brand China an aggressor was introduced at the end of January 1951. It is strange that though the Chinese intervention took place in October 1950 the United Nations waited till the end of January 1951 to discuss whether or not it was aggression on the part of China. It is also significant that when the matter was put to vote, the Resolution did not receive the support of India, Burma, Indonesia and other Asian countries. The Asian countries evidently did not consider that China had committed aggression. Though the Resolution was carried, it was obvious that no great importance was attached to the charge, for otherwise the United Nations could not have entered into negotiations with the Sino-Korean forces, for that would have been compounding with aggression and a betrayal of the principles of the United Nations. An aggressor, *ex hypothesis,* has to be punished, but instead of doing it, the United Nations, after deliberately branding China as an aggressor, has been equally deliberately engaged in negotiations with that government.

In the circumstances, the attitude of India that it is a major error of policy to keep the Peking Government out of the United Nations has only been confirmed and this remains a vital point of difference between the United States and India. The other minor difficulties, such as India's refusal to associate herself with the Japanese treaty sponsored by the United States, her refusal to follow the American lead regarding trade with China, and so on, stem from this fundamental difference.

V

It is now possible in the light of the above discussion to explain what India's so-called "neutralism" means. India's affiliations,

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sympathies and general contacts are all with the democratic states. Her relations with Great Britain and some of the Commonwealth countries are intimate. With the United States, in spite of the differences of policy, relations are cordial, and there is friendly coöperation between the two governments over a wide range of matters. With the Soviet Union and with China, India's relations stand on a different footing. They are no doubt friendly, but neither in the economic nor in the political field is there anything approaching active coöperation. In the wider sense, India, therefore, lives with and in the democratic world. But in what is known as the cold war she does not stand in with the United States and its friends for the simple reason that she does not, as we have seen, accept as valid the postulates on which their policy is based. Her predominant interest is peace, as no doubt it is of the United States; but India is firmly convinced that peace would not be served by the policies which have culminated in the cold war. She may be wrong, but she is not prepared to surrender her independent judgment on so important a matter for any price.

India is as definite as the United States in her view that Communism is a danger, but she feels that the danger will become serious only if the free nations in Asia are unable to organize their economic and political life on a sound and stable basis. The competition between democracy and Communism has to be fought and settled in the internal structure of each state. If India and the nations of South Asia can improve their standards of living, modernize their societies, utilize their resources to the best advantage, bring education and health to the people, then they will be able to defeat Communism. This is the struggle in which India is engaged and in which she is determined not to fail. The American Government, while regretting the differences of policy which separate us, has realized the importance of this struggle and has helped us generously in many important ways. India welcomes that help and hopes that the areas of constructive coöperation between the two countries will be widened with time.

When the political controversies, which are inevitable between two independent countries, are put in their proper perspective, it will thus be seen that the United States and India are coöperating actively in many fields of vital importance. To enable that coöperation to become more fruitful and comprehensive each must understand the point of view of the other and tolerate honest differences of opinion, even if they are inconvenient for the time.

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THE MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM

By Ezequiel Padilla

THERE is little evidence of national "good neighborliness" in history, which runs more to invasions, violence and wars. All empires have, like the Roman Empire, been established by conquest, and all great nations have sought to expand their boundaries. The Good Neighbor doctrine, born in the Americas, is a radical break with this tradition, and history offers little guidance for those who wish to put it into practice.

It is not surprising that sincere good neighborliness in America meets mistrust and resentment, just as it has throughout history. The story of the territorial expansion of the United States includes episodes of violence and war, and not only at the expense of Mexico. Extracontinental conquests were made to assure strategic security. "Dollar Diplomacy" and the Theodore Roosevelt policy of the Big Stick are still remembered in the Americas, and the memory offers emotional barriers to the advance of Pan-Americanism. The history of the Latin peoples carries the same story of violence and of war among themselves; and these too are sources of resentment. If all these discords cannot be surmounted, American unity is impossible.

Fortunately, there is also a powerful trend toward solidarity which opens a path. The destiny of our community of nations was early revealed by the sympathy felt in the United States for the struggle for freedom of the peoples of Latin America and by the recognition by the United States of the new independent governments there. In a dramatic and moving gesture, President Monroe received a crippled patriot, Manuel Torres, in June 1822, as diplomatic representative of Greater Colombia—the first recognition of the free nations of Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine was received with approval when it was proclaimed, and undoubtedly saved the Latin Americas from the greed of Europe. United States' support of the Mexican liberals of the "Reform" in their struggle against Maximilian's Empire carried the community further along this path, and the conference summoned by Blaine created the body later known as the Pan American Union and renewed the noble mission of Bolívar, which Henry Clay said opened "a new epoch in human affairs."

The idea of Pan-Americanism is essentially Hispano-Ameri-

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can. It began with Bolívar in 1826, and before it crystallized at the Washington Conference in 1889 various plenipotentiary congresses (in 1847, 1864 and 1877) had made Lima the seat of the "Americanist" movement. A Continental Treaty had been signed at Santiago, Chile, in 1856, and in 1888–1889 an important International South American Law Congress had met in Montevideo. These occasional congresses were guided by the ideal of collective defense against aggression from outside the continent, and, at the same time, showed that America had undertaken her task of developing the principles of international law. The Inter-American Conferences initiated in 1889 have enriched the heritage of international law and given the first example of continental solidarity. They have helped develop a system of conciliation and arbitration for the peaceful solution of international conflicts. The American system has repudiated the idea that conquest creates right, has proclaimed the juridical equality of nations, established the essentially New-World doctrine of "nonintervention," and constructed an international order on the principle of "one for all, and all for one." In the process, distinguished men gave their names to new legal doctrines: Calvo, Drago, Gondra, Espinosa, Bustamante, Estrada. Their bold conclusions regarding international justice are embodied in a new Law of Nations.

II

The Lima Conference of 1938 authorized meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to supplement the Pan-American conferences. Such meetings were held in Panama, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Chapultepec in the stormiest days of our contemporary history. Decisions at these conferences were not limited by academic formulas of international law. Forthright political, economic and military measures were taken to meet the danger which confronted the hemisphere, and the common interests of the continent were greatly strengthened.

This most recent advance toward continental solidarity was made possible by the Good Neighbor Policy. The continent as a whole had been a spectator to the tragedy of the First World War. Even when some of the Latin American nations declared war on Central European countries, or broke off relations with them, the prevailing Latin American attitude was one of neutrality, and doubtless there existed secret sympathy for Germany. But the attitude of the Latin American peoples in the

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Second World War was very different. The Good Neighbor Policy had wrought a significant change in the hearts of Latin American peoples and in their faith in the United States. The change was a result of the unequivocal repudiation of imperialism by the United States, and the wholehearted support of this friendly policy by public opinion there.

The very strength of the United States emphasized her sincerity. Her power had increased greatly since the First World War. The decision was spontaneous, free of the slightest trace of coercion by any other nation. The United States responded to Latin American feelings and juridical principles with utmost cordiality, revoking the 1905 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and declaring that the Doctrine was intended to apply against Europe and not against Latin America. Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua and Haiti, the Platt Amendment was repealed, the unilateral Wilsonian doctrine of "nonrecognition" abandoned, and the principles of "nonintervention" and the equality of nations affirmed in numerous documents and conferences. In one decade, the United States cleared the horizon.

When threats of a second world war had begun to darken the world, public opinion in Latin America had, therefore, rid itself of its more serious resentments and prejudices. The consultative meetings of Foreign Ministers in Panama, in 1939, and Havana, in 1940, had demonstrated a growing solidarity in this hemisphere. It came to a climax at the meeting in Rio de Janeiro, in January 1942, five weeks after Pearl Harbor, when all America raised the flag of a common destiny. This was the romantic period of continental solidarity. Everyone followed the news from the fighting fronts, shared the pride in the great documents of human brotherhood formulated during the struggle, hailed the days of victory as a triumph for all. During these four years of war the 21 American flags were displayed together—from the stores of Fifth Avenue to the shops of the most remote villages of South America.

But the compass veered with the end of the war, and American unity began to break up. Why? Because the 21 American nations forgot that the essence of Pan-Americanism is economic solidarity. The nation most responsible for this mistake was the United States. On April 14, 1939, President Roosevelt had declared that the United States was prepared to coöperate economically with all Latin American peoples, and the countries

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which had gladly worked for a common objective during the war justifiably hoped that they would share the benefits of peace. But in 1947, when the 21 American nations met at Rio de Janeiro to sign a pact of military defense, the problem of economic defense and the promise of a common prosperity were forgotten.

The economic objectives of the inter-American system were, in fact, formulated first in the United States. When the Pan American Union was born in Washington it was called, significantly, the "Commercial Bureau of the American Republics." The first conference, in 1889, put forward the basic idea of an inter-American bank; it has never materialized, though the proposal recurs again and again—at the Seventh International Conference held in Montevideo in 1933, for example, which recommended that the Third Pan-American Financial Conference, scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile, should press on with plans for the establishment of a central continental bank. The Chilean Conference did not meet, however. The Inter-American Financial Economic Advisory Committee, set up by Resolution 13 of the Panama Conference of 1939, offered to draft an agreement for the establishment of an inter-American bank. Again nothing was done.

Numerous institutions for economic coöperation have, of course, been established, but when the question of actually constructing a unified continental economic system comes to the fore, the Pan-American spirit seems to fade away. An Inter-American Development Commission, established by the Havana Conference of 1940, carried on many activities during the war, promoting various agreements and conventions to stimulate production of vital strategic raw materials, assuring markets to the producers, and guaranteeing a minimum price for these materials. An assured market and the stimulation of a fair price are the legitimate ideals for economic security of Latin America. Agreements were signed with the United States by Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. The Coffee Convention—comparable to the world-wide Wheat Convention adhered to in 1940 by 14 producing countries—was a model of what can be done. It brought a sharp rise in prices and still exerts a beneficial effect.

Though space will not permit me to give a detailed plan, the United States has developed effective methods which could be useful in establishing Latin American economic collaboration. The various committees engaged in adjusting agricultural pro-

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duction throughout the United States can serve as examples of how an assured consumption of Latin American products might be organized. Likewise, minimum prices can be established by contracts for given periods. One-crop countries would benefit tremendously from quotas such as are now being used for sugar on this continent and for wheat in world agreements. The Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation, so useful in reducing the dangers of economic crises through overproduction, serves as an example of a system of storing crops until market conditions improve.

The objective would be to treat the whole hemisphere as one economic unit, and thus to rescue Latin American economy from the grip of blind economic forces. The Latin American countries frequently make bilateral trade agreements with the United States, but these give rise to the charge of imperialism, for separate, weak nations are likely to be victims of their own needs, and of the strength of buyers, sponsored by some powerful nation, who frequently control world monopolies.

The industrial might of the United States—to which Latin America is contributory—is concentrated; but Latin American producers are unorganized. Nothing and no one defends them. They are at the mercy of foreign markets over which they have no shadow of control. This is the explanation of their protests against inequality, and of their demands for fair treatment. No Pan-American plan will be considered satisfactory in the countries of Latin America unless it addresses itself constructively to the problem of fair prices and secure markets. The efforts of the Inter-American Development Commission to regulate trade have been fruitful, but its activities should be oriented toward continental economic unity. To increase the purchasing power of the Latin American masses would be of incalculable value to the United States also.

III

The establishment of the Inter-American Bank would make possible the harmonious development of the economic resources of the continent. This expansion must be pursued along three lines: first, by the construction of large public works which private enterprise cannot undertake, such as sanitation, communications, large dams and electrification; second, by increasing the investments of private capital from the United States; third, by

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assisting capable native youths with loans which would give them the opportunity to take an active part in the economic development of their countries. I am thinking here not of grants for education, but of financial aid for those who seek capital.

Public works could be financed through the Inter-American Bank by means of loans to the governments, handled according to customary banking rules in order to avoid abuses. There have been instances in the past in which dollars loaned for public works have been deposited in the private accounts in foreign banks of unscrupulous politicians.

The Inter-American Bank could also assist greatly in establishing a basis of confidence for direct private investments. Both the United States and the Latin American countries want to create this atmosphere of confidence, but the task is very difficult. No country of Latin America is willing to grant foreign capital greater privileges than it gives to domestic concerns or to make promises that are contrary to its constitution. Some investors still look for the kind of protection that will never again be given anywhere in the world. On the other hand, some Latin American countries should review their own practices and remedy abuses. The only sound basis is the application of the golden rule; if cordial relations are to prevail it must be applied on both sides, not in letter but in spirit. Practical good sense is needed to channel investments into areas where the investor can be properly protected and where development will profit the nations in whose territories investments are made, raising their standard of living, ensuring fair prices and providing opportunities for permanent employment. The strength of any guarantee depends upon the degree to which the United States and the Latin American nations, through constant consultation, are willing to maintain an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect.

The Inter-American Bank, as proposed at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, would be an autonomous institution, performing the functions of a continental bank. Its principal objectives would be to establish and promote inter-American credit, help stabilize currency, control foreign exchange, and stimulate trade. It would be chartered by the United States Government. Latin American states would commit themselves to subscribe to an important block of shares, in proportion to the foreign trade of each. Shares would be subscribed to only by participating governments.

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The World Bank, the Export-Import Bank and the Mutual Security Agency have comparable objectives, but an investment and credit institution created exclusively for American countries would undoubtedly be much more effective than these institutions can be and would have a decisive psychological influence. None of the American nations holding shares and having responsibility for the management of the bank would resent its intervention in loans and investments and vigilant supervision.

The Inter-American Bank, with the national banks, could also exert a most useful effect on inter-American relations by opening a source of credit to the younger generation of Latin America. Everyone dislikes the humiliation of receiving charity. Genuine coöperation should awaken the creative powers in men and help them develop initiative. Nothing could so benefit Latin American youths as to make available to them reasonable amounts of credit —protected by every kind of guarantee—at moderate interest. United States capital could thus find a secure and humanitarian outlet, and its employment would help solve the struggle for funds which, in its present form, frustrates the best and most legitimate aspirations of Latin Americans. The American peoples ask to be allowed to share equitably in the benefits of a hemispheric economy. They know that investments, and the achievements of technology, go hand in hand with legitimate profits for investors, high wages, fair prices and an enlightened, reciprocal trade policy that promotes industrialization.

The people of the United States share these ideals. The exploitation of the weak is no longer permitted in the United States. Its abolition correspondingly marks the end of colonial exploitation. The ninth Resolution of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, proposed a basic agreement for economic collaboration. The purpose of this agreement was to promote technical and financial coöperation, guarantees for investments, a higher standard of living, and industrialization. It was approved by the Bogotá Conference of 1948. But in the tragic atmosphere of violence and revolution at Bogotá, efforts to take further action met the fate of all similar efforts for more than a century: the question was passed on to another conference, to convene in Buenos Aires. This was not held. Preparations are now being made for a conference at Caracas, and the American states have been asked by the Inter-American Economic and

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Social Council of Washington to supply information regarding resources, raw materials, transport, and needs for capital and technical assistance.

Together with the question of common defense, the Caracas Conference will undoubtedly address itself to finding a practical solution of the problem of hemispheric economic coöperation. It will do so because Latin America is faced with the urgent obligation of defending its resources. The inheritance of future generations is gravely threatened. The sense of peril is sharp in Latin America and the outlook is dark. The population is increasing at an accelerated pace, on land rapidly being worn out by erosion. Products are meeting increasingly powerful competition from Africa. Many of the countries with one-crop economies are mortally threatened. Just as quinine and rubber were transplanted to the jungles of Malaya, Burma and Indonesia, so hardwood fibers, copra, cocoa, sugar, peanuts, coffee, cotton and about 20 other less important agricultural products are now being intensively cultivated in Africa. European countries have used Marshall Plan aid to develop these products; their resulting production even of minerals such as tin and copper is usurping the share of similar Latin American enterprises in world markets.

Moreover, modern technology is conspiring against New World products by substituting synthetics for fibers. The whole Mexican state of Yucatan, once prosperous from cultivation of henequen, is now suffering an acute crisis because henequen is being sold at lower prices in Africa and because it can be replaced by synthetic fibers. Cotton threatens to decline if not to disappear as the raw material for textiles in a few years; the masses of the world may presently wear chemical synthetics. Copper, used especially in the electrical industry, is being successfully replaced by aluminum alloys. Even petroleum may be replaced as a fuel by atomic energy when the latter becomes used for commercial purposes—in the near or distant future. Latin America has stoically watched its wealth vanish. But Latin American statesmen will be held responsible by history if they do not seize this decisive moment to provide for the future. No charge could be so serious as that they had abandoned the land to exhaustion.

IV

The United States is faced with a dilemma: to leave Latin America to its fate and accept the resulting triumph of extremist

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doctrines there, or to use all the material and moral means at its disposal to organize an economic community. The path of isolation is perilous for the United States. It opens the door for the defection of the peoples of Latin America in an hour of danger, with the consequent disruption of the supply of raw materials, and sabotage, treason and espionage. The cost of forces to guard the security of a hostile hemisphere would be greater than the cost of cordial participation in a fair partnership. It should not be forgotten that one of the aspects of the present world contest is the opportunity sought by empires and large nations to develop the backward countries of the world. Russia, under tyranny, is focussing her efforts on the conquest of Asia. The European empires have taken over Africa under their systems of colonialism. The Pan-American system must develop America under hemispheric solidarity.

The neglect of Latin America by the United States has brought lamentable results; the confusion created by the activities of President Perón in Argentina is an eloquent example. Conflicting economic interests of the United States and Argentina have given rise to endless difficulties throughout Pan-American history. To solve them, President Perón seems to have adopted a policy designed to divide the American states into two parts: the United States and Latin America. For the latter he proposes a "third position," which means renunciation of the cause of the free world—in practice, estrangement from the United States.

Save for the strength and sacrifices of the United States in the global struggle, the whole world would now be subjected to the terror of the Soviet régime. Seen in this light, "Latin Americanism," as advocated by President Perón, may not mean the fraternity of Latin American peoples. It may mean a weak and truncated system instead of a strong inter-American system. Then its final result will not be to unite the Latin peoples, but to disrupt the Organization of American States. The so-called Latin American "unification" which a false school of thought is advocating at this moment when two ideologies are fighting a death struggle means that a political weapon forged in Moscow is being brandished, deliberately or unwittingly, by those who are trying to destroy the unity of the Americas at the expense of the free peoples of the world. It endangers the whole hemisphere—and all mankind.

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All of these difficulties will disappear when Latin America and the United States treat their problems together in the true spirit of Pan-Americanism, with clarity of vision and purity of motive.

▼

Everything I have discussed seems to bristle with difficulties; but where there's a will there's a way. The first step should be a campaign to appeal to the common sense of the Latin American people. The root of Latin America's great evils is poverty. And that does not spring from congenital incapacity or racial inferiority; it comes from lack of investments. What are investments? What is an enterprise? They represent man's ability to conquer nature. Without enterprise, without investments, without capital, nothing can be done; that is why the strength of a nation is reflected in its investments. The capital which sets up a business is not formed, as primitive minds may imagine, by money in circulation, nor even by credits and financial arrangements. Capital is the accumulation of the savings of generations. When we say we need United States investments, spiteful minds think of a caricature labelled "Wall Street." They do not realize that the "reserves" are the accumulated resources of intelligence, order and willingness to sacrifice—the savings of the multitudes of people spread throughout the great North American continent. This capital represents billions of hours of work transformed into forces which are a sacred heritage and the mainsprings of civilization. Such capital also represents struggles to realize the people's claims to a better life and the conquests of inventive genius, all implicit in the technology which has put into man's hands the power of lifting himself out of poverty and misery. All this wealth, this store of achievement, this vast power for human deliverance, is epitomized in these magic words: Enterprise, Capital, Investment. It is this accrual that the United States, motivated by idealism and by the new American spirit of helping other nations to help themselves, can use to enable the Latin American peoples to redeem themselves not only from the oppression of man but of nature—from soul-destroying poverty.

However, Latin America would not alone be the economic beneficiary of such an effort. It is the best market of the United States. As the *Wall Street Journal* recently pointed out, the

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Latin American countries purchase one-half of the automobiles exported by the United States, 40 percent of the exports of chemical products, one-half of the medical products, 40 percent of the industrial machinery and 34 percent of the agricultural machinery. And still more important (as that newspaper adds) are Latin America's exports to the United States. They are vital: 100 percent of the United States requirements of vanadium, 95 percent of the quartz crystal, 60 percent of the copper, more than half the antimony, beryllium, bismuth and lead—not counting oil from Venezuela, manganese from Brazil, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and about 20 more secondary products. And all this takes place in an America broken up into economic compartments, with wretched wages and permanent unemployment in great sections of it. To consider the possible future of a united continent stirs the imagination.

The moral problem of freedom is as important as the economic problem of prosperity. The idea of mutual assistance against aggression—the idea of collective security—follows naturally from a system of real solidarity. At present, despite the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the United States has encountered a marked lack of response in its efforts in this field. This resistance comes partly from the social injustice under which the masses live; it is a protest against the national tyrannies and national dictatorships that exploit and oppress them. The inability of the Pan-American system to defend the democratic rights of the peoples causes this resentment to be extended to it. The inter-American system seems indifferent to the usurpations, the flagrant violations of popular will, and the spoliation to which undefended populations are subjected. Is it, therefore, the people ask, an accomplice of these forces? The only convincing answer is the creation of a Pan-American organization which can give voice to fair protests and bring the full light of public opinion to bear upon the assaults committed on their democratic rights.

The Caracas Conference will have an opportunity to solve the two outstanding problems of the Americas: economic solidarity and democratic solidarity. They cannot be solved unilaterally. If the United States attempted to solve them alone the result would be a return to intervention. Neither Argentina nor Brazil nor the United States nor Mexico nor any other country by itself can direct the future of the continent. We must

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be guided by the shining words written by Bolívar in 1823: "To concentrate the power of this great political body calls for the exercise of an authority . . . whose very name alone should put an end to our quarrels. Such a respected authority can exist only in an assembly of plenipotentiaries appointed by each one of our Republics." But unanimity in such a body would unquestionably be impossible, and insistence upon it would raise insuperable obstacles. The dogma of unanimity is the misfortune of our times; it makes one recalcitrant more important than all others together. The Pan-American system is beset by reservations and dissidence; most of its resolutions have not been ratified by all the governments. But we can make a start without unanimous agreement. The progress made has not been achieved through the written word, much less by unanimous consent; what has advanced is the moral force of principles. Moreover, this is the way all great historical advances are made. Important human causes always start in the minds of prophets—of men of genius. Step by step paths are opened, but only after long struggles do the ideas of a minority win universal assent. Thus the road to a Pan-Americanism that will save the masses from age-old poverty, malnutrition and decay will open up; those who pull back will feel their isolation—and they will always find the door open to useful coöperation.

We face the formidable task of winning the war for freedom. This does not mean only a triumph of arms: victory would be something more human, more noble. To win this war is to build a world of justice—of happy homes, from which slave wages, unemployment and fear have been banished. This is the undertaking that the two united Americas must carry out.

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MAKING A FRIEND OF INDONESIA

By Walter H. Mallory

AMERICANS are not popular in South and Southeast Asia, and what the inhabitants in that wide area take to be American policy is liked even less. Indonesia, perhaps because she so recently threw off her colonial status, but for a good many other reasons too, is the focal point for criticism and distrust. Taking Java as a center, sentiment toward the United States becomes more favorable as the distance from that island increases; but only the Philippines in the whole region is outright friendly.

The factors in each country which have brought about this unhappy state of affairs are numerous and diverse. No generalization explains them. Indian neutrality, Burmese nationalism, Hong Kong's need for trade, the low price of rubber—all these have their part in creating the picture of Uncle Sam as an overbearing, selfish, malevolent figure whose altruism is but a cloak for sinister designs and whose purposes can result only in the enslavement of the masses, or, worse yet, in provoking World War III. And through this fabric of misunderstanding and fear can be clearly discerned the red thread of Communist propaganda—persistently magnifying differences, ascribing false purposes, manufacturing lies, in fact utilizing any device to bemuse the ignorant, deceive the poor and suborn the ambitious.

There are reasons for the critical attitude of Orientals toward the United States. From their point of view they are good reasons. Americans ought to know what they are, and to try to understand them even though they think them ill-founded. In Indonesia some of the reasons will seem quite irrational. An American going to that country for the first time since it achieved independence looks forward to his visit eagerly. He remembers the early struggle of his own country to throw off its colonial status. He looks back with satisfaction to the part the United States played in the last war in defeating the Japanese and thus rescuing Indonesia from alien occupation. He knows that the United States gave Indonesia strong diplomatic support in her struggle for independence after the war—possibly the decisive support. Strongly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist himself, aware of his friendly interest in this new country, the visitor

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expects to be greeted as the representative of a friendly nation. But he finds that Indonesians do not think that the United States is anti-colonial at all, but the leading imperialist Power. He finds that many of the people of these islands welcomed the Japanese invaders, who, they believed, were rescuing them from white domination. And he is astonished to realize that virtually all Indonesians take it for granted that the United States never was their ally, but has actually sided with their enemy, the Dutch. Thus they are convinced that it was not American sympathy, arms and influence which assisted Indonesia in gaining freedom, but Russia's "firm stand against Western imperialism."

II

Indonesia is led by a very small group of men—really only a handful. They received their education under Dutch auspices in the islands, or in Holland. Their political orientation is very considerably left of center, and they seem to be overwhelmingly anti-capitalist although they deny this. Their experience with capitalism has been an unhappy one. On the theoretical plane they know only Karl Marx's version of it, and their practical experience is confined to European varieties discarded by many Europeans now, and by the United States many years ago. The image of the American capitalist which emerges from Indonesian misconceptions is indeed frightening—a figure as abhorrent to us as he is to them; but it is not easy to make them understand that, in fact, he doesn't exist.

The Indonesians, quite naturally, confuse capitalism with colonialism. After 300 years of Dutch rule, they found themselves largely illiterate, with only the rudiments of a system of public health (Djakarta, the capital city, has no adequate water supply and uses open canals for its sewage). Their foreign trade was in the hands of the Netherlands and their retail business in the hands of the Chinese; Indonesians were for the most part common laborers, who worked at a pitifully small wage. Meanwhile, however, their islands had been developed economically to a high degree. Djakarta had an excellent port, there was a good inter-island transportation system, excellent irrigation works, roads and railroads, tin mines, oil fields, vast rubber and tea and tobacco and palm oil estates—all built to develop the riches of the Indies but to funnel them away through Holland "for somebody else's benefit."

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Capitalism was used as an instrument of colonialism. There were no social controls such as America has devised, no attempt to seek the just distribution of the rewards of effort which can make capitalism the servant of the people. To the Indonesian, experience seemed to prove the Communist thesis that capitalism is simply the exploiter of the masses, and against this background it is difficult, if not impossible, for Indonesians to understand the American system which is called by the same name.



We like to point out to them that this system has brought 160,000,000 Americans the highest standard of living the world has ever known, but still they mistrust it; and they mistrust us the more because we are so sure it is the best possible plan for organizing society.

It is not easy to estimate how much the difference in race and color affects the feelings of Indonesians toward Americans. We are regarded, of course, as a white country, although perhaps 10 percent of our citizens are Negroes and many millions more are of mixed blood; and we have a greater variety of races and more racial intermarriage than any other nation. Americans who

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live in Indonesia do not sense antagonism on racial grounds, and find the people extremely tolerant. It is true that there have been excesses against the Chinese (as there have been in the United States), but this has more likely been for economic than for racial reasons. But race and color cannot be ruled out as a cause for hostility, even though they may not easily be recognized as such. Nationalism flourishes by pointing up, and exaggerating, differences. And certainly nationalism is one of the strongest forces in Indonesian society today.

Religion is, perhaps, a greater cause of misunderstanding. Indonesia is estimated to be 90 percent Moslem, and while the people seem not to be very devout, their beliefs and customs and attitudes toward others are clearly affected by their faith. Indonesia counts herself as a member of the Moslem bloc in the United Nations. She reacts strongly whenever there is an international issue affecting a Moslem country, as in the recent case of Tunisia. The United States, considered a Christian country, must expect to be regarded with less warmth than if she looked to Mecca; and with open hostility if she has differences with any of the Islamic bloc.

The greatest opportunities for misunderstandings and bad feeling, however, seem to lie in the economic field. The United States is capitalist, Indonesia left-wing Socialist; the United States is highly industrialized, Indonesia a raw-materials country; the United States has the highest per capita income of any country in the world, Indonesia almost the lowest; while both Indonesia and America are rich in resources, the United States is rich in capital while Indonesia is poor. Since the United States needs copra, rubber, tin and oil, and Indonesia all manner of manufactured goods and capital, one would expect that cordial economic relations would result. This condition did exist to a certain extent in the past, but it is diminishing. World War II was fought to a successful issue though the rubber and tin of Southeast Asia were in the hands of our enemies. America obtained tin in the Western Hemisphere, and manufactured much of the needed rubber; and since the war our synthetic rubber industry has supplied more than 65 percent of our demands.

Indonesia gained her independence from the Dutch in 1949. It was predicted at that time that while this new country could look forward with confidence to the long pull, the economic

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difficulties of the early years would be almost insurmountable. Actually, the exact opposite happened. The first three years were unexpectedly favorable, the fourth year proved to be a year of crisis, and the future seems extremely uncertain. The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 helped to set the new régime going economically. But this quick prosperity also engendered a degree of optimism and a profligacy of expenditure which laid the basis for 1953's troubles.

Rubber dominates Indonesia's foreign trade. It comprises more than 50 percent of her exports; and since it is sold for the most part to a hard-currency country (the United States), it provides an even larger share of her dollar exchange. The average price for rubber, 1935–1939, was 16.09 cents a pound. In 1949 it was 17.6 cents. In 1951 it skyrocketed to an average price of 60.9 cents. In 1953, the exceptional needs of the Korean war having been satisfied, it fell to around 20 cents. Tin, which comprises about 10 percent of Indonesia's exports, followed a somewhat similar pattern. From 1950 to 1953 the revenues of the Indonesian Government increased abnormally, and the reserve of foreign exchange mounted even more gratifyingly. The inexperienced government, not realizing the temporary character of this phenomenon, went in for an orgy of spending—not an unprecedented response among either Socialist or capitalist governments, one must admit. But while such policies will damage any state, they can be well nigh fatal to a new country. Indonesia bought 6,000 automobiles for government officials to ride in, 100 modern diesel engines for a railway system which, because of unsettled conditions, was hauling only about 50 percent of the normal amount of freight, hundreds of air-conditioned passenger cars (even including third-class carriages). The Ministry of Health bought large quantities of medical supplies and equipment. The Ministry of Economic Affairs made huge funds available for new enterprises. Thousands of new houses were built for government employees—an admirable accomplishment had there been the money for it.

But, alas, in 1952, the money began to run out, and the foreign exchange reserves to dwindle. A young, energetic and able Minister of Finance finally saw the danger. He hammered out a budget which, while not balanced, inclined in that direction; drastic foreign exchange regulations were imposed; buying abroad was discouraged. But the horse was more than half way

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out of the barn, and the task of pushing him back in has not yet been accomplished.

This unfortunate situation bears with increasing heaviness on Indonesian business, and on the standard of living of the people. One can have nothing but sympathy for them in this predicament. But an American finds that sympathy somewhat hard to maintain when it is suggested on every side that these troubles are due in large measure to United States greed and the machinations of Wall Street.

Of course, no one would seek to deny that the drop in the price of tin and rubber had a direct effect on the Indonesian economy; but that the fall in those prices was the result of an evil plot on the part of the United States is nonsense. In retrospect, it is easy to see that the American stockpiling program was badly handled, but the war against aggression was the cause, not American "greed." Actually there is an appreciation in America of the difficulties of the countries whose economies are based on raw materials, and a real desire to see an improvement in their lot. But these basic, inherited problems are complex, and only time and patience can bring solutions.

A meeting of the Rubber Study Group on which there are representatives of both the producing and the consuming nations was held in Copenhagen in the spring of 1953. The producing countries brought forward a "bufferstock plan" designed to assure more stable and higher prices, but it was not accepted by the consuming countries. The leading Indonesian newspaper, commenting on the conference, said that the scheme was rejected "by the Eisenhower Administration because it is composed of big business representatives whose purpose is to protect the synthetic rubber industry." Another paper which supports the conservative Moslem Party said: "Judging from facts, the suspicion that the United States wants Asian nations to remain always in the same bad conditions so that they will always feel the need of American aid and live on American charity is well grounded . . . what is given away with one hand is taken back with the other." These comments are typical.

It is apparent that there is confusion in the minds of many Indonesians concerning the real objectives of American aid. (There is confusion in many American minds too.) We say that we want to improve their economic position, and they say: "If that is so, give us a better price for rubber." Perhaps they want

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both the aid and the better price for rubber; but if it is only the latter, they are certainly right that it is a less embarrassing way to receive assistance.

The announcement of the United States Government that it desired to return the American synthetic rubber industry to private ownership had the unexpected effect of eliciting an official communication from the Indonesian Government. One might have thought that this proposal would be greeted with satisfaction in Djakarta, since the cost of producing synthetic rubber would no longer be subsidized by the United States Government. But the deep-seated mistrust of American intentions apparently caused the Indonesians to assume that the plants would be sold to private owners at a figure which took no account of their actual cost or worth, thus enabling the "rubber interests" to force down the price and destroy the growers of natural rubber in Indonesia. The idea that the new owners of the plants would beat down prices disregards the fact that private companies are operated for profit. The price at which they could sell the product profitably is the price which the growers of natural rubber would have to meet. This is their problem. It is not the problem of the American taxpayer. Of course, if the United States Government did, in fact, sell the plants to private owners at an unreasonably low figure, there would be some justification for complaint; but there is no evidence that this is intended.

Underneath all such differences of approach to economic questions in the United States and Indonesia lie the different attitudes toward the organization of society. As has been said, the few Indonesian leaders who were educated abroad went almost exclusively to the Netherlands. Since they were anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, they naturally fell in with left-wing groups. During the war years many took part in the underground work against the Germans. Thus they were trained as conspirators and revolutionists, and some of them joined the Communist Party. They learned nothing at first hand about the United States, and little about any other Western country. It is, thus, natural that Indonesian leaders should think of government as an agency intended to control all the activities of a country. They have had no experience of a government belonging to and accountable to the people. There has never been a national election in Indonesia, either before the revolution or after it. These leaders like the idea of democracy, despite their lack of experience with it; they

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are suspicious of private enterprise; and they despise capitalism, or what they have been told is capitalism.

These prejudices, this unsureness, and withal this sincere wish to build a democracy, supply the clue to Indonesia's attitude toward foreign affairs, which her leaders describe as a "positive, independent policy." They are determined to isolate Indonesia politically from the rest of the world until the country gets on its feet. This is not called neutrality, but independence; and by "positive" they mean that it will, they hope, leave the new state free to move in whatever direction seems most advantageous. From Indonesia's recent votes in the United Nations, it would appear that, in the view of the government, this advantage lies more in siding with the Russians than with the free world. For example, at the 1953 conference of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which was held in Indonesia, there was a split between the U.S.S.R. and the other nations; but the Indonesian delegation separated itself carefully from the free nations. In fact, during the whole conference the delegation did not once vote against the Russians; when it could not go along with them, it abstained. But on several occasions Indonesia did not hesitate to vote against the United States. Perhaps this is a left-handed compliment. At any rate, her delegates are following a similar course in the United Nations General Assembly. Unfortunately, it is a trend away from an earlier, more friendly attitude; at the beginning of the Korean war Indonesia voted with the Western countries. She also signed the peace treaty with Japan, but seems now to have regretted it and has failed to ratify the treaty.

The vast majority of the Indonesian people are not yet politically conscious. They were, of course, in favor of ending Dutch rule and of gaining their freedom. The process of political education which freedom requires, however, they find slow and painful. The villages have an old form of communal organization, and are essentially self-governed as far as social and local economic affairs are concerned; but their political experience does not go beyond the community. They have little interest in national affairs, and international questions are entirely beyond them. It is unreasonable to expect that they would have an understanding of America on which real friendship could be based. Indeed, reciprocal knowledge and appreciation of Indonesia by Americans is almost as completely lacking, and it will take more than press re-

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leases and broadcasts to provide an atmosphere in which real understanding can develop.

III

In a world at peace the United States could be quite indifferent to being misunderstood; but in the world of today, when we are subjected to both military and psychological attack, friends are not luxuries. America has gone to some lengths to try to make her motives clear and to gain support for the policies—backed by treasure and blood—which, we feel, will help us and all free nations. There are many ways in which nations influence people and make friends (or enemies). Some of the methods we are using are nongovernmental, and have been used for a long time. Others are official, and adopted fairly recently. Of those which may be called private, some are man-to-man—the informed and very influential letters that travelers, or new citizens of the United States, write to the folks at home; some are group-to-group—the activities of missionaries, or businessmen, or scientists. Such influences can be both good and bad, but on balance we in the free world believe them to be good. The barriers that totalitarian states erect against such easy international intercourse shows that they are afraid of it.

Governmental programs, much emphasized in recent years, seek to charm the alien by gifts of money, by wide distribution of the printed or spoken word, by the sharing of technical knowledge. There are debits as well as credits here too, when the accounts are honestly cast up. Grants or loans of funds are an old device. From the earliest times nations have given assistance to their allies and bribed neutrals and their enemies. As an emergency measure such methods have utility, but they soon become self-defeating. Once an emergency seems past, the pride of the recipient turns him against the donor. The subsidy is a mark of inferiority; and, indeed, if continued long may bring the giver to the same level of poverty.

The use of "propaganda" is a newer development. The United States, a country with a free press, took it up reluctantly and looks upon it skeptically. It has been accepted largely as a necessary measure of retaliation. "Is it right that the only voice that is heard in the world is the voice of our enemies? We must speak even louder with the voice of truth." We get some satisfaction when we feel we have put the record straight, and no doubt our

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active friends do also, but there seems good reason for skepticism as to the effect of all of this argument on the neutral. In Southeast Asia they merely say, "Now we are getting two lies; we won't listen to either." (But actually they seem to heed more the voice of Moscow than the Voice of America.)

The sharing of knowledge with other nations seems by all odds the most acceptable method of assistance to them and the least damaging to us. Of course, this, too, is subject to misrepresentation. Technical advice to governments can be portrayed as an effort to control their policies; technical assistance to industry or agriculture can be pictured as a plot to take over the economy. But the advisers operate largely as individuals, and if they are carefully chosen, and establish cordial relations with the people, they can indeed be messengers of good will.

IV

In Indonesia there are particular handicaps—the suspicion and hostility of government and people toward American policy, already noted; the ceaseless effort of the Communist Party to discredit every American action, governmental and private, and belittle every accomplishment; the newness of the nation and its lack of experience with the United States. Non-official American contacts with Indonesia are few. When it was a colony, relationships of all kinds between the inhabitants and other countries were discouraged by the Netherlands. But there are some American business enterprises there: the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, which has a producing division, a refinery in Sumatra, and a marketing organization throughout the islands; the California Texas Oil Company; General Motors, which has maintained an assembly plant in Djakarta since 1925; the Goodyear Rubber Company, with its plantations in Sumatra and tire factory at Bogor; and, of course, there are agents, mostly Dutch or Chinese, for the importation and distribution of American manufactured products and for the export of raw materials to the United States. Hollywood moving pictures are preferred to all others. There is no American bank. Only a handful of travelers from the United States visit the islands. There are a few missionaries. Since the war the Ford Foundation and the China Medical Board have given some assistance in the educational field.

On the official side, the American effort in Indonesia is also small, due, among other things, to two basic causes: first, the

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reluctance of Indonesia to accept assistance except on her own terms, and the extraordinary delays which occur in the definition of those terms; second, to the lack of organization and trained personnel through which assistance can be channeled. It must be remembered that "underdevelopment" in a country is almost always a result of lack of human, not material, resources. No amount of money will produce a steel mill without the skill to plan and operate it. The slow processes of education and training must precede effective aid in such cases.

The official United States program to win Indonesian friendship has consisted of an Export-Import Bank loan of $100,000,000 granted in 1950, not yet entirely spent; an offer of military assistance which was declined; a Technical Assistance program of a few million dollars annually; the provision of books, moving pictures and press handouts through the United States Information Service; and an "exchange of persons" program which has made available travel funds for Indonesian visitors to the United States and opportunity for study and training in this country. Compared with assistance programs in other countries it is small, but if the Indonesian Government and people had welcomed it in the spirit in which it was offered, it would have been very much larger.

It is important for us to reflect on the fact that the attitude of Indonesians toward schemes of assistance sponsored by the United Nations, such as the Technical Assistance program, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, is far more cordial than it is toward purely American programs. Doubtless the U.N. missions also suffer from lack of trained local people through whom to work. But the readiness of the Indonesians to coöperate with their efforts is apparent, and there is no criticism of their purposes by the people or the press.

The entire assistance program of the United States in the Far East was evolved to counter the open aggression and covert infiltration of Communism. The necessity for prompt action resulted in the adoption of particular measures before the basic purposes were thought through. It was suggested, for example, that if underdeveloped countries could be industrialized and the standard of living of their people improved, they would embrace democracy and love peace. How such a notion could have gained currency in the face of the experience with Japan is hard to

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understand, for Japan was an underdeveloped country until the early years of this century. She industrialized at an astonishing rate and the standard of living of her people was enormously improved. But this new-found strength was used not for peace but for aggression.

Now we are told that if people in the underdeveloped countries can be made more prosperous they will join our side in the cold war. But this is certainly still open to proof. There are very good reasons for seeking the improvement of conditions of life everywhere, and for a more equitable distribution of the world's riches; but to think such a consummation automatically produces political friendship is naïve indeed. Perhaps the notion is an echo of the Communist assumption that the causes of war are economic, a theory which history belies.

V

In the light of the particular situation in Indonesia, what might our policy be? In the first place, if we want to make friends of the Indonesians we had better give up those aspects of our activities about which they are suspicious and hostile. This would mean discontinuing purely American financial assistance. If we are sincere in our desire to help build up the country, however, and I think we are, we should apply whatever we feel able to spend through the United Nations Technical Assistance program which the Indonesians welcome with enthusiasm. The United States Information Service should be informational. We should be ready to supply the facts about the United States when asked; but we should give up all propaganda activities. Nobody believes self-serving pronouncements, and more progress can be made in real enlightenment by sticking to unvarnished facts and leaving the interpretation to others. The program for exchange of persons should be enlarged to include as many as possible who are willing to go abroad for observation and training, and competent to profit by the experience.

Even this reoriented program would suffer from its official character, but it would not yield as many opportunities for effective Communist attack. Meanwhile, every avenue for coöperation of a private nature should be encouraged. The American people have a genius for perfecting ways of being helpful, group-to-group and man-to-man. Through foundations, committees established for special purposes, trade associations, professional

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societies, labor unions, the dynamic forces of our free society are always seeking means for improving man's lot. Some way may perhaps be found to extend these activities more widely beyond our frontiers. The Boy Scouts of America can help the Boy Scouts of Indonesia. American universities can benefit themselves, and can benefit education in the islands, by exchanging professors with Indonesian universities. Opportunities can be found for studying each other's culture; probably the recent visit to the United States of the Balinese dancers did more to bring Indonesia to favorable American attention than any other single event. A small beginning has been made in all these ways; their development is limited only by the will on each side to be friends.

Given the proper conditions, the opportunities for economic coöperation are great. But with the best will in the world, American investors cannot be expected to risk their capital in a country where security is still lacking, where the government is in the process of nationalizing foreign holdings, and where labor, tax and other laws make profitable operation almost impossible. The Indonesian Government has stated that it seeks foreign investments, but the terms have not yet been defined. They must rightly ensure that the Indonesian people will be master in their own house, but it is to be hoped that the terms will give sufficient benefits to friendly investors to make a real development plan possible. The American economy was built up by means of loans from abroad, but we did not lose our freedom in the process. There is no reason, given fair dealing on both sides, why Indonesia cannot develop and be free. Incidentally, the training of Indonesian managers and technicians can most expeditiously be accomplished coincident with foreign investment, especially if the terms of the contract provide for that. The initial staff would, of course, be foreign, but provision for training their replacements could be made. But it should be remembered that it takes some 15 years in the United States to fit an executive or a shop manager for his post. Indonesians cannot be expected to learn faster.

Much has been said here of Indonesian hostility. It should be made clear that this applies to Americans in general, more particularly to American institutions, and most particularly to American policy. It does not apply to individuals. Actually Indonesians are extremely courteous, friendly and kind. They are

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a simple and easy-going people who have undertaken great responsibilities and are acutely aware of the difficulties they face and of their lack of experience. We, on our part, must recognize these difficulties and be ready with both forbearance and courtesy. This will help more than our money.

Everyone wants to be liked, whether acknowledging it or not, nations as well as individuals. To be sure, Britain bore with wonderful complacency the opprobrium of most of the world for generations, for she was regarded as an imperialist nation in those days. She wanted peace in order that her trade might prosper, and she had the power and the will to secure it for a hundred years. But in the end her strength alone was not equal to the task, and the wars came.

Now the leadership has passed, at least for the moment, to the United States. We likewise wish peace. But we seek to secure it not by our strength alone, but by the combined strength of the free world. In such an enterprise the trust of the other nations is not only desirable, but essential; and it is not in the least easy to secure. It cannot be forced; it cannot be bought; and it cannot be won by clever salesmanship. In the end, if it comes at all, it will be because the basic concept of human freedom has been encompassed in policies so broad that men everywhere can rally to them without sacrificing their pride or their dignity, and without being diverted by petty jealousies, fears or prejudices.

These policies, and the instrumentalities to make them effective, are in a fair way to being forged; but they have not won popular understanding abroad, much less support. Whether the masses of mankind, especially in the newly-established countries, steeped as some are in superstition, handicapped by ignorance, and faced with the overriding task of making even a meager living, can recognize the issues and choose the way of freedom is a question. Those who believe in democracy think they can. But they would do well to remember the hugeness of the problem, and to school themselves in persistence and patience.

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CAN APARTHEID SUCCEED IN SOUTH AFRICA?

By Gwendolen M. Carter

SOUTH Africa has the unfortunate distinction of possessing the world's most tangled racial situation. Its 2,500,000 Europeans (whites), themselves divided between Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking people, are far outnumbered by 10,500,000 non-Europeans. More than four-fifths of these are native Africans, or Bantu; and there are also more than 1,000,000 Colored (those of mixed blood), and 250,000 Indians. None of these non-Europeans possesses any significant political power. Nevertheless, the dominant political fact in South Africa today is, as everybody knows, the steady deterioration in the relations between Europeans and non-Europeans.

On the surface, life in the Union is quiet and pleasant. In daily contacts in the urban centers, as well as in the reserves and on European farms, the African is his customary, good-humored self. I have, in fact, rarely met such friendliness and open-handed hospitality as was accorded me in visits to native kraals in the eastern Transvaal. But tension always exists in the large cities, particularly Johannesburg, where there are hundreds of thousands of Africans, many of them "raw" from the reserves. *Tsotsi* gangs of young ruffians terrorize their own people. Murders of Europeans do occur; housebreaking and minor thefts are frequent. Many people remain calm, but there are others who carry guns, and are afraid to be alone, particularly at night.

Moreover, in urban areas the Africans and the police are in a state of constant hostility; this is aggravated by frequent raids into the native townships outside the cities, and often flares into violence. The three large-scale outbreaks toward the end of 1952 —at Port Elizabeth, East London and Kimberley—were set off by trouble between the police and a few natives. Innocent white people were killed during these outbreaks, including white people who were genuine friends of the natives.

Non-Europeans feel increasingly frustrated and bitter. The political color bar was raised against them when Africans were taken off the common roll in Cape Province in 1936 and placed on a separate roll to elect three Europeans. In their view the Na-

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tive Representative Council, established in 1936, had become worse than useless as a political instrument even before it was abolished in 1950. It was this absence of constitutional channels, they maintain, which led them to direct action through the defiance campaign of 1952.

The passive resistance by Africans to "unjust" laws, however, was almost a complete failure. Some few Europeans like Patrick Duncan (son of a former Governor-General of the Union) openly ranged themselves on the side of the Africans, but most of them ignored the campaign. Yet there was much to learn from it. Quite apart from the fact that this resistance movement was better organized than any in the past, it gave insight into the thinking of the articulate, still moderate African.

One of the measures on which the campaign was focussed was the Bantu Authorities Act, which aims at reëstablishing the authority of the chiefs in the tribes. Some anthropologists maintain that the objective cannot possibly be achieved at this late date. The African National Congress opposes it as directly contrary to its program of developing a national spirit among the Bantu. It also opposes the culling of cattle, not as bad in itself so much as because of the feeling that it avoids the fundamental issue: the need of the Africans for more land. But the strongest opposition is to the complex of pass laws regulating the movements of Africans outside the reserves. The African insists that these often force him to take low paid and unattractive jobs as the only way of getting out of the reserves, and beyond this, he resents the humiliation of being the only non-European obliged to carry a pass.

At any given time, 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 Africans are outside the reserves. The soil of the reserves is badly eroded, through over-grazing by cattle and the ubiquitous goats which strip the last bit of grass from the unprotected land. Since it is quite impossible for these areas to support the native population, anywhere from 50 to 80 percent of the men are away working in the gold and diamond mines, industry, domestic service, etc. There is, of course, a fairly large detribalized group of Africans who have no footing in the reserves at all. But most Africans who come to the cities or mines do so for periods of service—nine to 15 months in the mines, and less regular terms in other employment—leaving their families in the reserves to till the small plot of land which is a kind of old age insurance.

This practice of migratory labor has struck at the roots of the

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African's tribal and family institutions and shattered his traditional sanctions of behavior without putting others in their place. Recent surveys show, for instance, that more than 70 percent of African babies in Johannesburg are illegitimate, and 25 percent in a typical area in the reserves. Moreover, there is little chance for Africans to develop a stake in the community outside the reserves. Even those who live permanently outside and have money —and there are a number of them—are prevented by law from buying a house, or from buying land except in certain restricted areas. At the moment, in fact, some of the very few existing African freeholds in Johannesburg are in danger of expropriation to facilitate moving the native townships farther from the city. (Incidentally, the Group Areas Act, which the African National Congress bitterly opposes, makes it possible to expropriate the holdings of any individual or group in order to enforce racial segregation in an area where the Act applies.) Thus there is not only insecurity, but hopelessness. It is hard to find anywhere in the European areas things which minister to the African's own personality, his self-respect, and his sense of responsibility.

The African is a good industrial worker—his output compares favorably with that of English or continental workers so long as nothing goes wrong—and he is being drawn increasingly into the Union's factories. The older trades—mining, engineering, building, typographical—still maintain a rigid color bar, enforced more through the attitude of the white trade unions than through legislation. But the newer industries, *e.g.* textiles, are giving the African opportunities for more skilled positions, though usually at a different wage rate, enforced by regrading the job.

Some people say that the African should let the South African industrial revolution carry his cause for him. But the African leaders are not prepared to wait for such long processes to operate. Moreover, they have moved past the point where concessions like better housing, social services, education and a few more skilled jobs answer their demands. Perhaps these might have satisfied them five years ago. Today, the African leaders are demanding equality, a highly explosive concept in South Africa and one which almost no European is prepared to grant.

II

A good deal of publicity has been given to two questions: the influence of the Indians on the activities of the Africans, and the

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influence of the Communists. The government maintains that the Africans have been misled by both. There is, in fact, an effective working arrangement between the leaders of the African National Congress and the Indian National Congress through their Joint Action Committee. African leaders make a great point, however, of the fact that their Congress took the decision to engage in the defiance campaign at least a month before the Indians did so. They also declare that one reason the defiance campaign centered to such an extent in the Eastern Cape and Ciskei areas—where most of the 100,000 members of the Congress live—was because there are no Indians there. At the same time, it is clear that Indians provided a considerable share of the money for the campaign and probably some of the organizing. India was obviously sympathetic to it and was looked to as a leader in United Nations discussion on this subject. Nonetheless, there is still much latent antagonism between Indians and Africans wherever their economic interests conflict, which makes problematic their close collaboration over a long period.

The influence of Communists is still more difficult to determine. There are probably not more than a few hundred Communists in South Africa; relatively few of them were formally identified with the defiance campaign. At the same time, it is quite possible that they helped with advice. (Passive resistance is not, however, a Communist type of action.) Communist lawyers acted for resisters. Nonetheless, it seems clear that agitation by Africans would have taken place without any Communist encouragement, and whether or not the Nationalist Government had come into office. The rigid attitudes of the latter accelerated the process; the advice and aid of Communists may have supported African programs of direct action. But at the root of the matter is the insistence of the educated and half-educated African on having a greater share in the returns of his country. It is significant that much of the recent driving force toward organization and action by the Africans comes less from teachers, who have traditionally provided leadership, than from professional men, and young secondary school graduates who are working in industry. The latter are less ready for compromise than the older generation.

The first stage of the defiance campaign came to an end by January 1953. This was partly because 20 of its leaders, including Moroka (then President of the African National Congress,

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though now succeeded by ex-chief Luthuli), were convicted of so-called "statutory Communism" under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, that is, of aiming to bring about "political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union . . . by unlawful acts . . . or threat of such acts." Wholesale dismissals after a one-day strike in Port Elizabeth, orders forbidding certain Congress leaders to attend meetings or to travel, and exhaustion of funds all helped to check the campaign. Moreover, the two laws passed early in 1953 which make it possible for the Minister of Justice to declare a state of emergency at his discretion, and to impose heavier penalties, including flogging, both for law-breaking and incitement to law-breaking, are powerful deterrents to direct action.

But the defiance campaign did not fail as a training program. It has long been said that the African is incapable of disciplined or organized action; almost every European in the Union was surprised at the degree to which both were present during this program of passive resistance. Each of the 8,000 or so volunteers took a pledge of non-violence; each was instructed in the kind of treatment he was likely to receive from the magistrate and police. Once he had passed through this experience, the volunteer became not only an active member of the African National Congress but also a member of a "cell" or nucleus of organization in his district. In the Witwatersrand and eastern areas of the Transvaal, and in the native reserves of the Ciskei, this organization remains in existence though it has been forced underground.

There is no reason to suppose that African and Indian leaders have been diverted from their objectives. On the contrary, increasing restrictions have intensified their determination to press ahead toward their ultimate goal of equality. Their most effective means of forcing concessions is through organizing united action by the mass of Africans who form the great unskilled labor force of the Union. At the same time, African and Indian leaders are deeply concerned not to give any excuse to the authorities to use the armed force which would undoubtedly meet any outbreak of non-European violence. Whether they can transmit their plan for large-scale stoppage of work to primitive Africans, or keep such an effort passive, is, of course, a question.

The A.N.C. and I.N.C. now demand a vote on the common roll for all non-Europeans. In the existing primitive state of the great majority of Africans, this demand is obviously unwar-

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ranted. Some non-European leaders would probably still be willing to agree to high educational and property qualifications for an African franchise; not surprisingly, however, they insist on securing *some* direct political influence. But most European South Africans feel that even this opening wedge is too dangerous because of the disparity in numbers between whites and Africans. In fact, Dr. Malan's National Party believes that its substantially increased parliamentary majority in the election of April 1953 provides a mandate to limit still further the rights of non-Europeans outside their own particular areas, if not to put an end to them entirely. Thus one is left with the impression of irresistible forces and immovable objects coming closer to collision.

III

It is not difficult to understand the attitude of politically articulate non-Europeans in the Union. But it is no less important to understand the viewpoint of the European minority, particularly of the Afrikaners whose Dutch ancestors settled at the Cape 300 years ago and who have never had any other home than South Africa. Strong individualists, the Afrikaners inevitably have developed a deep racial consciousness out of their incessant contact with primitive peoples during the past centuries. And it is natural, too, that they developed what Americans call a "frontier" approach to law and order. One of their own most far-sighted leaders said recently: "The Afrikaner has lived so long in a state of crisis that he does not realize that this current crisis is different from the earlier ones." The Nationalists, in fact, believe that they are using their hard-won experience to cope successfully and constructively with their complicated problems.

The unexpected political success which first brought the present Nationalists into office in 1948 resulted from the appeal of their slogan, "apartheid." This implies both an intensification of the traditional South African policy of racial segregation, and also some self-development of non-Europeans. The "ideal" aspect of apartheid includes the conception of a "Bantustan" in which the African would be able to develop and govern himself as the European does in his own area. To achieve this, and protect white South Africa, an intellectual wing of the Nationalists known as SABRA (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs) and a prominent group in the Dutch Reformed Church advocate complete separation of Europeans and non-Europeans in every sphere of

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life. This would, of course, entail a complete change both in the average European household in South Africa, and in all phases of the economy, since both depend on cheap non-European labor. Few believe, therefore, that any government will seriously propose such a dislocation of South African life, unless, of course, large scale inter-racial violence made it appear the only alternative to chaos. Even its advocates like Dr. Dönges, the Minister of the Interior, now speak of it as something that will not come about for a century or two. But the myth of "ideal" apartheid provides an aura of righteousness for current segregation policies.

"What distinguishes us from our political opponents," said one of the best-informed of the Nationalists, "is our sense of separate South African nationality." When I asked one of their organizers whether they coached canvassers before they paid their visits, he said indignantly: "We don't need to, they know all about nationalism. They feel it. It is a religion to them." And there is no question but that the Nationalists are a highly disciplined and well-organized party, with much of the discipline self-imposed. At the same time, the remarkable cohesion of the National Party stems from ties which are emotional and rooted in history. The party calls to its support the memory of grievances against British imperialism in the nineteenth century which culminated in the Boer War; the concentration camps for women and children during that war; the bitter experiences of defeat; the way in which their spoken language, Afrikaans, was discriminated against until the 1920's; the long, up-hill struggle to bring the Afrikaner to his present substantial economic position. Most Afrikaners now point with pride to their flourishing language and literature, and to the share their people take in the professions, industry and commerce. They are no longer farmers only. But a surprising degree of insecurity still seems to exist in Nationalist minds, and the slogan "consolidate our gains" is effective.

In another way, the Nationalist Afrikaner, especially of the *platteland*—the countryside—is conditioned by his past. His ancestors of the Great Trek and thereafter were moulded by the isolation in which they lived; by their struggles with the natives who poured in from the north as the Afrikaner was moving up from the south; by their rigid and uncompromising Calvinism, with its strong overtones of authoritarianism. All these are still potent factors in the Nationalist Afrikaner's attitudes today, partly because tradition still has a powerful hold in the country

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districts, and partly because most of what he reads springs from these roots.

Finally, every institution in the Nationalist Afrikaner community contributes toward the unity of the whole. The National Party is the political spokesman; economic associations for aiding Afrikaners include the *Reddingsdaadbond,* which gives advice and makes contacts, and the *Volkskas* which is a commercial bank; while a wide group of societies, coördinated by the F.A.K. (*Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge*), perform the same mission in the cultural sphere. There is also the *Broederbond,* variously interpreted as the central directing agency of Afrikaner nationalism or as a cultural society. The very secrecy of its membership and actions tends to promote rumors about its activities, but it may now well be no more than the Nationalists say it is: a body of people who are outstanding in every sphere of life who work together to promote what they consider the best interests of South Africa. What is chiefly important is the general unity of purpose of all these groups and their continuous and intimate contact with the Dutch Reformed Church, the Nationalist-inclined schools, and the Nationalist press. Many people belong, or have belonged, to several or almost all of the groups: Dr. Malan, for example, was a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church and subsequently the first editor of *Die Burger,* the outstanding Nationalist newspaper. When the party claims to speak for nationalistic Afrikanerdom, it does so with a double justification: its political leaders are closely in touch with those in every sphere of Nationalist Afrikaner activity and, in addition, it is followed with almost blind fervor just because it is the political organ of the community.

Even so, all Afrikaners are not within the party; the United Party includes a considerable number of them among its supporters and has Afrikaans-speaking members of Parliament. Though Afrikaners outnumber English-speaking South Africans by three to two, the Nationalists have never won a majority of the votes in any election, including that of 1953. Even in the Free State, the home of Nationalism, a substantial group of Afrikaners continues to vote U.P. even though it may entail real personal sacrifices of influence and even position.

IV

The United Party's strength—as also its weakness—is the

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wide variety of groups it embraces: those speaking both English and Afrikaans; liberals and conservatives; Christians and Jews. It gained its present name through the fusion of the parties of General Smuts and General Hertzog in 1934, but it inherits honestly the tradition of unity established by South Africa's great leader, General Botha, in his first Cabinet after the Act of Union in 1910. The United Party is the great hope of those who believe —as did Botha, Smuts, and, especially after 1933, Hertzog—that the country must be built on both the English and the Afrikaner traditions. The Nationalists, on the other hand, though quite ready to admit English-speaking people to their party, will do so only on their own terms.

It is generally said that there is no economic base to South African politics. This is not quite true, though economic interest is far less influential in determining party allegiances in South Africa than in countries like Australia or Great Britain. Nonetheless, it is significant that among the adherents to the United Party are the most prominent business, commercial, industrial and mining interests in the country, the prosperous English-speaking section, and a substantial number of well-to-do Afrikaner farmers. The Nationalists depend mainly on the rural areas (outside Natal), which are heavily over-represented in electoral districts, and on the semi-skilled Europeans who work on the railways, in the mines, and publicly-owned industries like Iscor (iron and steel), and in lower administrative jobs. The latter groups have not only benefited from Nationalist policies, but feel most acutely the economic pressure of the non-Europeans and thus strongly support policies which are aimed at holding them down.

Though the United Party has never developed a sense of inner cohesion comparable to that of the Nationalist Party, it did build a highly efficient organization in the last weeks of the 1953 election campaign. If due allowance is made for the 18 uncontested seats won by the United Party and the returns for its ally, the Labor Party—a small group composed mainly of intellectuals—the opposition polled nearly 75,000 more votes than did the Nationalists. Yet the latter gained a parliamentary majority of 29 seats. This paradoxical result stems from two factors, neither of which is likely to be reversed in the foreseeable future: the heavy over-representation of rural areas, and the solid concentrations of United Party supporters in the big cities and Natal.

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Equally discouraging for the electoral future of the U.P. is the relatively greater increase in total Nationalist vote since 1948.

A few weeks after the defeat of the United Party in the 1953 elections, two new parties were founded: the Liberals, and the Union Federal Party. The former, under the leadership of a brilliant woman deputy, Mrs. Margaret Ballinger, who has served as a native representative since 1938, and two outstanding writers, Alan Paton and Leo Marquard, is the first party in South Africa's history to make "equal rights for all educated men," including votes on the common roll, a plank in its program. As of the moment, its support comes from intellectuals and professional people in the cities; it has no mass following. The Union Federal Party, led by Senator Heaton Nicholls, formerly leader of the United Party in the Senate, brings together some liberals formerly prominent in the Torch Commando movement with a group centered in Natal which is particularly concerned to safeguard provincial autonomy. Since Natal includes almost all the Indians in the Union, as well as a huge, largely tribalized African population, the liberalism of the Union Federal Party is strictly qualified. The party program, however, does include votes on a communal roll for Indians, who at present have no political channels, and holds out an ultimate hope of votes on the common roll for highly educated non-Europeans.

No doubt aware of the strains within the United Party, the Nationalists, on the very morrow of their 1953 electoral victory, appealed for the support of 12 to 13 members of the Opposition in their renewed efforts to make political apartheid complete by taking the Colored off the common roll in Cape Province, the only place such a right exists. They proposed to put these voters on a separate roll to elect four European representatives in Parliament. The Nationalists had been balked by the Appeal Court in 1952 in their attempts to achieve this change through a simple parliamentary majority, and sought the two-thirds majority necessary to amend an entrenched clause. Despite original signs of wavering, U.P. discipline (reinforced by an active concern in U.P. constituencies) brought about the defeat of the amendment. Dr. Malan then switched to a bill designed to change the composition of the Appeal Court. By this time, sharp personal rivalries within the United Party and criticism of its leader, Mr. Strauss, precipitated a crisis resulting in the expulsion from the party caucus of four intransigent members, including the leader of the

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party in the Transvaal, Bailey Bekker. On the appeal of the "rebels," the Nationalists agreed to hold the bill affecting the courts in suspension, while making another attempt to achieve their ends through constitutional means. A select committee was set up to study the matter, in preparation for the next session of Parliament in January 1954; and the United Party (but not the Labor Party) has accepted representation on this committee.

In view of the Nationalists' emphasis on *volkswil* and on the supremacy of parliament over the courts, it may be asked why they are persisting in their long efforts to find a constitutional means of taking the Colored off the common roll. Certainly this procedure contradicts the too-loose accusations that Dr. Malan is a dictator. Such charges overlook the fact that the National Party has always stood for parliamentary action, and during World War II bitterly fought the conceptions of a one-party state advanced by the *Ossewa Brandwag,* a militant Afrikaner organization. The National Party will not consciously violate the constitutional framework within which it operates. (In this regard, it must be remembered that the Nationalists believed in 1951 that they had a legal right to take the Colored off the common roll by majority action, even though in earlier times many of their leaders had affirmed a moral obligation not to do so.) At the same time, the Nationalists do not follow the English idea of parliamentarianism in which the government looks on itself as the representative of the whole people, not merely of its own party. They feel justified in passing controversial measures whether or not they conform to traditional patterns of civil rights or parliamentary restraint.

A reason for special scrupulousness by the Nationalists at the present time is that the constitutional question is the one on which English South Africans have the strongest feeling. The Torch Commando sprang into existence in 1951 when the Nationalists first proposed taking the Colored off the common roll by a procedure outside that specified by the Act of Union. This association of ex-servicemen, with its torchlight processions and meetings, helped arouse the political consciousness of English South Africans, who have in the past tended to preoccupy themselves with business and professional life. The English voted solidly for the United Party in the 1953 election. Always outnumbered three to two by the Afrikaners, the English South African faces the likelihood of seeing the gap widen further, since immi-

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gration from the United Kingdom is now a mere trickle, while the Afrikaner birth rate is considerably higher than their own. But the Nationalists are not satisfied to depend on their numbers for their political power. They would like gradually to persuade the English in South Africa that their only hope of political influence lies in associating themselves with the Nationalist Afrikaners. They see this objective in long-range terms, and it has influenced them to soft-pedal the republican issue on which the English—especially in Natal—feel strongly. For the same reason, they do not want to alienate the English South Africans by violating constitutional safeguards.

The right-wing members of the U.P. hold to the principle of apartheid no less than do the Nationalists. But there is also a hesitant but fundamental liberalism in many adherents of the United Party who are trying to bring their ideas and feelings on race relations abreast of contemporary thought in other parts of the world. All the major organs of the party strongly support its present leader, and the United Party might yet emerge with a constructive alternative to the Nationalists in the all-important field of native policy. Here, the party's close relations with the mines and secondary industry offer an opportunity not open to any other political party, for no liberalism, however modified, can become effective—particularly in a country like South Africa where history and color consciousness work so strongly against it—unless it has a natural economic base. But unless the party can unite on some basis of principle it may disintegrate. Then its right wing might make a permanent alliance with the Nationalists, giving Dr. Malan a two-thirds majority in parliament, with all that that involves.

While public attention concentrates upon the constitutional crisis, the Nationalists are rapidly implementing their program of apartheid. In the 1953 midyear session of Parliament, the Nationalists passed the Bantu Education Act, the Native Labor Act and the Separate Amenities Act. They are also moving ahead with the implementation of the Group Areas Act—the cornerstone of their residential apartheid policies—and the Bantu Authorities Act.

The Separate Amenities Act legalizes unequal amenities for Europeans and non-Europeans in trains, buses, waiting-rooms and other public places. This is the legal endorsement of a long-existing situation which had been brought into question by a ju-

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dicial decision that an African could not be punished for using a railway waiting-room reserved for Europeans if the facilities available to him were not comparable. Potentially more far-reaching are the two other recent Acts which affect native education and the African worker. Under the former, all except higher education is transferred from the provinces to the central government, and from the Ministry of Education in the latter to the Ministry of Native Affairs, which is strongly imbued with the philosophy of apartheid. Local control of education is being transferred to tribal authorities in place of missions which, be it noted, are largely responsible for enabling perhaps 40 percent of Union Africans to receive at least some primary education. The missions receive grants from the government to pay their teachers and provide equipment, but these subsidies are now made specifically dependent on the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs. None of these provisions is necessarily restrictive, but educated Africans fear that the real purpose of the Act is to bolster what they look on as outworn tribal traditions and practices rather than to aid the African to learn about the liberalizing elements of Western civilization. No one who has visited native schools in South Africa can be quite happy about their over-emphasis on academic subjects. Nonetheless, any development which limits the opportunities of Africans to prepare themselves for higher education and the professions strikes at the roots of their advancement.

The Native Labor Act not only reaffirms that African trade unions are without legal recognition, and that strikes by Africans are illegal, but also sets up a complicated hierarchy of channels for the settlement of disputes which leave African workers with almost no direct influence. Regional mediation boards are to have African members working under a white chairman, but the Minister of Labor is chiefly advised on African labor matters by an all-white Central Native Labor Board appointed by himself. Wage settlements for Africans may be made by the Wage Board without evidence being received from African trade unions. Despite the protests of the native representatives and the Labor Party (which has recently shown a new liberalism in native affairs), the Act substantially curbs even the limited influence still left to the small group of African trade unions. Henceforth government will settle their concerns. Thus in two crucial areas—education and industrial organization—the Nationalists are go-

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ing ahead with apartheid in ways bitterly opposed by articulate non-European opinion.

Can apartheid succeed? In practice, success would mean that the close working together of Europeans and non-Europeans in the economic sphere went side by side with their separate development in all other aspects of life. It would mean that the support of the non-Europeans would ultimately have to be gained for these policies. The Nationalists recognize that they have embarked on a long and difficult road which involves reversing trends in non-European development which are already well-established. But they have faith in the righteousness of their cause. They believe, and sincerely, that strict residential segregation, a rigid color bar in industry, a complete and permanent exclusion from voting on the common roll with Europeans, and hard repressive measures in case of outbreaks by non-Europeans, offer the best hope of maintaining peace and order in South Africa. They ask the outside world to refrain from passing judgment, and to permit European South Africa to cope with its racial problems in its own way.

Yet what the Nationalist Afrikaner seems not yet to have realized is that his own understandable nationalism is creating counter-nationalism among English-speaking South Africans and, more dangerously, among the non-Europeans. His own history seems to provide the most forceful illustration that nationalism is stronger than any effort that can be made to repress it. It will be a classical tragedy if the very attempts of the Afrikaner Nationalists to safeguard the position of the white minority in South Africa bring upon them the disasters which a more far-seeing policy of conciliation might have avoided.

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ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

By Gardner Patterson

IN THE task of creating a national home the Israelis have been faced with economic problems that would have led them to despair had they not been possessed of unbounded hope, great imagination and resourcefulness, and many generous friends abroad. Much has been said of the economic miracles that have been wrought in Israel. The face of the land has indeed been changed. Nonetheless, some of the impressive accomplishments appear to be without sustaining economic substance, and fundamental policy changes are needed if Israel is to solve her problems in the sense of producing by her own efforts sufficient goods and services to maintain the health and vigor of her people within the present democratic political structure. Some of these policy changes are now in the making.

The core of Israel's economic problems is that she is at this time desperately poor in resources. The poverty in natural resources is well known. Only about two-thirds of an acre of arable land is available per inhabitant, and yields on most of this are exceedingly poor unless it is irrigated at great initial and operating costs. Although there are traces of many minerals, the only large known deposits which give firm promise of being commercially workable (even assuming that real wages demanded by both labor and management are significantly less than at present) are phosphates, potash, salts of the Dead Sea, limestone, gypsum, sands and clay. At least for many years to come the nation will be for all practical purposes without forests; and the nearby accessible fishing grounds are extremely poor.

Less commonly recognized but no less important is the present *economic* poverty in human resources, if it be accepted that in an economic context the labor force must be assessed in terms of its ability and willingness to make use of the other available factors of production. To appreciate this aspect of the problem one must glance back. The economy of Palestine during the mandatory period could, for present purposes, be divided into the Arab sector and the Jewish sector. Nearly two-thirds of the Arab working population in Palestine in 1946 were farmers. They tended sugar fruit trees, raised sheep, grew bread grains, picked olives, and, in general, tilled, by arduous and primitive methods,

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the hillside farms. Over half of the Jews gainfully employed in Palestine at that time provided services of one kind or another —professional, merchandising, financial, communications, etc. Less than one-fifth were engaged in agriculture, and most of these were on large, heavily mechanized farms in the fertile plains and valleys. A small number of both Arabs and Jews were busy at industrial and craft occupations. Together, the two groups created a rough sort of national economic balance in the area at a low, and partially subsidized, level of consumption.

Between 1947 and the present something like 900,000 Arabs left the area now included in Israel, and over 800,000 Jews entered. But most of the workers leaving were farmers and most of those entering were producers of commercial, personal and professional services. Less than 5 percent of the newcomers who had been working had been engaged in agriculture. Further, the incomplete data available indicate that less than one-quarter of the immigrants had been gainfully employed at all before coming to Israel—the percentage of aged and of children in the total was high. It must also be kept in mind that most of the immigrants brought little or no productive capital with them and that over 95 percent of them came from the Arab States, Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and Central and Eastern Europe—areas where the services performed and the commodities produced were often not of the type requiring labor talents which could be easily transferred or made use of in the Western European-North American type of economy which the Government of Israel, the Jewish Agency, the old settlers, and most of the foreign investors have been trying to create in the new homeland.

The hostility of the surrounding Arab States has added greatly to the burdens resulting from Israel's poverty. High on the list of resulting costs is that of maintaining a larger military establishment than would otherwise have been necessary. Perhaps equally burdensome and more permanent, if less obvious, have been the costs associated with the policy of attempting to make the frontiers secure by creating new settlements along them. This often involved heavy expenditures on housing, irrigation, roads, farm machinery and equipment, as well as the use of men's time, which would have yielded more goods had they been in other parts of the country. A third major group of costs has resulted from the Arab economic boycott. This has not only denied Israel nearby markets and sources of supply, but has forced her to pay

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out many millions of dollars extra each year on transportation.

In spite of these difficulties, investment in Israel has been large, perhaps as much as 20 percent of total national income. Equally impressive to the outside observer are the living standards that have been maintained. The consumption levels in Israel are austere indeed as compared with those in the United States or with the aspirations of the Israelis. But in terms of such essentials as food, clothing, housing and medical care, consumption in Israel is not only much higher than that of the surrounding nations, but the average probably exceeds that of Greece, Turkey, Jugoslavia and Italy. More important, it appears to be well above the pre-1948 levels of many of the citizens and is certainly far beyond the present capacity of Israel to maintain by her own efforts.

These levels of investment and consumption have of course been made possible by huge amounts of outside help.[1] Currently, and for the past few years, it may be estimated roughly that something like one-fourth of the total value of goods and services available to the Israelis (that is, about four-fifths of all imports) have been provided as gifts or loans. World Jewry and the United States Government have been the principal contributors. Private foreign banks and commercial suppliers have extended large short-term credits, saddling Israel with a particularly difficult and expensive debt management problem. Within the last few months Israel has begun to receive goods under the reparations agreement which provides that the Federal Republic of Germany shall pay to the State of Israel three billion Reichsmarks ($714,000,000 at the current rate of exchange) during the period ending in 1965–1966.

II

Apart from Israel's poverty, much of the explanation for her failure to become more self-supporting is to be found—as in many nations—in the preoccupation of policy makers with the

[1] It must not be assumed that international deficits are a recent development. How deep-rooted this problem is in the area is shown by the fact that during the last decade of the British mandate in Palestine exports paid for less than half the imports, the balance being financed by private capital movements (in large part owned by the incoming immigrants), the national Jewish funds, and the Mandatory Government. Huge payments were received during most of this period from the foreign armed forces in Palestine (largely British), but most of this income served to increase the assets abroad of the territory. A part of these assets was subsequently made available to Israel and was used during the early days of the new state to finance imports.

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immediate economic well-being of the people. During the mandatory period, the Jewish residents in Palestine, by dint of hard work, sacrifice, entrepreneurial ability and imaginative application of their energies, buttressed with help from world Jewry, had created for themselves a relatively high standard of living. With the birth of Israel and the accelerated "ingathering of the exiles," the responsible officials deliberately decided that for social and political reasons it was undesirable to have two large groups in the country with widely divergent living standards. Rather than attempt to force down the existing levels of the pre-1948 residents, they decided to concentrate on raising those of the newcomers.

This policy in the first instance took the form of heroic efforts to provide the immigrants on their arrival with food, shelter, medical care and various amenities which, meager as they were, were often superior to what some of them had been accustomed to. Virtually nothing was *demanded* in return, and the recipients knew that if they did nothing the government would make every effort to care for them. More important were the government's policies of setting high monetary wages for the newcomers; providing them with opportunities for employment in public works; and attempting to improve the individual's economic position by selling imported goods at low prices and by placing price controls on many locally produced foodstuffs and clothing. These policies, together with the large expenditures on defense and investments, resulted in a serious inflation. Among other effects to be noted later, this left much cash in the hands of the residents and thereby created a demand for many personal and commercial services which the new citizens were willing and able to sell but which added little to the nation's capacity to support itself. The immigrants were not trained at the start to do much of the arduous work that the departed Arabs had performed and that self-support demanded; on top of this, the government's policy, resting in important part on aid from abroad, served to decrease their willingness to accept such employment.

Some of the consequences of these policies were not unrecognized, and in 1952 sharp changes took place. The local prices of many imports were raised by devaluing the Israeli pound, and price controls were removed from many locally produced goods. Officials of the General Federation of Jewish Labor, which also

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has extensive interests as an employer, agreed to show restraint in demanding increases in basic wages. The government undertook to engage in no inflationary financing of the budget, to restrict bank credit and to reduce certain of the public works expenditures. These stringent policies, heroically administered, have had fundamental and beneficial effects. The most publicized has been a doubling or more of the number of unemployed. Undesirable as this in itself is, it has encouraged some of those affected to seek a more menial sort of work on the land and in the factories than they had hoped for, but which will add more to the national income than did their earlier work. Further, the threat of unemployment is operating in many instances to increase labor productivity greatly. The anti-inflationary task is far from completed. Prices are still rising, though less rapidly than before. The pressures to return to the old ways are strong, especially from the unemployed, the merchants and the industrialists. Nonetheless, these new financial policies are the most encouraging single economic development of the past two years, for they are laying the groundwork for a basic reorganization of agriculture and industry.

III

The importance of farming has received much stress from the very beginning of the organized Zionist movement. The general proposition is widely accepted in Israel that for economic, political, social and security reasons the nation must devote much of its energies to farming, even though the crops be wrested from the soil at great cost in time and energy. Since 1948 the government and the Jewish Agency have repeatedly appealed to the newcomers to move onto the land, especially to the areas formerly farmed by the Arabs. Many new homes have been built in the rural areas. Elaborate and extensive irrigation schemes have been constructed and many more are planned. Loans and credit have been available on generous terms. Great efforts have been made to provide seeds and machinery to the new settlers. Many new agricultural settlements have been created and the resulting increase in agricultural production between 1948 and the present has been no mean accomplishment. But the fact remains that less than 20 percent of the people now live on farms; that the total acreage under cultivation during 1953 was some 12 to 15 percent less than it was in the same area during the lat-

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ter years of the mandatory period; and that the production of many basic agricultural products, notably meat, wheat, olives, citrus and sugar fruits, is probably still less than half what it was in the years just before the new state was created.

We have already noted the major reasons for Israel's failure to increase even more the area under cultivation and the number of people engaged in agricultural pursuits. In view of their backgrounds, the newcomers have a strong disinclination to go to the land; and let no one underestimate the tremendous sociological difficulties of converting a large group of urban people into farmers. Other policies of the government, springing from the desire to treat the newcomers well, served to defeat the "to the land" program. Farming, especially in the hill land, promised hard work and uncertain returns. It is not surprising that few chose to farm when the government offered the alternative of life in the towns or in camps near urban areas, where medical attention, public services, social life and probably even food consumption, temporarily at least, were superior to those in the countryside, where employment could be found on road construction, afforestation and other public works; and where all sorts of miscellaneous services could be sold to the older urban residents who had ready cash. Furthermore, so long as the government followed a policy of insuring the people a reasonable standard of living by importing many foodstuffs and selling them at heavily subsidized prices, and at the same time enforced rigid price controls on many local products, it was often economic nonsense for a person to leave a camp or a socially unproductive job in the towns for a farm.

The removal during the past several months of many price controls on local foods, the devaluation of the Israeli pound with a consequent rise in the price of imported foodstuffs, and the more stringent internal financial policies have made life in the towns more onerous and have, on the other hand, increased the profitability of farming. The result has been a widely-hailed movement of a few thousand families to the land. This transfer has only just begun. It will be necessary to intensify the unpopular anti-inflationary measures, to curtail further the imports of agricultural products, and to extend elaborate and expensive irrigation works, before Israel produces as much of her foodstuffs as she is both physically and economically able to do. All this will take time. It must also be expected that for a few years many of the new farmers will have to be subsidized if they are

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to survive. The cost of this, and of additional irrigation, will be great; and there seems no alternative but that these costs be borne in large part by Israel's foreign friends. However, such assistance, if stringently administered, holds great promise of being terminable, for it will greatly increase the local production of goods that are now imported.

Aside from the question of the extent of agriculture in Israel, it must be said that past policies have encouraged farming methods that do not appear to be supportable by Israel on her own. She was confronted with the fact that there were only a few experienced farmhands; she was under great pressure to increase production quickly; she was aware of and impressed by the techniques used in the richest and most industrialized agricultural areas—especially the United States; she was disdainful of the primitive methods used by the Arabs who formerly farmed the land and free of any pressure from vested interests to maintain those methods; and she was determined, as a matter of principle, to do things in the most "scientific" and "modern" way. With all this in mind, Israel proceeded to mechanize her farms to an extent not seen in many sections of the United States or Western Europe. This was made feasible by large-scale aid from abroad. It was economically wise from the point of view of the individual farmer, even though yield per acre increased little if at all, so long as foreign exchange was one of the cheapest commodities in Israel and labor one of the most expensive. The consequence, however, has been that the value contributed by Israel to a given unit of locally produced farm products has progressively declined. At the same time her agriculture has become increasingly dependent on imports of fuel, spare parts and replacements without thereby increasing appreciably her ability to export. Stated in another way, the one resource Israel has in abundance now, and probably will have for the indefinite future, is labor, much of it underemployed and little of it currently producing goods or services that the rest of the world is willing to buy. Yet an agricultural structure has been created which relies heavily on the import of the labor of others. Surely this is the road toward perpetual dependence.

It is easy to underestimate the political and social difficulties of reverting to somewhat more primitive methods of cultivation, in particular to a greater use of manual labor and animal power. To those directly affected, such a course will doubtless seem to

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be a step backward and an indication of failure on the part of the authorities. Still, until some as yet unforeseen opportunity for other productive employment is found, it is along this path that Israel will find opportunities for increasing her ability to support herself. It is not suggested that the crude techniques of the departed Arabs should be adopted, though some of these may still be the most efficient for a nation with lots of people and little else. Methods common in the United States a generation ago, and on many farms still, would permit Israel to make a greater use of her own particular resources. There are, after all, methods of farming which lie between the camel, the small wooden plow and the flail at the one extreme and the crawler-type tractor pulling a seven-bottom plow or a huge combine at the other.

Self-support also seems to call for changes in the kinds of goods produced on the land. The considerable increase in total output during recent years has not resulted in anything like a comparable reduction in imports. Rather, it has served in large measure to improve the quality of the diet. During the mandatory period, a large part of the basic foodstuffs—bread cereals, olive oil, vegetables and range-fed mutton—were produced by the Arab farmers. The Jewish settlements concentrated heavily on producing animal products—eggs, milk, veal and pond-grown fish, the animals themselves frequently consuming imported feed. The departure of the Arab farmers dramatically altered the task of Jewish agriculture, but the fact was not fully appreciated and in important respects the agricultural settlements established since 1948 have been along lines similar to the earlier Jewish farms. The result has been, as thoughtful Israelis point out, that the present composition of agricultural production is that of a rich country, while the food basket is—and must continue to be, if Israel is to be viable—that of a poor country.

The Israelis are becoming more and more aware of this third aspect of their agricultural problem and are making a start, but only a start, to correct it, frequently with the help of Point Four and United Nations technicians. A program for rehabilitating the virtually abandoned olive trees is under way. Picking olives is menial work; but edible oil is an essential in the diet, and in recent years it has been provided by Israel's friends abroad rather than from her own hillsides. Plans are under way once again to graze sheep on the hills, without animals since the Arabs

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left, and to do it in a way which will preserve rather than destroy the ranges. Great hopes are held out for the current experiments in growing certain industrial crops—peanuts, sugar beets, carobs and castor beans—which are designed to replace some food imports and provide raw materials for local industry. Successful cultivation of these crops will necessitate some drastic reforms in the physical and social organization of the agricultural settlements and will require much hard manual labor. These changes will not be easy but they will permit a greater use of the resources which Israel herself possesses and therefore will be in the nation's long-term interest—unless, that is, she can safely assume that by not doing them the resulting shortages will, merely because there are shortages, result in more help from the outside.

IV

In view of Israel's limited land and large population, many persons there, often with encouragement from their friends abroad, have nurtured the hope that their nation will become a great manufacturing center. Little rigorous and systematic thought seems to have been given to just what Israel has to contribute to the maintenance of such an economy. For some time, at least, many persons even in responsible positions accepted the mischievous notion that there is a clearcut and one-way cause-and-effect relationship between manufacturing and prosperity. The government offered many inducements to both foreign and local investors, and very large investments indeed have been made—by private Israelis, by the Government of Israel, by the all-embracing Jewish Federation of Labor, by private foreign investors, and from funds supplied by the United States Government. By and large, the government reserved its blessings and encouragement for industries which in its view would reduce imports and expand exports. In applying the criterion of reducing imports, however, it usually assumed implicitly that all the goods being provided during the period of large-scale aid from abroad, and more, were "necessary;" whereas the argument being made here is that if Israel is to become viable she must for some time at least learn to do without many of the goods which her friends have supplied in the past. In applying the criterion of increasing exports, the record unfortunately indicates that hope was substituted for a careful analysis of costs, of potential markets, and of what part of the exports were simply

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previous imports, now carrying heavy transportation charges.

An exhibit of the current output of Israel's factories is very impressive: automobiles, tires, electric refrigerators, radios, fine shoes and excellent textiles, nylon hosiery, steel pipes, plastics, chemicals, cement, polished diamonds, jams and fruits, chocolates, to name a few. On inspection, however, the economic foundations of many of these industries appear fragile indeed. Many of the new enterprises are close replicas of those found in the United States and Western Europe, the assumption having been made that the particular processes and techniques which had proven successful in countries with quite different amounts and combinations of physical and human resources, employment alternatives, markets, and sources of supply could be easily and economically transplanted in Israel. Relatively little of the investment has been in expanding and improving the modest undertakings which had proven successful during the mandatory period. This reflected in part a tendency to favor speculative new undertakings with possible large returns as against modest investments which would build on what previously existed and were reasonably certain to yield moderate, but only moderate, returns. Admitting some exceptions, the most significant aspect of the new industries is that they are built almost entirely of imported equipment, consume imported raw materials and semi-processed goods, are powered by imported fuel, rely on foreign producers for replacements and spare parts, and employ only small numbers of relatively unskilled, but highly paid, local labor. That is to say, Israel's contribution to the value of the final product is very small as these things go.

So long as the internal inflation created a large and continually expanding domestic market for the output, and generous foreign assistance provided the means for obtaining the fuel, raw materials and machinery, these industries were, or promised to be, profitable from the individual investor's standpoint. But much evidence has been accumulating during the last year or so that raises grave doubts as to the contribution many of these investments are likely to make to Israel's ability to support herself. Thus, in spite of the huge amounts of outside financial aid which Israel has been receiving, and the various special arrangements permitting the retention of foreign exchange earnings, the shortages of imported raw materials in the past year have restricted the output of the existing industries to something, on the aver-

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age, of half of their rated capacity. Faced with increasing competition by Western Europe and Japan, and burdened by high wages in terms of output and the high costs that go with operations at perhaps half of capacity, only token exports have been made. As a result of the more stringent internal monetary policies of recent months many of the industrialists are also finding the domestic markets much smaller than they had anticipated.

These developments are leading to a serious reëxamination in Israel of the past industrial investment policy. Harsh realities are being faced as they have not been before. Some reforms are being made, and if they are vigorously pursued, they hold out promise that some of the plants will be able to contribute to a solution of Israel's economic problems by reducing costs and increasing the national share in the value of the final product. Many of the industrialists are for the first time actively seeking out export markets. Efforts are being made to increase labor productivity. Growing numbers of people are concluding that perhaps men can perform some of the tasks previously planned for imported machines. Greater emphasis is being placed on producing more local raw materials. The experts hold out promise for industrial farm crops, but many view with great skepticism the current plans to make huge investments in facilities for processing the mineral resources of the Negev. The possibility of finding large deposits of raw materials in that desolate area must of course be fully explored. But until the mining engineers, the geologists and the businessmen have satisfied themselves that the mineral deposits are of sufficient size and quality to be commercially exploitable there is grave danger that investments in such processing facilities will prove to be at best premature, with returns long delayed, and at worst completely wasted. Israel is too poor to take such risks, especially when there are attractive though unspectacular investment projects in irrigation, in small hillside farms, in agricultural research, in animals, in piecing out, improving and expanding those few existing manufacturing plants which are doing well, and, above all, in training people.

It may well be that unless foreigners continue to carry the burden, many of the past industrial investments will have to be abandoned in order to cut losses. This is not to say, however, that there is no future in Israel for industry. In the present gloomy picture two industries—citrus byproducts and diamonds

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—stand out as eminently successful from the point of view of their owners, the value of their exports and their contribution to the viability of Israel. It is perhaps not just chance that the first relies on local raw materials, the second on great technical skills, and that both are small-scale flexible operations employing relatively simple and inexpensive machinery.

The one economic resource which Israel has in abundance is her intelligent, receptive and imaginative people, respectful of high-order skills and eager to teach and to be taught. Surely the industrial and agricultural future of the nation lies in taking advantage of these resources, that is, in producing goods with a large content of labor that becomes progressively more skilled. Returns to Israel from this sort of investment will be slow, and it must be accepted that while these new human skills are being created earned living standards will be low. A perplexing aspect of Israel's economic policies is that the effort to insure the people a decent standard of living at once should have made so many of her economic problems more difficult, but that so little has been done to develop and use the people's potential talents.

V

It is sometimes assumed that once the Arab boycott is ended many of Israel's present economic problems will disappear. The costs of the boycott have been heavy and the lifting of it will certainly lighten some of Israel's—and the Arab States'—burdens. Given time, the advantages accruing from a greater international division of labor can be impressive. Also, peace will facilitate the execution of joint development programs, especially in the all-important fields of irrigation and hydroelectric power in the watershed of the Jordan and in the exploitation of the Dead Sea salts. But it is easy to overestimate the economic benefits that seem likely to be felt in the first several years. The biggest immediate gain to Israel will be in the saving of transportation costs on her imports, especially fuel and bread grains. Peace should also permit some reduction in defense expenditures, though the amount of such savings seems likely to be small in view of the interest of Israel and her Western friends in the regional defense of the area. No doubt additional exchange will be received from tourists and the services that Israel can provide in connection with transit trade. There is an easy assumption afoot that the Arab countries will provide eager and lush markets

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for the industrial production of Israel. This may be so, but in assessing this potential benefit we must not forget that many of the goods which the new factories of Israel produce must be regarded as luxuries by poor people and are therefore not well designed for large sales in the Arab markets. Further, it must be recognized that in these markets Israel will be competing not just with local Arab manufacturers but also with the products of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. The record to date is not encouraging on this score.

Altogether, it will be surprising if the net savings plus net earnings total more than $25,000,000 to $30,000,000 a year during the first few years. This would be equal to less than one-seventh of the international deficits in recent years. And against these possible early gains from peace and the opening of trade channels must be set the obligation Israel has assumed to pay compensation for the property left in Israel by the former Arab residents. The effective honoring of this obligation has not been formally tied to the end of the boycott. It would not be surprising, however, if, at least indirectly, such payments absorbed a very large part indeed of any net economic benefits accruing to Israel for a great many years. In sum, the end of the boycott will not constitute that hoped-for miracle which is to take the place of the fundamental reorganization of economic life which is here held to be necessary if Israel is to become self-supporting.

Israel's economic problems are difficult, and will remain difficult for a long time. Thoughtful Israelis do not believe that perpetual dependence on foreign friends to anything like the present extent is a satisfactory answer; the dignity and independence of their valiant democracy and of themselves as individuals rule that out. The other foreseeable solutions will be painful, for they will involve at best a long period of lower real wages, of harder and more irksome physical work, and of drastic occupational readjustments. Some elements of these alternative solutions are now being charted. To apply them will not be lacking in danger, for subsidized living standards can quickly become the minimum standards which are socially and politically acceptable. Israel's friends can take hope, however, in the fact that her people have only too frequently in the past demonstrated a capacity for making sacrifices and enduring hardships.

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THE NEW GERMAN PRESS

By Claus Jacobi

GERMANY is no longer the country with the largest number of newspapers, as it was before 1933. Even so, the products displayed on a German newsstand bring to mind the words of Benedict XIII when, after his election as Pope, he looked out at the vast crowds assembled in the Piazza San Pietro: "What in the world do they all live on?"

Today the Federal Republic and West Berlin with a total population of 52,000,000 have 1,230 daily papers with a total circulation of 13,000,000, which means that there is one copy for every four inhabitants. This quota is about halfway between the figures for the newspaper paradise of the Weimar Republic (2.6 copies for one inhabitant in 1932) and the propaganda era of Joseph Goebbels (five copies for one inhabitant in 1939).

Yet among the more than 1,000 new German daily papers there are not even half a dozen of national reputation and not a single one with an international reputation such as the *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* had in pre-Nazi Germany or like that of *The Times* in England, *Le Monde* in France or the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in Switzerland. The great weakness of the German press is not in quantity but in quality. This situation has its roots in the Third Reich and in the economic and sociological changes of that era and the years following. Its consequences may one day be of deep political importance.

The end of the Second World War brought a basic structural change in the German press. German readers noted with amazement that when *The Recorder* made its appearance in London last fall it was the first new paper in 25 years. Germany has had nothing but new papers during the last eight years.

After the capitulation in May 1945 the old papers were no longer allowed to appear. At the beginning the various military governments issued a few newspapers under their own imprint. But by the end of 1946 about 100 new German papers had been established; at first these had American, English and French censors on the editorial staff, but later they operated on their own responsibility. The Allies confided their responsibility in each case to some proven anti-Fascists, and the paper's license was made out in their names. In theory the idea of licensees, as

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they were called, may have seemed almost perfect to its inventors, but actual practice soon showed several defects. Not all the anti-Fascists were democrats. Communists played the leading rôle in all the anti-Fascist organizations during the first postwar months. Further, besides being anti-Fascists and democrats, the licensees were of course supposed to have at least some knowledge of newspaper work. Not many of them did.

Soon legal and economic problems arose in addition to those involved in the selection of personnel. Was a licensee to be publisher only or was he to be editor as well? Was he to be just the owner of the paper's name or did he own the enterprise? At this point the old-time publishers reappeared on the scene; they had been, naturally, publishers of more or less Nazi papers before 1945 and now were no longer allowed to operate in this field. In so far as they were not owners of purely Nazi publishing houses which were broken up by the Allies, or publishers who emerged as major offenders from the denazification process and whose printing offices were confiscated, most of them were, in spite of their "brown stains," the legal proprietors of the houses where the democratic editorial offices were now installed and owners of the machines which now composed and printed the democratic daily papers. They fixed the rental for the use of publishing houses and printing machines, either according to their consciences or their pocketbooks. One German paper wrote in those days that it was the right of the old-time publishers to make money and the duty of the licensees to carry the responsibility.

After the currency reform had been made in 1948, after the circulation restrictions enforced by the Allies through the rationing of paper had been lifted, and after licenses had been abolished in 1949, the old-time publishers regained their former rights. New papers shot up like mushrooms. Small provincial papers tried to revive well-known old names. From the beginning of 1949 to the middle of 1950 the number of newspapers in Germany rose from 160 to more than 1,000. Paper consumption still remained low compared to that of other countries, though it soon exceeded that of 1939. In 1951 approximately four and one half pounds of paper per inhabitant were used in the Federal Republic compared to approximately 18 pounds in Great Britain and something more than 71 pounds in the United States.

In the newly-established Federal Republic the basic factors for calculating the costs of a daily paper had drastically changed

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from the days of the Weimar Republic. Expenditure in terms of the monetary unit had increased by more than 100 percent. Moreover, it had proven economically impossible to meet costs if the price per copy was increased by only 20 percent, or five pfennige. In order to operate at a profit, the German papers had to have twice as large a circulation as they had needed in 1933. This was achieved in due course. While the 4,700 papers of the Weimar Republic of 1932 had an average circulation of 5,300 copies, the average circulation of the 1,230 papers of the Federal Republic and West Berlin was 10,500 copies by mid-1953.

The struggle for larger circulation soon had its effect on the papers' contents. As the circulation was doubled, so the concessions to popular taste had to be doubled. German readers, stuffed with political news of a contradictory nature during 12 Nazi years and four postwar years, more and more preferred papers in which the non-political reading matter outweighed the political. They wished to be informed as briefly as possible and with as little mental exertion as possible. They liked light, dramatized and short news items, with pictures. They skimmed over the political headlines and then turned to local news, features, entertainment, sports and picture supplements. Sensational and shallow illustrated papers flourished.

The severe competition between the newly-established daily papers, and the need of each for larger circulation, resulted in more and more catering to popular demand, as ascertained through polls and experience. This was the boomerang of tyranny and "reëducation."

II

Today there are five different types of German newspapers:

Local and Provincial Press

Fifty percent of all papers which appear in the Federal Republic are so-called boiler-plate papers. They write and edit only the local news in their own offices. All the other pages, including those with political news and leading articles, are obtained ready-made from other larger papers. Before 1933 this type of paper existed only as an exception. Today half of all the German papers have had to turn to it to keep down costs. A daily press of this kind offers a danger to the budding German democracy, for the larger publishing houses which provide the boiler-plate papers with the finished pages deliberately try to fit political news and

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comments to as many readers as possible, regardless of political trend. The result is a complete lack of political color.

The "Generalanzeiger" Press

This is the city equivalent of the provincial press—popular news organs without party tendencies. The operating principles of these papers are the same as those of the boiler-plate press, and the dangers are the same: political indifference in order to try to please all readers. The best-known paper of this type is the *Hamburger Abendblatt* with a circulation of about 400,000.

The Boulevard Press

Since this type of paper requires a big city it exists only in Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg. Here the color of a statesman's necktie is more important than the treaty he has signed. The largest paper of this kind is the *Bildzeitung* of Hamburg, the only German paper which has a circulation passing the million mark and which, like the *Hamburger Abendblatt,* is owned by the most powerful German publisher, Axel Springer.

Aside from these three faceless types of newspaper, all of them with more or less petit bourgeois tendencies, there are two kinds of political papers in Germany:

The Party Press

It became evident as far back as the twenties that German readers were turning away from the party press, a trend which has progressed steadily ever since. Even papers which are definitely attached to a political party now pretend that they are independent. In the first postwar years licenses were granted in the British zone to party papers only; in the American zone to no party papers at all; and in the French zone to both kinds. These geographic differences are still reflected in the party press. Only two papers of a purely party character have a circulation of more than 200,000, and both appear in the British zone. They are the *Rheinische Post* of Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union, and the Social Democratic *Westfälische Rundschau.* Communist and extreme rightist papers play no part at all in the German press. Neither in number nor in circulation nor in influence are they of any consequence.

The Independent Political Press

Among the few papers of this kind there are perhaps four which have a certain national importance. *Die Welt* which appears in Hamburg was originally the paper of the British occupation

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power and was sold to its present German publisher, Axel Springer, only in 1953. It has a circulation of about 250,000. Since it came into German hands, its trend has been in accord with the present government policy. It was the first political daily to break with the tradition of the daily leading article; it prints brief political editorials on weekdays, and a more extensive leading article only in the weekend issue.

The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* is the only one among the more important papers which tries—in name and make-up—to follow the lines of a famous paper of former days, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. It was founded only after the currency reform, in 1949. The publishers spent 1,500,000 D-marks (about $375,000) before the paper became profitable; today its circulation lies between 100,000 and 200,000. The original money came from the "Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft," which sponsors among other things the social market economy of Professor Erhard, Minister of Economics in the Federal Government. The paper has a similar slant and is taken as representing German industry. Only in foreign policy does it at times deviate slightly from the Chancellor's line.

The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich is a former licensed paper. Of its four publishers some are close to the C.D.U., some to the S.P.D. Its circulation has passed 200,000. Its trend is left liberal, with special consideration for Bavarian interests. The *Frankfurter Rundschau,* with a circulation of between 100,000 and 200,000, stands for the policy of the S.P.D. opposition. It is also a former licensed paper. Among its first licensees were two steadfast Communists who, however, departed at an early date. In spite of its strong trend to the left the paper was endowed by the American High Commission with 1,600,000 D-marks (about $400,000) after the currency reform, and thus ranks at the top of the list of German papers which drew on the American fund for the support of the German press.

III

There are three main reasons for the low quality of the German political press and its consequent lack of importance and influence: shortage of good journalists, lack of financial means, absence of a metropolitan press.

The problem of qualified personnel affected every aspect of life in postwar Germany. To put it in an extreme way: after 12 years

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of Nazi rule and six years of war the only democrats who had not emigrated and were still in Germany either had survived by coincidence, or had been considered too unimportant to be liquidated by Hitler and his security police. Ernst Friedlaender, at present the most influential German publicist, came back from abroad after the war. Only in exceptional cases have young talents been able to assert themselves against the dominating mediocrity of the older journalists. Occasional Nazi journalists with great names from the Hitler days reappeared on the scene. They were a failure. Apparently they had forgotten journalism in the Third Reich under Goebbels; it turned out that they could neither think nor write clearly, and in no case did they succeed in gaining an influential position in publishing.

The lack of financial resources was the result of the structural change in the German press after the war and of the rise in costs and the decrease in income. Increased publishing costs led to cuts in the editorial department. For the same reason the entire German daily press has not been able to send even a dozen correspondents abroad in the postwar years.

There is no metropolitan press for the simple reason that there is no capital. Berlin papers like the independent *Kurier* and *Tagesspiegel* have no chance of becoming great and influential papers because of the city's precarious situation. Also, their rigid habit of viewing all political issues from the Berlin perspective makes them unobjective and monotonous, while their distribution is limited by Berlin's insular position. On the other hand, the temporary capital, Bonn—a small university town on the Rhine—has no press of importance.

Apart from that, the choice of Bonn as temporary capital of the Federal Republic interfered with the possible development of a great political press for another reason. When the Parliamentary Council convened to spend months in working out the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, German readers were entirely preoccupied with vital economic needs and in consequence were to a large extent indifferent to whether there was progress or discord at Bonn. As a result, German papers contented themselves with auxiliary correspondents who happened to live in Bonn or nearby. Some papers retained these representatives after Bonn was selected as the capital; others either sent a different correspondent or procured their news from the Federal capital exclusively from news agencies. So it happens that several German papers do

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not maintain any direct representation in Bonn, while others have a minor journalist on the spot or share a correspondent. On the whole, one might say that the German press has only about the same number of representatives in its own Federal capital today as it used to have in a foreign capital in normal times.

In the old days in Berlin the various departments of the metropolitan papers used to be in close touch with the appropriate ministries, parties and organizations. Provincial papers worked along the same lines by sending a large staff to the capital. The old *Frankfurter Zeitung* had its editor and an editorial staff of from 20 to 30 in Berlin. Today a Bonn correspondent has to cover —often for several papers—everything from parliament to foreign policy to the Ministry of Communications to film legislation. The present *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which endeavors to follow in the steps of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, does not have one of its important leader-writers in Bonn; its staff there consists of but a single correspondent. It must be noted that this is not solely the result of locating a capital in a small town; the lack of qualified personnel and the lack of financial resources mentioned above are also factors.

IV

For all these reasons it is hard to underestimate the political importance of the German press. Its information from abroad is insufficient and certainly is not original. Its domestic influence is slight; the entire political press has not been able to bring about the fall of one minister or even bring him into serious danger during the four-year rule of the first Federal cabinet—not for lack of opportunity, but for lack of influence. In the same way, it was not the German press but the reports and reactions of the foreign daily press which recently prevented the establishment of a Ministry of Information.

This lack of an influential political press has become all the more lamentable since the parliamentary elections of September 6, as there is now a crushing government majority and little impressive opposition in parliament. In this situation, it should be the duty of the press to keep an ever-watchful and critical eye on the behavior of the victorious government parties, to remind them to observe moderation and thus to fill the rôle of a real "opposition" in the country. The German press will hardly prove able to fulfil this assignment, either because it is lacking in strong

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opinions, as in the *Generalanzeiger* and provincial press, or because it is authority-conscious, as in part of the independent political press.

The dangers which may follow the decreasing alertness of the German press threaten not only democratic development in general but also the press itself. There is as yet no universal press law in the Federal Republic. Bavaria and Hesse have issued individual regional press laws. For the remaining seven Laender, the "Reichsgesetz für die Presse" of May 7, 1934, with a few amendments, is still valid. Since, however, the Basic Law refers to press legislation as the privilege of the Federal Government, there is every reason to suppose that within the next four years a new Federal press law will be created. This law may be favorable or damaging to the free development of the young democratic press.

Tendencies which have already become evident in this connection justify a certain anxiety. For one thing, there was the recent unsuccessful attempt of influential politicians and officials of the Federal Republic to establish a Ministry of Information for the purpose of "enlightening the public" and to prepare press legislation. For another, there was the first draft of a Federal Press Law as published in 1952 by the Ministry of the Interior. This draft provided that papers and magazines "hostile" to the state might be banned for a period of up to six months by the Minister of the Interior, or "in cases of particular danger to the security of the state for an indefinite period." In official quarters it was even suggested that this paragraph might be dropped if, instead, a copy of every printed item were to be presented to an official for approval before it went on sale. Bonn has since dropped the idea of this draft law. But the uneasiness it caused remains.

Article 5 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law says: "Freedom of the press is guaranteed; there is no censorship." There thus can be no doubt regarding the good-will of the legislature. But 12 years of Nazi rule and the present totalitarian threat from the East have confused even truly democratic brains and hearts in Germany. Many think to serve the cause of freedom by limiting it. Freedom cannot stand barbed wire fences, even though they might be put up for its protection. "Newspapers must not be bothered," said Frederick the Great 200 years ago. His words apply again in Germany today.

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The second volume of this magistral history of American foreign policy prior to Pearl Harbor deals with the period following the Destroyer-for-Bases Deal of September 1940. (The first volume, "The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940," was noted here April 1952.) As in the preceding volume, American policy is put in its global setting with much skill and insight.

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SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949–1950. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 590 p. $12.00.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949–1950. SELECTED AND EDITED BY MARGARET CARLYLE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 796 p. $12.50.

In his second contribution to this important continuing series Mr. Calvocoressi sets his narrative in the frame of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry which dominates the international scene. Middle Eastern and Latin American affairs are not included in this volume. The companion volume of "Documents" again provides reference material of great value.

BEYOND CONTAINMENT. By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 406 p. $5.00.

A somewhat uneven review of the causes and gradual development of the "cold war," including the first two months of the post-Stalin period. The author presents forceful reasons for looking "beyond containment," but is cautious in offering suggestions as to the proper alternative policy to follow.

REPORT ON THE ATOM. By GORDON DEAN. New York: Knopf, 1953, 321 p. $5.00.

The former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission has written a straightforward, popular but sober description of the major aspects of the atomic energy program. The chapters on Secrecy, Security and Spies, the International Atom, and atomic development behind the Iron Curtain are of particular importance to students of foreign affairs.

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TRUTH IS OUR WEAPON. By Edward W. Barrett. New York: Funk, 1953, 355 p. $4.00.

A former Assistant Secretary of State, responsible for the American international information program, including the Voice of America, reflects on his experiences in this field, discusses the problems involved in the "war of ideas," and makes a number of proposals for the more successful prosecution of this war. While not making excessive claims for the power of propaganda, he presents a strong case for the necessity of an efficient and well-ordered handling of our information programs.

STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL. By John E. Kieffer. New York: McKay, 1953, 306 p. $4.00.

Accepting war between the Soviet Union and the United States as unavoidable, Mr. Kieffer constructs his strategy for victory. As a strategical study, however, it appears to have some serious gaps, especially in the field of logistics and atomic weapons.

CLIMA DE GUERRA. By General Alfredo Kindelan. Madrid: Aguilar, 1952, 328 p. Ptas. 50.

A Spanish general, who for some years has been predicting the inevitability of a conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, here develops his thesis in tracing the series of wars in the twentieth century, the principal points of friction in the world, and the lineup of belligerents.

FROM LENIN TO MALENKOV. By Hugh Seton-Watson. New York: Praeger, 1953, 377 p. $6.00.

Mr. Seton-Watson, an authority in the Eastern European field, has turned his efforts to a comparative analysis of Communist movements on the world scale. A valuable general survey, displaying comprehension and insight.

DER EUROPÄISCHE KOMMUNISMUS. By Franz Borkenau. Berne: Francke, 1952, 540 p. Swiss Fr. 23.80.

EUROPEAN COMMUNISM. By Franz Borkenau. New York: Harper, 1953, 564 p. $6.00.

While in many respects both stimulating and informative, this is a somewhat disappointing sequel to the author's earlier, and pioneering work, "World Communism" (1938). Dr. Borkenau's intricate exposition of the developments in Communist policy over the last two decades is not always convincing and sometimes goes beyond the available evidence. Of particular interest is the section on France, which receives special attention as the "stronghold of European Communism."

POLITIK OHNE WUNSCHBILDER. By Hans Mühlenfeld. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1952, 387 p.

An ambitious attempt to establish the principles of a conservatism corresponding to the needs of our time. After analyzing the content and trends of modern ideologies and various forms of German conservatism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the author outlines his own theory which rests on religious grounds.

THE CONSERVATIVE MIND. By Russell Kirk. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 458 p. $6.50.

A study, and defense, of the "British and American thinkers who have stood by tradition and old establishments"—from Burke and John Adams to Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More and George Santayana.

THE STATE THE ENEMY. By Ernest Benn. London: Benn, 1953, 174 p. 12/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

In the tradition of Herbert Spencer, Sir Ernest Benn makes a frontal assault on

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the Welfare State—especially the Fabianism of the Labor Party—to which he attributes many of the ills of modern society.

PARTIS POLITIQUES ET RÉALITÉS SOCIALES. By G.-E. Lavau. Paris: Colin, 1953, 169 p. Fr. 525.

A somewhat polemic contribution to the study of political parties, directed in part against the views of Maurice Duverger and those stressing the importance of electoral systems.

LA MONARQUIA DE LA REFORMA SOCIAL. By Angel López-Amo. Madrid: Rialp, 1952, 314 p. Ptas. 33.

An essay on the relation of political power to the movement of social forces and favoring a "monarchy of social reform."

AGGRESSIVE WAR, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME. By C. A. Pompe. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1953, 382 p. Guilders 17.

Proceeding from his conviction that "efforts to create an international legal order, of which criminal justice is an essential part, must and will be continued," the author analyzes the efforts to define aggression before, during, and after the Nuremberg Trials.

ÜBERWINDUNG DES TOTALITARISMUS. By Otto Valentin. Dornbirn (Austria): Mayer, 1952, 211 p. Schillings 51.90.

A discussion of the relation of economic problems and theories to the totalitarian trends of this century.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION. By Kenneth E. Boulding. New York: Harper, 1953, 286 p. $3.50.

This stimulating study undertakes to examine the rise and growing power of economic organizations—labor unions, trusts, governmental agencies—in relation to the ethics of a free society. Doubtful of the economic virtue of many such organizations, Mr. Boulding is particularly apprehensive of the coercive element which follows from this increased organization. A section of comments by a number of critics demonstrates the exploratory rather than dogmatic quality of the project.

AMERICAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. By William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1953, 615 p. $6.00.

A useful survey presenting a rather full account of the foreign assistance supplied by the United States Government from before Pearl Harbor to the end of 1952. In addition to the descriptive material the book contains analyses both of the policies followed in providing assistance and of changes in the programs to fit altered circumstances or new views of American interests.

INCOME STABILIZATION FOR A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY. Edited by Max F. Millikan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 730 p. $5.00.

A meaty symposium of essays by 15 economists, political scientists and professors of law dealing with the political and economic problems involved in achieving high employment without inflation.

THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS. By Giuseppe Ugo Papi. Rome: Bancaria, 1951, 270 p. L. 1500.

A professor of economics at the University of Rome reviews the origins and developing functions of the B.I.S.

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THE WORLD WHEAT ECONOMY, 1885–1939. By Wilfred Malenbaum. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 262 p. $6.00.

A study of the pre-1939 development of world supplies and demands for wheat with the aim of explaining the factors producing the disequilibria in this major commodity.

LE MARCHÉ MONDIAL DE L'ÉTAIN. By André Néel. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1952, 229 p. Fr. 1000.

A monograph on the world's tin production and trade.

AMERICANS AND CHINESE. By Francis L. K. Hsu. New York: Schuman, 1953, 457 p. $6.00.

The author, now professor of anthropology in the United States, compares the cultures of the two countries. Stimulating, as perceptive essays in comparison often are, but not always convincing, especially as regards the American scene.

WHEN PEOPLES SPEAK TO PEOPLES. By Harold E. Snyder. Washington: American Council on Education, 1953, 206 p. $3.00.

As the subtitle indicates this is an "action guide" for people or groups who wish to participate in one or another of the various programs for improving international cultural relations.

ETHNOLOGIE DE L'UNION FRANÇAISE (TERRITOIRES EXTÉRIEURS). By André Leroi-Gourhan and Jean Poirier. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 2 v. Fr. 3300.

An impressive scholarly, ethnological survey of France's overseas territories in Africa, Asia, Oceania and America. Extensive bibliography.

The Second World War

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE WAR DEPARTMENT: STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE, 1941–1942. By Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, 454 p. $3.25.

This third volume in the subseries dealing with the War Department is a study of the evolution of American strategy and planning through the end of December 1942. Of particular interest in showing the interplay of contrasting positions and views as the United States settled into the conflict.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE TECHNICAL SERVICES. THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: ORGANIZATION, SUPPLY, AND SERVICES. VOLUME I. By Erna Risch. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, 418 p. $3.25.

The first of four volumes to be devoted to the experiences of the Quartermaster Corps in World War II.

SOLDAT BIS ZUM LETZTEN TAG. By Albert Kesselring. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1953, 475 p.

Military memoirs of the German commander in the Mediterranean theater in the Second World War. Much like other recent offerings by former Wehrmacht officers.

LONDON CALLING NORTH POLE. By H. J. Giskes. London: Kimber, 1953, 208 p. 15/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.50.)

German counter-espionage in the Netherlands, involving the capture of a Dutch member of the British secret service and through him of radio communication with London.

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SO WAR DER U-BOOT-KRIEG. By Harald Busch. Bielefeld: Deutscher Heimat-Verlag, 1952, 391 p.

The story of German submarine action in the Second World War. Excellent illustrations and maps.

VENTO DEL TOBBIO. By Alessio Franzone (Arrigo). Genoa: Sambolino, 1952, 304 p. L. 600.

Recollections of the wartime partisan movement in north Italy.

TO BENGHAZI. By Gavin Long. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952, 336 p. 25/. (New York: Anglobooks, $5.00.)

This first of a seven-volume history of Australia in the Second World War deals with the North African campaign up to the surrender of Benghazi in 1941.

GREECE AND CRETE, 1941. By Christopher Buckley. London: H.M.S.O., 1952, 311 p. 12/6. (New York: British Information Services, $2.85.)

This account of the campaign in Greece and the battle for Crete is part of a series of popular military histories of the Second World War, prepared at the request of the British Government.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1952. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1953, 492 p. $5.00.

The latest volume in this series examines an unusually controversial phase of American foreign policy. An almost unmanageable mass of factual data has been reduced to coherence and presented in a manner that illuminates many of the more critical issues in contemporary international affairs. The author appears somewhat unhappy about the military emphasis in recent American policy, which he contrasts with the apparent Soviet expectation of major economic, social and political difficulties within the non-Communist world.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME XIII: JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 1951. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Katherine D. Durant. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the World Peace Foundation), 1953, 626 p. $7.50.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1952. Edited by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1953, 391 p. $5.00.

These two volumes of this useful annual selection of documents relating to American foreign relations mark the transfer of sponsorship from the World Peace Foundation to the Council on Foreign Relations. The volume for 1952 has been designed as a complement to the corresponding volume of the "United States in World Affairs," noted above.

THE GREAT AMERICAN PARADE. By H.-J. Duteil. New York: Twayne, 1953, 321 p. $3.75.

A translation of a French journalist's provocative observations on the United States. The French edition was noted here July 1951.

THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET–AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. By Robert Paul Browder. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 256 p. $5.00.

A scholarly study of the events and negotiations leading to the American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933.

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MAJOR CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON, 1952. New York: Random House, 1953, 320 p. $3.50.

Fifty of the Democratic candidate's addresses during the campaign, with a sprightly post-diluvian introduction.

A FRONT ROW SEAT. By Nicholas Roosevelt. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953, 304 p. $4.50.

Memoirs of one of the Oyster Bay Roosevelts, this volume covers the journalistic and diplomatic adventures of an active, humorous observer.

HENRY CABOT LODGE. By John A. Garraty. New York: Knopf, 1953, 433 p. $6.00.

A scholarly and fair biography of one of twentieth century America's most controversial Senators. Of chief interest, of course, is the story of the dramatic struggle over the League and the bitter, stubborn conflict between Lodge and President Wilson. At a number of points the book includes marginal comments by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in defense of his grandfather's position.

PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN: CHARLES G. DAWES. By Bascom N. Timmons. New York: Holt, 1953, 344 p. $5.00.

An admiring but not outstanding biography.

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES. By William H. Riker. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 428 p. $3.50.

Setting up, in his first chapter, what he considers to be a coherent, political ideal—democracy—the author then examines American political institutions and their adequacy in furthering and promoting this ideal.

AMERICAN LIFE: DREAM AND REALITY. By W. Lloyd Warner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 267 p. $3.75.

Employing the techniques previously used in the investigation of Australian aborigines the author approaches American life by way of the "rite" of Memorial Day. This does not appear to be a particularly rewarding method, though a number of observations are of interest.

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. By Howard Mumford Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 168 p. $3.50.

An urbane gloss on Jefferson's famous phrase—its changing meanings in the course of American history, and the disconcerting effect of its vulgarization.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. By David Easton. New York: Knopf, 1953, 320 p. $5.00.

A sharp critique of the present state of political science in the United States. The author urges the necessity of a systematic theory to order the plethora of data which have been accumulated.

THE REFUGEE INTELLECTUAL. By Donald Peterson Kent. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 317 p. $5.00.

A study of the adjustments to American life of the refugee intellectuals from Austria and Germany in the 1930's. More satisfactory, perhaps, in its collection of information, much of it statistical, than in its interpretation of this very complex and subtle process.

THE TREND OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1900. By Solomon Fabricant. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952, 267 p. $4.00.

An effort to analyze the long-term trend—primarily in the economic field—toward

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"big government," a trend which, in the author's view, was clearly present before the Great Depression.

THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY. By Grant McConnell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, 226 p. $3.75.

A study of the transformation of American agrarianism since the beginning of the century: the decline of Populism, the rise of a political power organization in agriculture, especially in the shape of the American Farm Bureau Federation. In general, the author regards these changes with a good deal of apprehension.

ECONOMICS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE. By Edwin G. Nourse. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 511 p. $6.00.

Dr. Nourse, first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, reports candidly on the first six years of the Employment Act of 1946, and why the Act, and the Council, failed to achieve the expected goals.

Western Europe

L'INTÉGRATION ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 332 p. Fr. 860.

A number of authors of various nationalities, brought together by the Paris office of the Carnegie Endowment, and under the direction of Lucien de Sainte-Lorette, have contributed to this survey of Western European economic coöperation. Trade, raw materials, monetary matters, transportation, agriculture, population problems, and the rôle of private organizations are the subjects of individual chapters, and there are several more general studies of the state of Western Europe as well.

LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Paul Reuter. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1953, 320 p. Fr. 1800.

M. Reuter, a French professor of law, examines systematically and in some detail the Schuman Plan Treaty and the first acts of the coal and steel organization. His emphasis is juridical but he also explores some political and economic problems.

POPULATION CHANGES IN EUROPE SINCE 1939. By Gregory Frumkin. New York: Kelley, 1951, 191 p. $3.75.

The former editor of the "Statistical Year Book of the League of Nations" analyzes the population changes since 1939 in 24 European countries, and draws some general conclusions and estimates for the future.

LAS COMUNICACIONES EURO-AFRICANAS A TRAVES DEL ESTRECHO DE GIBRALTAR. VOLUME I. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1952, 180 p. Ptas. 60.

A series of studies on existing and projected communications and transportation systems between Europe and Africa, in the region of the Straits of Gibraltar.

PANORAMA POLITICO DE LA EUROPA ACTUAL. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1953, 146 p. Ptas. 20.

A collection of essays by Otto of Hapsburg and others.

FRENCH POLITICS. By Dorothy Pickles. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, 302 p. $5.00.

A competent and perceptive study of the complex French political scene, including foreign as well as domestic affairs, under the Fourth Republic. In the author's view the shortage of political manpower and the lack of political morale, rather than institutional shortcomings, are at the root of France's difficulties.

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ANATOMIE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS. By Alain Brayance. Paris: Denoël, 1952, 288 p. Fr. 600.

A useful analysis of the structure and organization of the French Communist Party by an author who doubts that Communist strength in France is seriously falling off.

DELCASSÉ (1852–1923). By Albéric Neton. Paris: Académie Diplomatique Internationale, 1952, 587 p. Fr. 1000.

A substantial, if at times uncritical, biography of the architect of the Entente Cordiale and one of the most illuminating examples of the possibility of achieving an element of continuity in French foreign policy despite the flux of domestic politics.

THE PAGEANT OF NETHERLANDS HISTORY. By Adriaan J. Barnouw. New York: Longmans, 1952, 370 p. $4.50.

An interpretation of the cultural history of the Netherlands. Little on recent or contemporary affairs.

PARADIS FÖR OSS. By Frank Burns. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1952, 253 p. Kr. 17.50.

Only slightly disguised as a novel (the British Minister to Stockholm is called Sir Augustus Pumpkin), this book, written pseudonymously by a Swedish diplomat, Gunnar Hägglöf, is an examination and critique of Swedish neutrality.

FRIDTJOF NANSEN. By Heinz Sponsel. Frankfurt: Büchergilde Gutenberg, 1952, 313 p.

A biography covering Nansen's explorations in the Arctic before the First World War and his humanitarian activities in the 1920's.

THE RETURN OF GERMANY. By Norbert Muhlen. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 310 p. $4.50.

Mr. Muhlen, a German-born scholar and journalist, has written a perceptive and illuminating account of the mood and movement of postwar Germany.

L'ALLEMAGNE CONTEMPORAINE, SOCIALE, POLITIQUE ET CULTURELLE, 1890–1950. By Edmond Vermeil. Paris: Aubier, 1952–53, 2 v. Fr. 1680.

A broad social, political and cultural history of Germany since Bismarck's fall, by a leading French historian in the field.

UM DIE NATION. By Albert Norden. Berlin: Dietz, 1952, 414 p.

Essays, from the Communist point of view, on contemporary German politics.

L'ALLEMAGNE DE L'OCCIDENT, 1945–1952. By Alfred Grosser. Paris: Gallimard, 1953, 340 p. Fr. 680.

A brief but lucid interpretation of developments in postwar Germany, from the French point of view. The author was deputy director of the UNESCO office in Germany in 1950–51.

DEUTSCHE AUS POLEN HEIMATVERWIESEN. By Oskar Eugen Günther. Marburg: Elwert, 1952, 140 p.

Speeches and articles, principally dealing with the background and postwar plight of the Germans of Central and East Poland.

BERLIN: SCHICKSAL UND AUFGABE. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. Berlin: Schulz, 1953, 99 p.

A Bürgermeister of Berlin from 1946 to 1950 reviews the problems and achievements of that city since the war.

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WAHLKAMPF UND MACHTVERSCHIEBUNG. By Stephanie Münke. Berlin: Duncker, 1952, 282 p.

This first volume of a new German series, "Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft," provides a history and detailed analysis of the Berlin election of December 3, 1950.

MONARCHISM IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. By Walter H. Kaufmann. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953, 305 p. $4.00.

A study of the parties and groups aiming at a monarchist restoration in Germany after 1918. Of interest in disclosing a strand of anti-Weimar sentiment which weakened the republic without achieving its own rather uncertain hopes.

STRESEMANN: DAS DEUTSCHE SCHICKSAL IM SPIEGEL SEINES LEBENS. By Hubertus Prinz zu Löwenstein. Frankfurt: Scheffler, 1952, 356 p.

Not a major biography, this is an effort to reassess the Weimar foreign minister in the light of Germany's and Europe's subsequent vicissitudes.

GEFÄHRTIN DES TEUFELS. By Erich Ebermayer and Hans Roos. Hamburg: Hoffmann, 1952, 360 p.

A life of Frau Goebbels.

IM STURM EINES JAHRHUNDERTS. By Jacques Hannak. Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1952, 423 p. Schillings 66.

A popular history of the Socialist Party in Austria from 1848 to the present.

LA CONDANNA DELL'ITALIA NEL TRATTATO DI PACE. By Attilio Tamaro. Bologna: Cappelli, 1952, 332 p. L. 1000.

An extensive and vigorous criticism of the Italian peace treaty, as unjust, as failing to recognize Italy's function in Europe, and especially as favoring the Jugoslavs in the Trieste question.

IL PROBLEMA DI TRIESTE. By Diego de Castro. Bologna: Cappelli, 1952, 679 p. L. 1800.

A detailed review, from the Italian point of view, of the Trieste issue since 1943, the first of a series of studies on the area. The author is a professor at the University of Turin.

LA GUERRA E IL FRIULI. VOLUME III: CAPORETTO. By Giuseppe del Bianco. Udine: Del Bianco, 1952, 383 p. L. 1800.

A history of the major Italian military defeat in the First World War; the third volume of a series dealing with this front.

VENTI ANNI DI VITA POLITICA. PART II: L'ITALIA NELLA GUERRA MONDIALE. VOLUME II: DALLA DICHIARAZIONE DI GUERRA ALLA VIGILIA DI CAPORETTO (MAGGIO 1915–OTTOBRE 1917). By Luigi Albertini. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1952, 597 p. L. 2000.

In this fourth volume of his memoirs, the late director of the *Corriere della Sera* covers the two critical years from Italy's entry into the First World War to the defeat at Caporetto.

DIARIO (APRILE 1925–MARZO 1945). By Enrico Caviglia. Rome: Casini, 1952, 589 p. L. 1800.

The detailed diary kept by Marshal Caviglia up to his death in 1945; a useful document for Italian history between the wars.

NÉ FRANCO NÉ STALIN. By Gaston Leval. Milan: Istituto Editoriale Italiano, 1952, 323 p. L. 800.

In defense of Spanish anarchism.

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Eastern Europe

PAN-SLAVISM: ITS HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY. By Hans Kohn. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1953, 356 p. $6.25.

This wide-ranging survey is the first scholarly study in English on the history and ideology of Pan-Slavism. While the bulk of the book deals with the origins and development of the movement in the nineteenth century, the last section examines Pan-Slavism in the setting of the two world wars.

THE CHURCH UNDER COMMUNISM. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953, 79 p. $2.75.

This second report of the commission on Communism appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland briefly surveys church life in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China.

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED. By Merle Fainsod. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 575 p. $7.50.

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED. By Walter Kolarz. London: Batchworth, 1953, 175 p. 7/6.

Of these two identically titled books, Professor Fainsod's is far and away the more substantial and scholarly. Seeking to analyze the physiology as well as the anatomy of Soviet totalitarianism, the author briefly traces the development of the system and settles down to a careful examination of the rôle of the Communist Party, the instruments by which the system is ruled and directed, and the tensions produced by such a system. The Kolarz study, intended only as a popular introduction, is based on a series of B.B.C. broadcasts.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 1917–1923. VOLUME III. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 614 p. $6.00.

In the third volume of this major study, which is to serve as a prelude to a history of Soviet Russia, Mr. Carr analyzes the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks from the revolution to 1923. Based, as were the preceding volumes, upon an extraordinary mastery of Soviet sources, it is perhaps the most successful part of the trilogy. With respect to the ultimate question whether Soviet foreign policy was derived from Communist principles or was a by-product of the struggle of the young Soviet state for existence, the author inclines to the latter view, though he provides the reader with abundant evidence pointing toward the primacy of revolutionary ideology.

THE RUSSIANS IN FOCUS. By Harold J. Berman. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1953, 209 p. $3.00.

A brief, popular statement on the various facets of everyday Soviet life.

HANDS ACROSS THE CAVIAR. By Charles W. Thayer. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1952, 251 p. $3.50.

A continuation of Mr. Thayer's anecdotal account of his contacts with Soviet diplomacy, in this case in Southeastern Europe and in Korea in the closing stages of the Second World War.

LÉNINE. By C. J. Gignoux. Paris: Les Iles d'Or (Plon), 1952, 218 p. Fr. 435.

A brief, interpretative and critical study, with special attention to the sinister twists Lenin gave to the Marxist doctrine.

SOVIET IMPERIALISM: ITS ORIGINS AND TACTICS. Edited by Waldemar Gurian. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1953, 166 p. $3.75.

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A symposium of essays—with quite divergent points of view—discussing the question: Who is the enemy—Russian imperialism or Soviet Communism?

DAS RÄTSEL RUSSLAND. By Gerhard Thimm. Stuttgart: Scherz, 1952, 502 p.

A former correspondent in Moscow undertakes to relate the Soviet order to the Russian past. A mist of words, however, keeps settling down to obscure the vision.

SOVIET SCIENCE. Edited by Ruth C. Christman. Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1952, 108 p. $1.25.

A symposium of nine papers on various aspects of Soviet science.

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY. VOLUME III: 1933–1941. Selected and Edited by Jane Degras. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 500 p. $8.50.

The third and last volume of a most useful selection and translation of Soviet documents on foreign policy.

I JOINED THE RUSSIANS. By Heinrich von Einsiedel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 306 p. $4.00.

The diary of a German officer, a great-grandson of Bismarck, who was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1942. He joined the Free Germany Committee, and worked for a time with the Communists in Germany after the war. The German edition was noted here April 1952.

DIE SOZIALISIERUNG IN DER SOWJETISCHEN BESATZUNGSZONE DEUTSCHLANDS ALS RECHTSPROBLEM. By Eckart Krömer. Göttingen: Schwartz, 1952, 184 p.

A monograph, using the Soviet Zone of Germany as a case history, on the basic legal problems involved in the decision to create a socialized economy.

SIIRTOVÄEN SOPEUTUMINEN. By Heikki Waris and Others. Helsinki: Otava, 1953, 400 p. M. 800.

A detailed study of how Finland absorbed nearly 500,000 refugees from Carelia and other territories ceded to the Soviet Union.

ESTONIA: A REFERENCE BOOK. Compiled by Villibald Raud. New York: Nordic Press, 1953, 158 p. $2.50.

A popular reference book about Estonia, with emphasis on her political, economic and cultural achievements in the interwar period. Useful information in chapters dealing with the conditions in Estonia under the Soviet rule and the life of Estonian refugees in the Western World.

HISTOIRE DES DÉMOCRATIES POPULAIRES. By François Fejtö. Paris: Seuil, 1952, 446 p. Fr. 900.

M. Fejtö, writing from the point of view of a moderate Socialist, discusses the course of events in Eastern Europe since 1945. Critical of the present satellite régimes, but not cherishing the past nor approving proposals for forceful liberation, he sees as the only possible solution a new effort at settlement by the Great Powers, a settlement in which Germany would be the central question.

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET SATELLITES. By Peter Meyer and Others. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953, 637 p. $6.50.

Designed as a companion to Solomon M. Schwarz' "The Jews in the Soviet Union" (noted here January 1952), this authoritative study sponsored by the American Jewish Committee comprises lengthy studies by four specialists on the situation

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of the Jews on the eve of, during, and since the Second World War, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The disintegration of the Jewish community life under Communist auspices is a central feature of the work, but it is only the conclusion of an exceedingly painful and disheartening story.

POLAND: WHITE EAGLE ON A RED FIELD. By Samuel L. Sharp. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 338 p. $5.00.

A concise and informative study of the background and present lineaments of the Polish problem. The author's conscious avoidance of sentiment and his cool and somewhat subacid power-political approach to this emotionally charged issue will undoubtedly arouse criticism, but the serious reader will find much to ponder.

LA POLOGNE, D'UNE OCCUPATION A L'AUTRE (1944–1952). By Jean Malara and Lucienne Rey. Paris: Éditions du Fuseau, 1952, 371 p. Fr. 750.

An analysis of the steps by which the Communists achieved power in Poland and remodeled the country in the Soviet image.

RUMANIAN SUMMER. By Jack Lindsay with the Collaboration of Maurice Cornforth. London: Lawrence, 1953, 152 p. 5/.

A pro-Communist view of Rumania in 1952, complete with blinkers.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES ON BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS 1931–1952. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 2 v. $15.00.

A valuable selection of documents and speeches for the period opening with the Statute of Westminster and concluding with the Accession Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth II.

BANKING IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. Edited by R. S. Sayers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 486 p. $7.00.

A collection of articles discussing the banking systems—their recent development and present organization—in the countries of the Commonwealth. Chapters on the colonial empire and the sterling area.

PROBLEMS OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY. Edited by William A. Robson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 390 p. $5.00.

Essays by a number of British authors dealing with the various problems that arise from the nationalization of industry. The editor's conclusion is that the prospect for Britain's nationalized industries is generally favorable, much more favorable than if the industries had remained in private ownership.

THE ATTACK. By R. H. Tawney. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 194 p. $4.50.

A collection of essays, written originally between 1916 and 1950 by one of the great figures in the British Labor movement.

THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF DOUGLAS HAIG, 1914–1919. Edited by Robert Blake. London: Eyre, 1952, 383 p. 25/.

Selections from the wartime private diary and correspondence of the late Field Marshal.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF DAVID, EARL BEATTY. By Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers. London: Hodder, 1951, 488 p. 25/. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, $5.50.)

A substantial biography based largely on the papers of the late Admiral of the Fleet.

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PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN COLONIES. London: Hansard Society, 1953, 154 p. 12/.

A brief but very competent report.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE, 1939–1941. By Paul Hasluck. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952, 644 p. 25/. (New York: Anglobooks, $5.00.)

This first of two volumes dealing with social and political events in Australia during the Second World War covers the period prior to the Japanese entry into the war. A substantial and authoritative account based on official documents.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE WAR. By George Kirk. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 511 p. $10.00.

This is one of the volumes of the "Survey of International Affairs" covering the years of the Second World War. A learned, substantial, but occasionally crabbed review of diplomatic, political and economic events in the Islamic world.

WORLD WITHOUT END. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Day, 1953, 374 p. $5.00.

A popular survey of the multitude of problems besetting the Middle East, knowledgeable but a bit breezy.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION IN ACTION. By H. B. Allen. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953, 204 p. $3.50.

The Director of Education for the Near East Foundation discusses with authority problems and achievements in rural improvement in a number of areas in the Near and Middle East.

THE REBIRTH OF ISRAEL. Edited by Israel Cohen. London: Goldston, 1952, 338 p. 22/6.

Essays on the Zionist movement and the state of Israel by a score of distinguished Jewish contributors, in memory of Paul Goodman.

ARABIAN JUBILEE. By H. StJ. B. Philby. New York: Day, 1953, 280 p. $6.00.

Tableaux of the 50 years of Ibn Sa'ud's reign by a leading British specialist in Arabian affairs and longtime intimate of the King. The concluding chapters deal with Sa'udi Arabia's foreign relations with the Yemen, Jordan and Palestine.

LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN PERSIA. By Ann K. S. Lambton. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1953, 459 p. $9.00.

A scholarly investigation of land tenure and land revenue administration. The first part of the book traces the history of the problem down to the Constitution of 1906, and the second part describes the contemporary situation. It is the author's contention that the problem is essentially political and social and that a profound alteration of the conception of social relations is a prerequisite to any real improvement in conditions.

South and Southeast Asia

NORTH FROM MALAYA. By William O. Douglas. Garden City: Doubleday, 1953, 352 p. $3.95.

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Based on a recent visit to Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Formosa and Korea, Justice Douglas' latest book presents forthright, often controversial judgments on the best way to meet the Communist threat on these Asian fronts. In general he despairs of efforts based on a preservation of the old order; social change is necessary.

NEW WORLD ARISING. By Harry Hopkins. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952, 310 p. 18/.

A British journalist's account of an extended trip through virtually all of Southeastern Asia. Well written and informative.

INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AUGUST 1947–JANUARY 1950. By K. P. Karunakaran. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1953, 407 p. $6.00.

This volume represents the first of a periodic series which has the aim of reviewing India's foreign relations and interpreting her foreign policy. A welcome addition to a growing international family of such surveys.

THE INDIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1952. Edited by Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. Madras: University of Madras, Indian Study Group of International Affairs, 1952, 316 p. Rs. 10.

A most interesting collection of 17 articles on international law and international relations as they appear from the Indian vantage point.

THE STRUGGLE FOR KASHMIR. By Michael Brecher. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 211 p. $5.00.

A dissertation on the Kashmir dispute since 1947.

CASTE IN MODERN CEYLON. By Bryce Ryan. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953, 371 p. $6.00.

A sociological inquiry, based on a good deal of field work, into the Sinhalese caste system and its changes in the twentieth century.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE CHINA TANGLE. By Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 445 p. $6.00.

Having traced, in "The Road to Pearl Harbor," the background of the war between Japan and the United States, Mr. Feis now deals in this excellent study with the American effort in China from 1941 to the Marshall Mission. This difficult and intensely controversial topic is treated with scholarly care and emotional restraint but also with an eye to the inconsistencies and misjudgments in American policy. It is as the author says "a tale of crumpled hopes and plans that went awry."

THE GREAT PEACE. By Raja Hutheesing. New York: Harper, 1953, 246 p. $3.50.

A Bombay journalist, brother-in-law of Prime Minister Nehru, reports on two visits to China in 1951 and 1952. Critical of much that he saw, especially of the political system, he considers that even the land reform—for which he has some praise—will probably prove abortive.

OUT OF RED CHINA. By Liu Shaw-tong. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1953, 269 p. $4.00.

The story of a young Chinese intellectual who worked for a year in 1949–50 with

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the propaganda department of the Chinese Communist régime, and then escaped to Hong Kong. Less illuminating than it might have been.

GOD'S UNDERGROUND IN ASIA. By Gretta Palmer. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, 376 p. $3.75.

A report on the vicissitudes of the Catholic Church in Communist China and the quiet resistance offered to the new régime.

TIBET AND THE TIBETANS. By Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Liu. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953, 199 p. $5.00.

Observations on the life and political organization of pre-Communist Tibet by two Chinese scholars, one of whom was Nationalist China's Resident Commissioner at Lhasa.

JAPAN'S NATURAL RESOURCES AND THEIR RELATION TO JAPAN'S ECONOMIC FUTURE. By Edward A. Ackerman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 655 p. $25.00.

In this revision of a work originally done for the Natural Resources Section of SCAP, Professor Ackerman analyzes Japan's position in regard to food supply, energy sources, and raw materials, and makes suggestions for integrated resource management. Illustrated with many excellent photographs, maps and graphs.

JAPAN FROM SURRENDER TO PEACE. By Baron E. J. Lewe Van Aduard. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1953, 351 p. Guilders 19.

An interesting analysis of Japan under the occupation by the former Deputy Chief of the Netherlands Mission to that country. Foreword by Secretary of State Dulles.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY MOVEMENT IN PREWAR JAPAN. By Robert A. Scalapino. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, 471 p. $6.50.

A thoughtful examination of Japan's social structure and modern political development, "in an effort to discern the most basic handicaps facing democracy in late-developing societies." The author makes extensive use of the best recent work by Japanese political scientists.

MISSION TO KOREA. By Edgar S. Kennedy. London: Verschoyle, 1952, 181 p. 16/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.50.)

An informative and well-written book about Korea and the Korean people by an English member of the International Refugee Organization.

BORN OF THE PEOPLE. By Luis Taruc. New York: International Publishers, 1953, 286 p. $3.00.

The autobiography of the Communist commander of the Hukbalahap in the Philippines.

Africa

ECONOMIA SOCIAL DE MARRUECOS. VOLUME II. By Tomas Garcia Figueras and Rafael de Roda Jimenez. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1952, 520 p. Ptas. 110.

The second volume of this broad survey deals primarily with agriculture and social groups in Spanish Morocco. (The first volume was noted here April 1952.)

L'ISLAM DANS L'AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE. By Alphonse Gouilly. Paris: Larose, 1952, 318 p. Fr. 950.

A study of the penetration of Islam into French West Africa—its history, its effects on the indigenous society, and its relevance to French policy.

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CON AMEDEO D'AOSTA IN AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA IN PACE E IN GUERRA. By Alfio Berretta. Milan: Ceschina, 1952, 546 p. L. 2000.

In praise of the achievements of the Duca d'Aosta, Viceroy of what was Italian East Africa. The text was ready for publication in 1939; the delay was for reasons well beyond the author's control.

THE GOLD COAST REVOLUTION. By George Padmore. London: Dobson, 1953, 272 p. 12/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

A vehemently anti-colonial survey of Gold Coast nationalism.

MAU MAU AND THE KIKUYU. By L. S. B. Leakey. London: Methuen, 1952, 114 p. 7/6.

A most valuable little study of the problems and frustrations of the Kikuyu people in Kenya, about whom the author probably knows more than any living white man. A son of missionaries, he was born and brought up among the Kikuyu tribe.

THE DILEMMA OF SOUTH AFRICA. By John Hatch. New York: Roy, 1952, 255 p. $4.00.

A discussion of the social question in South Africa, based largely on extensive travel and personal experiences in 1950 and 1951.

NATAL REGIONAL SURVEY. VOLUME II: THE POPULATION OF NATAL. By M. H. Alsop. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 144 p. $6.50.

An analysis of Natal's population structure; one of a series of studies which are to survey the economic and social structure of the province.

Latin America and the West Indies

MAKING OF THE MEXICAN MIND. By Patrick Romanell. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1952, 213 p. $3.75.

A somewhat more specialized work than the title might indicate, this book traces the major currents of philosophic thought in Mexico, especially in the years since 1910. Useful bibliography.

PANORAMA SOCIOLOGIQUE DU BRÉSIL. By A. Carneiro Leão. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 152 p. Fr. 600.

A survey of the study of sociology in Brazil and some of its areas of application. The author is dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Brazil.

CHILEAN SCRAP-BOOK. By Stephen Clissold. New York: Praeger, 1952, 315 p. $4.75.

Mr. Clissold, the author of an important study of Marshal Tito, here reports on three years spent in Chile. In the form of a travelogue, it also contains an intelligent discussion of the social and economic difficulties and dislocations in that country.

THE IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAM OF THE PERUVIAN APRISTA MOVEMENT. By Harry Kantor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, 163 p. $3.00.

A history, generally favorable, of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, intended for all Latin America, though of greatest political importance in Peru.

SINOPSIS DEL DERECHO TERRITORIAL ECUATORIANO. By Teodoro Alvarado Garaicoa. Guayaquil: Cervantes, 1952, 396 p.

A historical survey largely in support of certain of Ecuador's territorial claims against her neighbors.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

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Africa

Energy in overseas territories in Africa south of the Sahara and in Surinam. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1953. 45 p. 200 fr.

Some aspects of the development of Kenya government services for the benefit of Africans from 1946 onwards. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1953. 24 p. 1s.

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Commercial Policy and Trade

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Trade agreements extension act of 1953. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 4294, Apr. 27–May 19, 1953. Washington, 1953. 2028 p.

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——. Report, Committee on Finance, Senate, Je. 26, 1953. Washington, 1953. 7 p. (S. Rept. 472.)

——. Report, Committee of Conference, House, Aug. 1, 1953. Washington, 1953. 6 p. (H. Rept. 1089.)

——. Statements on H. R. 5495 submitted to the Committee on Finance, June, 1953. Washington, 1953. 600 p.

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PRIVATE and public investment in Canada, 1926–1951. Ottawa, Cloutier, 1951. 254 p. $2.00.

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